Knowledge that Transforms

This study evaluates the effectiveness of geographic diversification in reducing housing investment risk. To characterize diversification potential, we estimate spatial correlation and integration among 401 U.S. metropolitan housing markets. The 2000s boom brought a marked uptrend in housing market integration associated with eased residential lending standards and rapid growth in private mortgage securitization. As boom turned to bust, other macroeconomic factors, including employment and income fundamentals, importantly contributed to the trending up in housing return integration. Portfolio simulations reveal substantially lower diversification potential and higher risk in the wake of increased market integration.

We develop an optimal tax-timing model that takes into account asymmetric long-term and short-term tax rates for positive capital gains and limited tax deductibility of capital losses. In contrast to the existing literature, this model can help explain why many investors not only defer short-term capital losses to long term but also defer large long-term capital gains and losses. Because the benefit of tax deductibility of capital losses increases with the short-term tax rates, effective tax rates can decrease as short-term capital gains tax rates increase.

This paper studies the dual role of risk managers and loan officers in a bank's organizational structure. Using 75,000 retail mortgage applications, I analyze the effect of risk-management involvement on loan default rates. The bank requires risk-management approval for loans that are considered risky based on hard information, using a sharp threshold that changes during the sample period. Using a regression discontinuity design and a difference-indifferences estimator, I am able to show that risk-management involvement reduces loan default rates by more than 50%. My findings suggest that a two-agent model can help to facilitate efficient screening decisions.

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry in which agents learn about the likelihood of negative shocks. Managers can exert risk prevention effort to mitigate the consequences of shocks. If no shock occurs, confidence improves, attracting managers to the innovative sector. But, when confidence becomes high, inefficient managers exerting low risk-prevention effort also enter. This stimulates growth, while reducing risk prevention. The longer the boom, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. Although these dynamics arise in the first-best, asymmetric information generates excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents, inflating the innovative sector, and increasing its vulnerability.

An empirical q-factor model consisting of the market factor, a size factor, an investment factor, and a profitability factor largely summarizes the cross section of average stock returns. A comprehensive examination of nearly 80 anomalies reveals that about one-half of the anomalies are insignificant in the broad cross section. More importantly, with a few exceptions, the q-factor model's performance is at least comparable to, and in many cases better than that of the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model in capturing the remaining significant anomalies.

Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this "contagion" channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion premium. We provide empirical evidence that indicates credit-event risk premia are less than 1 bp, but contagion risk premia are significant.

Analysts follow disproportionally firms whose fundamentals correlate more with those of their industry peers. This coverage pattern supports models of profit-maximizing information intermediaries producing preferentially information valuable in pricing more stocks. We designate highly followed firms whose fundamentals best predict those of peer firms as bellwether firms. When analysts revise a bellwether firm's earning forecast, it changes the prices of other firms significantly; however, revisions for firms that are less intensely followed do not change the prices of heavily followed firms. Unidirectional information spillovers explain how the more accurately priced stocks might exhibit more comovement.

We study risk premium in U.S. Treasury bonds. We decompose Treasury yields into inflation expectations and maturity-specific interest-rate cycles, which we define as variation in yields orthogonal to expected inflation. The short-maturity cycle captures the real short-rate dynamics. Jointly with expected inflation, it comprises the expectations hypothesis (EH) term in the yield curve. Controlling for the EH term, we extract a measure of risk-premium variation from yields. The risk-premium factor forecasts excess bond returns in and out of sample and subsumes the common bond return predictor obtained as a linear combination of forward rates.

Using investor-level data, I document that the disposition effect is absent following a stock split; inattentive investors may fail to split-adjust their reference point, confusing the winner versus loser status of their holdings. Consistent with the disposition effect impeding the incorporation of news, ex-date returns are significantly higher for split stocks with higher gains. However, the magnitude is small relative to momentum, and momentum remains robustly present among this sample of stocks void of the disposition effect. The results suggest that the disposition effect may slow the incorporation of news, but not to the extent that it alone explains momentum.

We provide a model of nonredundant credit default swaps (CDSs), building on the observation that CDSs have lower trading costs than bonds. CDS introduction involves a trade-off: it crowds out existing demand for the bond, but improves the bond allocation by allowing long-term investors to become levered basis traders and absorb more of the bond supply. We characterize conditions under which CDS introduction raises bond prices. The model predicts a negative CDS-bond basis, as well as turnover and price impact patterns that are consistent with empirical evidence. We also show that a ban on naked CDSs can raise borrowing costs.