Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Using over 5,000 trades unequivocally based on nonpublic information about firm fundamentals, we find that asymmetric information proxies display abnormal values on days with informed trading. Volatility and volume are abnormally high, whereas illiquidity is low, in equity and option markets. Daily returns reflect the sign of private signals, but bid-ask spreads are lower when informed investors trade. Market makers’ learning under event uncertainty and limit orders help explain these findings. The cross-section of information duration indicates that traders select days with high uninformed volume. Evidence from the U.S. SEC Whistleblower Reward Program and the FINRA involvement addresses selection concerns. Received January 11, 2017; editorial decision December 17, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We use computational linguistics to develop a dynamic, interpretable methodology that can detect emerging risks in the financial sector. Our model can predict heightened risk exposures as early as mid-2005, well in advance of the 2008 financial crisis. Risks related to real estate, prepayment, and commercial paper are elevated. Individual bank exposure strongly predicts returns, bank failures, and return volatility. We also document a rise in market instability since 2014 related to sources of funding and mergers and acquisitions. Overall, our model predicts the buildup of emerging risk in the financial system and bank-specific exposures in a timely fashion. Received March 1, 2018; editorial decision November 18, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Abstract We study a widespread yet under-explored corporate governance phenomenon: the pledging of company stock by insiders as collateral for personal bank loans. Utilizing a regulatory change that exogenously decreases pledging, we document a negative causal impact of pledging on shareholder wealth. We study two channels that could explain this effect. First, we find that margin calls triggered by severe price falls exacerbate the crash risk of pledging firms. Second, since margin calls may cause insiders to suffer personal liquidity shocks or to forgo private benefits of control, we hypothesize and find that pledging is associated with reduced firm risk-taking. Received March 2, 2017; editorial decision January 24, 2019 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract This paper studies how financial inclusion affects wealth accumulation. Exploiting the U.S. interstate branching deregulation between 1994 and 2005, we find that an exogenous expansion of bank branches increases low-income household financial inclusion. We then show that financial inclusion fosters household wealth accumulation. Relative to their unbanked counterparts, banked households accumulate assets in interest-bearing accounts, invest more in durable assets, such as vehicles, have a better access to debt, and have a lower probability of facing financial strain. The results suggest that promoting financial inclusion for low-income populations can improve household wealth accumulation and financial security. Received April 13, 2017; editorial decision November 14, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We show that negative policy rates affect the supply of bank credit in a novel way. Banks are reluctant to pass on negative rates to depositors, which increases the funding cost of high-deposit banks, and reduces their net worth, relative to low-deposit banks. As a consequence, the introduction of negative policy rates by the European Central Bank in mid-2014 leads to more risk-taking and less lending by euro-area banks with a greater reliance on deposit funding. Our results suggest that negative rates are less accommodative and could pose a risk to financial stability, if lending is done by high-deposit banks. Received April 17, 2018; editorial decision September 18, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Firms significantly reduce their investment in response to nonfundamental drops in the stock price of their product-market peers. We argue that this results stems from managers’ limited ability to filter out the noise in the stock prices when using them as signals about their investment opportunities. Ensuing losses of capital investment and shareholders’ wealth are economically large and even affect firms not facing severe financing constraints or agency problems. Our findings offer a novel perspective on how stock market inefficiencies can affect the real economy, even in the absence of financing or agency frictions.Received December 14, 2016; editorial decision July 30, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

[Portfolio diversification of firms’ controlling owners influences their firms’ capital investment. Empirically, the effect of owners’ portfolio diversification on their firms’ investment levels is positive for publicly traded firms and tends to be negative for privately held ones. These findings are consistent with predictions of a model in which a risk-averse investor simultaneously chooses her portfolio structure, and both the level and riskiness of capital investment of the firm she controls, and in which the firm can be potentially constrained in its capital investment choices. Overall, our results indicate that owners’ portfolio underdiversification and firms’ financial constraints can affect firms’ resource allocation.]

We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but faces implementation constraints. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is preassigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution, the operational structures, risks, and incentives of global banks.

We model the interaction of financial constraints, capacity constraints, and the response of production and inventory to cost and demand shocks. The model predicts that in response to favorable shocks, financially constrained firms are unable to build inventory as rapidly as are unconstrained firms. However, because the favorable shocks gradually ease the financial constraints, constrained firms continue to build inventory and eventually carry surplus inventory (relative to unconstrained firms) to unfavorable states. This allows them to deplete inventory more aggressively in response to unfavorable shocks. Our empirical evidence provides broad support for the model’s predictions.Received September 3, 2016; editorial decision January 11, 2018 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data from 64 countries during the period 2005–2014, we find that cross-border M&A activity is associated with subsequent improvements in the governance of nontarget firms when the acquirer country has stronger investor protection than the target country. The effect is more pronounced when the target industry is more competitive. Cross-border M&As are also associated with increases in investment and valuation of nontarget firms. Alternative explanations, such as access to global financial markets and cultural similarities, do not appear to explain our findings. Received October 27, 2015; editorial decision March 25, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.