We examine how banks use loan sales to manage liquidity during periods of marketwide stress and the associated spillovers to market prices. We track the dynamics of loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from a U.S. supervisory register of syndicated loans. Controlling for loan quality using loan-year fixed effects, we find that banks reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to exit syndicates through sales during 2007/08. This effect is stronger for banks dependent on short-term funding and holding fewer liquid securities. In addition, secondary market prices decrease significantly more for loans funded by liquidity-strained banks. Received November 16, 2015; editorial decision January 9, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

A five-factor model that adds profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) suggests a shared story for several average-return anomalies. Specifically, positive exposures to RMW and CMA (stock returns that behave like those of profitable firms that invest conservatively) capture the high average returns associated with low market β, share repurchases, and low stock return volatility. Conversely, negative RMW and CMA slopes (like those of relatively unprofitable firms that invest aggressively) help explain the low average stock returns associated with high β, large share issues, and highly volatile returns.

[We collect detailed qualitative information from financial filings to categorize financial constraints for a random sample of firms from 1995 to 2004. Using this categorization, we estimate ordered logit models predicting constraints as a function of different quantitative factors. Our findings cast serious doubt on the validity of the KZ index as a measure of financial constraints, while offering mixed evidence on the validity of other common measures of constraints. We find that firm size and age are particularly useful predictors of financial constraint levels, and we propose a measure of financial constraints that is based solely on these firm characteristics.]

[We use daily short-selling data to examine whether short selling around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) reflects informed or manipulative trading. Around SEO announcements, we find no evidence of informed short selling. Around issue dates, higher levels of preissue short selling are significantly related to larger issue discounts for non-shelf-registered offerings. This evidence is consistent with manipulative trading. We show that SEC Rule 105 constrains some but not all manipulative trading. Our results reverse previous research that uses monthly short-interest data, because daily data allow more powerful tests. Our evidence helps explain the increased popularity of shelf registrations. Although short selling usually enhances price efficiency, we document a situation where short selling reduces price efficiency.]

[Theory suggests that greater hierarchical distance between a subordinate and his boss makes it more difficult to share abstract and subjective information in decision making. A novel dataset put together from credit dossiers of large corporate loan applicants enables us to observe the information collected by loan officers, and how it is used by the ultimate loan approving officer. We find that greater hierarchical/geographical distance between the information collecting agent and the loan approving officer leads to less reliance on subjective information and more on objective information. By exploiting nonlinearities in the "assignment rules" that determine an applicant's hierarchical distance, and using information collecting agent fixed effects, we show that our result cannot be driven by endogenous assignment of applicants. We also find that higher frequency of interactions between the information collecting agent and loan approving officer, both over time and through geographical proximity, helps mitigate the effects of hierarchical distance on information use. Our results show that hierarchical distance influences information use, and highlights the importance of "human touch" in communication.]

We present a detailed view of market quality in the presence of preferencing arrangements. A unique dataset provides the opportunity to measure trading costs of marketable orders and fill rates and ex post costs of limit orders across trading venues. For market orders, we find the primary exchange provides the lowest execution costs. However, the preferencing exchanges are no worse than, and in most cases better than, the nonpreferencing regional exchanges. For limit orders, the regionals execute limit orders more frequently than the primary market and with an ex post execution cost that is not very different from the primary market.

Confirming predictions shared by the trade-off and pecking order models, more profitable firms and firms with fewer investments have higher dividend payouts. Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the trade-off model, more profitable firms are less levered. Firms with more investments have less market leverage, which is consistent with the trade-off model and a complex pecking order model. Firms with more investments have lower long-term dividend payouts, but dividends do not vary to accommodate short-term variation in investment. As the pecking order model predicts, short-term variation in investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt.

Journal Article Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt Get access Eugene F. Fama, Eugene F. Fama University of Chicago Address correspondence to Eugene F. Fama, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th St., Chicago, IL 60637, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Kenneth R. French Kenneth R. French Dartmouth College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 15, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.1.1 Published: 16 June 2015

Journal Article Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence Get access Robert Forsythe, Robert Forsythe University of Iowa Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Russell Lundholm, Russell Lundholm University of Michigan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Thomas Rietz Thomas Rietz University of Iowa Address correspondence and reprints requests to Thomas Rietz, Department of Finance, College of Business Administration, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 12, Issue 3, July 1999, Pages 481–518, https://doi.org/10.1093/revfin/12.3.0481 Published: 01 June 2015

This article compares the predictions of finite-shareholder models of conditional and unconditional takeover offers with the outcomes of laboratory experiments. In addition to differentiating between types of offers, the experimental designs span small and large firms as well as different levels of offer premiums. It is found that in unconditional offers to large groups of subjects (28–40), the symmetric Nash equilibrium predicts observed tendering frequencies quite accurately. For other experimental designs, the results are mixed. The analysis of shareholder tendering strategies from the experiment yields insights into (i) the effects of takeover offer designs, (ii) the appropriateness of finite-shareholder models for research, and (iii) the costs of free riding when shareholders are nonatomistic.