Knowledge that Transforms

We argue that internal capital market imperatives of business groups i.e., reallocation of capital across group firms, influences an affiliated firm's dividend policy. Intuition is developed in a model in which business group insiders distribute dividends from cash-rich firms and use their share of payout to invest in other affiliated firms. Employing multi-country panel-data, we find support for this channel: Dividends by a group firm are positively related with equity-financed investments by its affiliated firms. Results are corroborated by exploiting variation in a firm's investment opportunity generated by changes in import tariff policy: a shock to investment opportunity of an affiliated firm is propagated to dividend policies of other firms in its group.

We develop a novel methodology to infer the amount of capital allocated to quantitative equity arbitrage strategies. Using this methodology, which exploits time-variation in the cross-section of short interest, we document that the amount of capital devoted to value and momentum strategies has grown significantly since the late 1980s. We provide evidence that this increase in capital has resulted in lower strategy returns. However, consistent with theories of limited arbitrage, we show that strategy-level capital flows are influenced by past strategy returns and strategy return volatility and that arbitrage capital is most limited during times when strategies perform best. This suggests that the growth of arbitrage capital may not completely eliminate returns to these strategies.

The increasingly large role played by financial intermediaries, such as venture capitalists and angels, in nurturing entrepreneurial firms and in promoting product market innovation has led to great research interest in the area of entrepreneurial finance and innovation. This paper introduces the special issue of the Review of Financial Studies dedicated to entrepreneurial finance and innovation and highlights some of the promising topics for future research in this area. The special issue combines papers presented at the June 2010 “Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation (EFIC)” conference, which was jointly sponsored by the Kauffman Foundation and the Review of Financial Studies, with other related papers.

This paper develops a dynamic rational expectations model of the credit rating process, incorporating three critical elements of this industry: (1) the rating agencies' ability to misreport the issuer's credit quality, (2) their ability to issue unsolicited ratings, and (3) their reputational concerns. We analyze the incentives of credit rating agencies to issue unsolicited credit ratings and the effects of this practice on the agencies' rating strategies. We find that issuance of unfavorable unsolicited credit ratings enables rating agencies to extract higher fees from issuers by credibly threatening to punish those that refuse to acquire a rating. Also, issuing unfavorable unsolicited ratings increases the rating agencies' reputation by demonstrating to investors that they resist the temptation to issue inflated ratings. In equilibrium, unsolicited credit ratings are lower than solicited ratings, because all favorable ratings are solicited; however, they do not have a downward bias. We show that, under certain conditions, a credit rating system that incorporates unsolicited ratings leads to more stringent rating standards.

Both risk management and payout decisions affect a firm's financial flexibility—the ability to avoid costly financial distress as well as underinvestment. We provide evidence of substitution between hedging and payout decisions using samples of both financial and nonfinancial firms. We find that a more flexible distribution, favoring repurchases over dividends, is negatively related to financial hedging within a firm, consistent with financial flexibility in payout decisions and hedging being substitutes. Our findings, which are robust to controlling for the endogeneity of hedging and payout choices, suggest that payout flexibility offers operational hedging benefits.

We find that the stock market underreacts to stock-level liquidity shocks: liquidity shocks are not only positively associated with contemporaneous returns, but they also predict future return continuations for up to six months. Long-short portfolios sorted on liquidity shocks generate significant returns of 0.70% to 1.20% per month that are robust across alternative shock measures and after controlling for risk factors and stock characteristics. Furthermore, we show that investor inattention and illiquidity contribute to the underreaction: while both are significant in explaining short-term return predictability of liquidity shocks, the inattention-based mechanism is more powerful for the longer-term return predictability.

Can concern with relative standing, which has been shown to influence consumption and labor supply, also increase borrowing and the likelihood of financial distress? We find that perceived peer income contributes to debt and the likelihood of financial distress among those who consider themselves poorer than their peers. We use unique responses describing perceived peer characteristics from a Dutch population-wide survey to handle two major challenges of uncovering social interaction effects on borrowing: (1) debts, unlike conspicuous consumption, are often hidden from peers and (1) location is missing in anonymized data. We employ several approaches to uncover exogenous, rather than correlated, effects.

We argue and demonstrate that resource allocation within firms' internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing financial market dislocation. We estimate a structural model of internal capital markets to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision and illustrate how these forces interact with external capital market stress. The weaker (stronger) division obtains too much (little) capital, as though it is 12% (9%) more (less) productive than it really is. Out-of-sample simulated data are consistent with the actual data showing that internal capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16%–30%.

We document frictions in money market mutual fund lending that lead to the transmission of distress across borrowers. Using novel security-level holdings data, we show that funds exposed to Eurozone banks suffered large outflows in mid-2011. These outflows had significant spillovers: non-European issuers relying on such funds raised less short-term debt financing. Issuer characteristics do not explain the results: holding fixed the issuer, funds with higher Eurozone exposure cut lending more. Due to credit market frictions, funds with low Eurozone exposure provided substitute financing only to issuers they had pre-existing relationships with, even though issuers are large, highly rated firms.

Why don’t VCs eliminate excess demand for follow-on funds by raising fees? We propose a model of learning that leads to informational holdup. Current investors learn about skill whereas outside investors observe only returns. This gives current investors holdup power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, no-one will fund him, as outside investors interpret the lack of backing as a sign of low skill. Holdup power diminishes the VC’s ability to increase fees in line with performance, leading to return persistence. Empirical evidence supports the model. We estimate that up to two-thirds of VC firms lack skill.