[There is a strong inverse relation between insider trading and institutional demand the same quarter and over the previous year. Our analysis suggests a combination of factors contribute to this relation. First, institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to trade. Second, insiders are more likely to buy low valuation and low lag return stocks while institutions are attracted to the opposite security characteristics.Last, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are more likely to view their securities as overvalued (undervalued) following a period when institutions were net buyers (sellers).]

[We show that, when stock prices are subject to stochastic mispricing errors, expected rates of return may depend not only on the fundamental risk that is captured by a standard asset pricing model, but also on the type and degree of asset mispricing, even when the mispricing is zero on average. Empirically, the mispricing induced return premium, either estimated using a Kaiman filter or proxied by the volatility and variance ratio of residual returns, is shown to be significantly associated with realized risk-adjusted returns.]

Substantial academic research explains why firms should hedge, but little work has addressed how firms should hedge. We assume that firms can experience costly states of nature and derive optimal hedging strategies using vanilla derivatives (e.g., forwards and options) and custom "exotic" derivative contracts for a value-maximizing firm facing both hedgable (price) and unhedgable (quantity) risks. Customized exotic derivatives are typically better than vanilla contracts when correlations between prices and quantities are large in magnitude and when quantity risks are substantially greater than price risks. Finally, we discuss how our model may be applied in practice.

[This study examines the impact of competition on bid-ask spreads in the spot foreign exchange market. We measure competition primarily by the number of dealers active in the market and find that bid-ask spreads decrease with an increase in competition, even after controlling for the effects of volatility. The expected level of competition is time varying, highly predictable, and displays a strong seasonal component that in part is induced by geographic concentration of business activity over the 24-hour trading day. Our estimates show that the expected addition of one more competing dealer lowers the average quoted spread by 1.7%.]

This article analyzes intraday patterns for U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks. For each market, the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar, non-cross-listed stocks. There is a 2-hour period each day when cross-listed stocks are traded both in New York and in London. This overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information, originating in New York, gets incorporated into prices in both markets. Cross-border competition for orderflow tends to reduce already declining spreads in London. By contrast, New York specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap. Overall, the evidence indicates that order flow for cross-listed securities is segmented.

[This article analyzes intraday patterns for U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks. For each market, the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar, non-cross-listed stocks. There is a 2-hour period each day when cross-listed stocks are traded both in New York and in London. This overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information, originating in New York, gets incorporated into prices in both markets. Cross-border competition for orderflow tends to reduce already declining spreads in London. By contrast, New York specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap. Overall, the evidence indicates that order flow for cross-listed securities is segmented.]

[Tests of financial asset pricing models may yield misleading inferences when properties of the data are used to construct the test statistics. In particular, such tests are often based on returns to portfolios of common stock, where portfolios are constructed by sorting on some empirically motivated characteristic of the securities such as market value of equity. Analytical calculations, Monte Carlo simulations, and two empirical examples show that the effects of this type of data snooping can be substantial.]

[If returns on some stocks systematically lead or lag those of others, a portfolio strategy that sells "winners" and buys "losers" can produce positive expected returns, even if no stock's returns are negatively autocorrelated as virtually all models of overreaction imply. Using a particular contrarian strategy we show that, despite negative autocorrelation in individual stock returns, weekly portfolio returns are strongly positively autocorrelated and are the result of important cross-autocorrelations. We find that the returns of large stocks lead those of smaller stocks, and we present evidence against overreaction as the only source of contrarian profits.]

[In this article we test the random walk hypothesis for weekly stock market returns by comparing variance estimators derived from data sampled at different frequencies. The random walk model is strongly rejected for the entire sample period (1962-1985) and for all subperiods for a variety of aggregate returns indexes and size-sorted portfolios. Although the rejections are due largely to the behavior of small stocks, they cannot be attributed completely to the effects of infrequent trading or time-varying volatilities. Moreover, the rejection of the random walk for weekly returns does not support a mean-reverting model of asset prices.]

I examine the effect of house price declines on voter participation using a novel person-level panel data set. Contrary to what the “angry voter hypothesis” predicts, I find that a 10% decline in local house prices decreases the participation rate of the average mortgaged homeowner by 1.6 percentage points. Consistent with a financial distress channel, house price declines have no effects on renters and particularly severe effects on highly leveraged households. My findings are consistent with the existence of a feedback loop between financial distress and inequality operating through voter participation.