Knowledge that Transforms

This paper provides evidence on the incidence, characteristics, and performance of activist engagements across countries. We find that the incidence of activism is greatest with high institutional ownership, particularly for U.S. institutions. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements across 23 countries and find that almost one-quarter of engagements are by multi-activists engaging the same target. These engagements perform strikingly better than single activist engagements. Engagement outcomes, such as board changes and takeovers, vary across countries and significantly contribute to the returns to activism. Japan is an exception, with high initial expectations and low outcomes.

I develop a simple competitive equilibrium model and derive the prediction that CEO pay-size elasticity increases when more firms compete for an inelastic supply of managers. Using industry-level IPO waves as a proxy for increased competition for CEOs, I find that pay-size elasticity increases by 6% with a one-standard-deviation increase in IPO activity. This effect is stronger in specialized industries. In addition, increased IPO activity leads to a greater likelihood of executive transitions between firms. These findings indicate that market forces play a key role in the determination of CEO pay. Received August 6, 2015; editorial decision September 24, 2016 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

We propose an amplification mechanism of financial crises based on the information choices of investors. Information acquisition makes investors more likely to act against their prior. Deteriorating public news under an initially strong (weak) prior increases (reduces) the value of private information and induces more (less) information acquisition. Deteriorating public news increases the probability of a crisis, since the initially strong (weak) prior induces no attacks (attacks). This effect is amplified with endogenous information choices. To enhance financial stability, a policy maker affects information acquisition via taxes and subsidies. We derive and discuss testable implications for the magnitude of amplification. Received November 3, 2015; editorial decision July 22, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Mortgages are long-term loans with nominal payments. Consequently, under incomplete asset markets, monetary policy can affect housing investment and the economy through the cost of new mortgage borrowing and real payments on outstanding debt. These channels, distinct from traditional real rate channels, are embedded in a general equilibrium model. The transmission mechanism is found to be stronger under adjustable-than fixed-rate mortgages. Further, monetary policy shocks affecting the level of the nominal yield curve have larger real effects than transitory shocks, affecting its slope. Persistently higher inflation gradually benefits homeowners under FRMs, but hurts them immediately under ARMs.

I propose a consumption-based asset pricing model with disappointment aversion to investigate the link between downside consumption risk and expected returns across asset markets. I find that the disappointment model can explain 95% of the cross-sectional variation in size/book-to-market portfolios and more than 80% of the variation in the joint sample of stocks, bonds, and commodity futures. I also show that the performance of the disappointment model is comparable to that of the Fama-French three-factor specification, regardless of the sample frequency (annual, quarterly). Overall, my results indicate that disappointment aversion considerably improves the fit of consumption-based asset pricing models.Received November 27, 2014; editorial decision September 18, 2016 by Editor Stefan Nagel.

We investigate the impact of increasing bank concentration on bank loan contracts in a lightly regulated environment that allows us to abstract from possible confounding effects of regulation and focus on the “pure” effects of competition on bank lending. We study over 30,000 British bank loans over the period 1885 to 1925. Borrowers in counties with high bank concentration received smaller loans and posted more collateral than borrowers in other counties. In high concentration counties, the quality of loan applicants improved, suggesting that banks restricted credit, not that the quality of loan applicants had worsened. Received February 4, 2016; editorial decision December 20, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We test the trade finance channel of exports by controlling for the bank credit channel. Using Turkey’s July 2012 adoption of Basel II as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine whether shocks to trade financing costs affect exports. With data for 16,662 Turkish exporters shipping 2,888 different products to 158 countries, we find that the share of letters-of-credit-based exports decreases (increases) when the associated risk weights for counterparty exposure increase (decrease) after the adoption of Basel II. However, growth of firm-product-country-level exports remains unaffected. Trade financing might have a lesser role in exports than previously suggested by the previous literature. Received October 26, 2014; editorial decision March 15, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

Loan modification is widely discussed as an alternative to foreclosure, but little research has focused on quantifying its effect on loan performance. I quantify this effect early in the housing crisis by exploiting exogenous variation in the incentives to modify securitized nonagency loans. An additional modification reduces loan losses by 35.8% relative to the average loss; this reduction suggests that the marginal benefit of modification likely exceeded the marginal cost. Consistent with the idea that high-income borrowers may be better equipped to withstand bad economic times, I find that modifications are especially beneficial when borrowers have larger loans. Received April 25, 2016; editorial decision March 24, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We study the design and incentive effects of contingent convertible debt. With contingent convertibles, the endogenous bankruptcy boundary can be at either of two levels: one with lower default risk or one at which default precedes conversion. An increase in debt moves the firm from the first regime to the second, a phenomenon we call debt-induced collapse. Setting the conversion trigger sufficiently high avoids this hazard. Given this condition, we investigate the effect of contingent capital and debt maturity on optimal capital structure, debt overhang, and asset substitution. We calibrate the model to large banks during the financial crisis. Received April 10, 2015; editorial decision March 20, 2017 by Editor Leonid Kogan.

A standard real business-cycle model with external habit and capital adjustment costs matches a long list of asset price and business-cycle moments: equity, firm value, and risk-free rate volatility; the equity premium; excess return predictability; consumption growth predictability; basic moments of consumption, output, and investment; among others. The model also generates endogenous consumption volatility risk. Precautionary savings motives make consumption sensitive to shocks in bad times, leading to countercyclical volatility, even with homoscedastic technology shocks. Habit acts as countercyclical leverage, which amplifies this channel. Habit also implies high risk aversion, which amplifies the stock price response. Received April 21, 2016; editorial decision February 3, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.