Knowledge that Transforms

This paper shows that during industry downturns, firms experience significantly greater valuation losses when their industry peers' long-term debt is maturing at the time of the shocks. Across a range of tests, the analysis addresses the endogenous determination of peer debt-maturity structure. Overall, the evidence suggests that the negative externalities financially constrained firms impose on their industry peers can significantly amplify the effects of industry downturns. The evidence also provides support for the view that these amplification effects are driven by the adverse effect that financially constrained firms have on the balance sheets of their industry peers.

We estimate a dynamic model of the decision to close a troubled bank. Regulators trade off an aversion to closing banks against the risk that allowing a bank to continue will raise the eventual costs to the deposit insurance fund. Using a conditional choice probability approach, we estimate the costs associated with closing banks, both in direct costs to the insurance fund and in other costs perceived by regulators, either social or personal. We find that delayed closures were driven by a desire to defer costs, an aversion to closing the largest and smallest troubled banks, and political influence.

This paper studies the dual role of risk managers and loan officers in a bank's organizational structure. Using 75,000 retail mortgage applications, I analyze the effect of risk-management involvement on loan default rates. The bank requires risk-management approval for loans that are considered risky based on hard information, using a sharp threshold that changes during the sample period. Using a regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-differences estimator, I am able to show that risk-management involvement reduces loan default rates by more than 50%. My findings suggest that a two-agent model can help to facilitate efficient screening decisions.

A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital, and banks, which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the regulator's cost of injecting capital is private information, it manages expectations by using costly signals: (1) a regulator with a low cost of injecting capital may forbear on bad banks to signal toughness and reduce risk taking, and (2) a regulator with a high cost of injecting capital may bail out bad banks to increase confidence and prevent runs.

This study investigates the asset pricing implications of a newly documented refinement of the disposition effect, characterized by investors being more likely to sell a security when the magnitude of their gains or losses on it increases. I find that stocks with both large unrealized gains and large unrealized losses outperform others in the following month (trading strategy monthly alpha = 0.5–1%, Sharpe ratio = 1.5). This supports the conjecture that these stocks experience higher selling pressure, leading to lower current prices and higher future returns. Overall, this study provides new evidence that investors' trading behavior can aggregate to affect equilibrium price dynamics.

Home Equity Conversion Mortgages ("HECMs") implicitly bundle nondefaultable credit lines with put options that let borrowers, or their heirs, sell mortgaged homes for the credit line limit when borrowers move or die. The put option's value, net of closing costs, bounds HECM's value to borrowers below. Older homeowners' weak demand is commonly attributed to HECM's "high costs, " and the government prices insurance intending to avoid subsidy. However, simulations indicate put value has often exceeded closing costs, even ignoring other embedded options and using backward-looking expectations near the recent price-cycle peak. These results make weak demand more puzzling.

This study evaluates the effectiveness of geographic diversification in reducing housing investment risk. To characterize diversification potential, we estimate spatial correlation and integration among 401 U.S. metropolitan housing markets. The 2000s boom brought a marked uptrend in housing market integration associated with eased residential lending standards and rapid growth in private mortgage securitization. As boom turned to bust, other macroeconomic factors, including employment and income fundamentals, importantly contributed to the trending up in housing return integration. Portfolio simulations reveal substantially lower diversification potential and higher risk in the wake of increased market integration.

We study distress risk premia around a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress from debtholders to shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The reform effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effect leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.

Opening the capital account allows financially constrained firms to raise capital from abroad. Since capital and skilled labor are relative complements, this increases the relative demand for skilled labor versus unskilled labor, leading to higher wage inequality. Using aggregate data and exploiting variation in the timing of capital account openings across 20 mainly European countries, I find that opening the capital account increases aggregate wage inequality. In order to identify the mechanism, I use sectoral data and exploit variation in external financial dependence and capital-skill complementarity across industries. I find that capital account opening increases sectoral wage inequality, particularly in industries with both high financial needs and strong complementarity.

We propose an equilibrium model for defaultable bonds that are subject to contagion risk. Contagion arises because agents with “fragile beliefs” are uncertain about the underlying economic state and its probability. Estimation on sovereign European credit default swaps (CDS) data shows that agents require a time-varying risk premium for bearing state uncertainty. The model outperforms affine specifications with the same number of state variables, suggesting that there are important nonlinearities in credit spreads that are captured by our model. Contagion drives most of the variation in CDS spreads, especially before the crisis. However, economic fundamentals account for a significant fraction during the crisis.