Knowledge that Transforms

We document that the first and third cross-sectional moments of the distribution of GDP growth rates made by professional forecasters can predict equity excess returns, a finding that is robust to controlling for a large set of well-established predictive factors. We show that introducing time-varying skewness in the distribution of expected growth prospects in an otherwise standard endowment economy can substantially increase the model-implied equity Sharpe ratios, and produce a large amount of fluctuation in equity risk premiums. Received May 6, 2013; accepted January 26, 2016 by Editor Geert Bekaert.

In many countries, poorly functioning bankruptcy procedures force viable but insolvent firms to restructure out of court, where banks may have a bargaining advantage over other creditors. We model the choice of restructuring process and derive implications for the corporate mix of bank and bond financing. Empirical patterns match the model: inefficient bankruptcy in a country is associated with less bond issuance by risky, but not by safe, borrowers. This pattern holds for both levels of and changes in bankruptcy recovery. Our results establish a link between bankruptcy reform and corporate bond markets, especially high-yield markets. Received September 29, 2014; accepted February 1, 2016 by Editor David Denis.

We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage, while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust-preferred securities issuance, a form of regulatory arbitrage available to almost all U.S. banks from 1996 to Dodd-Frank. We also find support for predictions that constrained banks are riskier, perform worse during the crisis, and use multiple forms of regulatory arbitrage. We show that neither too-big-to-fail incentives nor misaligned managerial incentives are first-order determinants of this type of regulatory arbitrage. Received November 27, 2014; accepted December 17, 2015 by Editor Philip Strahan.

ZIP codes with high concentrations of originators who misreported mortgage information experienced a 75% larger relative increase in house prices from 2003 to 2006 and a 90% larger relative decrease from 2007 to 2012 compared with other ZIP codes. Several causality tests show that high fractions of dubious originators in a ZIP code lead to large price distortions. Originators with high misreporting gave credit to borrowers with high ex ante risk, yet further understated the borrowers' true risk. Overall, excess credit facilitated through dubious origination practices explain much of the regional variation in house prices over a decade. Received August 24, 2015; accepted January 22, 2016 by Editor Matthew Spiegel.

We analyze a model where investors use a credit rating to decide whether to finance a firm. The rating quality depends on unobservable effort exerted by a credit rating agency (CRA). We study optimal compensation schemes for the CRA when a planner, the firm, or investors order the rating. Rating errors are larger when the firm orders it than when investors do (and both produce larger errors than is socially optimal). Investors overuse ratings relative to the firm or planner. A trade-off in providing time-consistent incentives embedded in the optimal compensation structure makes the CRA slow to acknowledge mistakes. Received October 22, 2014; accepted August 29, 2015 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We propose a hybrid approach for estimating beta that shrinks rolling window estimates toward firm-specific priors motivated by economic theory. Our method yields superior forecasts of beta that have important practical implications. First, unlike standard rolling window betas, hybrid betas carry a significant price of risk in the cross-section even after controlling for characteristics. Second, the hybrid approach offers statistically and economically significant out-of-sample benefits for investors who use factor models to construct optimal portfolios. We show that the hybrid estimator outperforms existing estimators because shrinkage toward a fundamentals-based prior is effective in reducing measurement noise in extreme beta estimates. Received May 17, 2011; accepted October 7, 2015 by Editor Geert Bekaert.

The percentage of S&P 500 firms using multiyear accounting-based performance (MAP) incentives for CEOs increased from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008. The use and design of MAP incentives depend on the signal quality of accounting versus stock performance, shareholder horizons, strategic imperatives, and board independence. After the technology bubble, option expensing, and the publicity of option backdating, firms increasingly use stock-based MAP plans to replace options, resulting in changes in pay structure, but not in pay level. While firms respond to the evolving contracting environment, they consider firm characteristics and shareholder preferences and do not blindly follow the trend. Received September 20, 2013; accepted November 20, 2015 by Editor David Denis.

A firm chooses its debt maturity structure and default timing dynamically, both without commitment. Via the fraction of newly issued short-term bonds, equity holders control the maturity structure, which affects their endogenous default decision. A shortening equilibrium with accelerated default emerges when cash flows deteriorate over time so that debt recovery is higher if default occurs earlier. Self-enforcing shortening and lengthening equilibria may coexist, with the latter possibly Pareto dominating the former. The inability to commit to issuance policies can worsen the Leland problem of the inability to commit to a default policy–a self-fulfilling shortening spiral and adverse default policy may arise. Received April 16, 2015; accepted February 20, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Using survey-based measures of mutual fund manager loss aversion, we study the effects of institutional investor preferences on their investment decisions, performance, and career outcomes. We find that managers with higher aversion to losses choose portfolios with lower downside risk, increase their risk-taking more in response to poor past performance, and display a stronger disposition effect. Further, we provide evidence that managers who are more loss-averse have lower performance and are more likely to have their contracts terminated. Received December 3, 2014; editorial decision May 25, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

I provide a measure for the value that investors place on trust and relationships in asset management by examining mutual fund flows around announced changes in the ownership of fund management companies. I find a decline in flows of around 7% of fund assets in the year following the announcement date, resulting primarily from fund outflows. Retail investors and investors in funds with higher expense ratios are most responsive to ownership changes, providing evidence that such investors appear to place a significant value on trust and are more likely to respond to a relationship disruption by withdrawing their assets. Received September 13, 2013; accepted August 10, 2015 by Editor Laura Starks.