Knowledge that Transforms

This article shows that individuals' product market choices influence their investment decisions. Using microdata from the brokerage and automotive industries, we find a strong positive relation between customer relationship, ownership of a company, and size of the ownership stake. Investors are also more likely to purchase and less likely to sell shares of companies they frequent as customers. These effects are stronger for individuals with longer customer relationships. A merger-based natural experiment supports a causal interpretation of our results. We also find evidence of causality in the other direction: inheritances and gifts have an effect on individuals' patronage decisions. A setup in which customer-investors regard stocks as consumption goods, not just as investments, seems to best explain our results. (JEL G11, G24, D83) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

This article establishes a role for corporate governance regulation. An externality operating through executive compensation motivates regulation. Governance lowers agency costs, allowing firms to grant less incentive pay. When a firm increases governance and lowers incentive pay, other firms can also lower executive compensation. Because firms do not internalize the full benefit of governance, regulation can improve investor welfare. When regulation is enforced, large firms increase in value, small firms decrease in value, and all firms lower incentive pay. Distinct cross-sectional and cross-country predictions for the number of voluntary governance firms are provided. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We study the real effects of market segmentation due to credit ratings by using a matched sample of firms just above and just below the investment-grade cutoff. These firms have similar observables, including average investment rates. However, flows into high-yield mutual funds have an economically significant effect on the issuance and investment of the speculative-grade firms relative to their matches, especially for firms likely to be financially constrained. The effect is associated with the discrete change in label from investment- to speculative-grade, not with changes in continuous measures of credit quality. We do not find similar effects at other rating boundaries.

This article proposes a novel method of extracting the cost of default from the change in the market value of a firm's assets upon default. Using a large sample of firms with observed prices of debt and equity that defaulted over fourteen years, we estimate the cost of default for an average defaulting firm to be 21.7% of the market value of assets. The costs vary from 14.7% for bond renegotiations to 30.5% for bankruptcies, and are substantially higher for investment-grade firms (28.8%) than for highly levered bond issuers (20.2%), which extant estimates are based on exclusively. (JEL G21, G30, G33)

We investigate the trade-off between incentive provision and inefficient rollover freezes for a firm financed with short-term debt. First, debt maturity that is too short-term is inefficient, even with incentive provision. The optimal maturity is an interior solution that avoids excessive rollover risk while providing sufficient incentives for the manager to avoid risk-shifting when the firm is in good health. Second, allowing the manager to risk-shift during a freeze actually increases creditor confidence. Debt policy should not prevent the manager from holding what may appear to be otherwise low-mean strategies that have option value during a freeze. Third, a limited but not perfectly reliable form of emergency financing during a freeze—a “bailout”—may improve the terms of the trade-off and increase total ex ante value by instilling confidence in the creditor markets. Our conclusions highlight the endogenous interaction between risk from the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet.

The surge in public debt triggered by the financial crisis has raised uncertainty about future tax pressure and economic activity. We examine the asset pricing effects of fiscal policies in a production-based general equilibrium model in which taxation affects corporate decisions by: (1) distorting profits and investment; (2) reducing the cost of debt through a tax shield; and (3) depressing productivity growth. In settings with recursive preferences, these three tax-based channels generate sizable risk premia, making tax uncertainty a first-order concern. We document further that corporate tax smoothing can substantially alter the effects of public expenditure shocks. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Probably not. First, allowing the probabilities of the states of the economy to differ from their sample frequencies, the consumption-CAPM is still rejected in both U.S. and international data. Second, the recorded world disasters are too small to rationalize the puzzle, unless one assumes that disasters occur every 6--10 years. Third, if the data were generated by the rare events distribution needed to rationalize the equity premium puzzle, the puzzle itself would be unlikely to arise. Fourth, the rare events hypothesis, by reducing the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption risk, worsens the ability of the consumption-CAPM to explain the cross-section of returns. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Mutual funds whose managers are in the same educational network as the firm's CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds are. This voting propensity is stronger when voting among the funds in a family is not unanimous. Furthermore, CEOs of firms who have relatively high levels of educationally connected mutual fund ownership have higher levels of compensation than their unconnected counterparts. This aspect of executive compensation is related to both the abnormal trading performance of the connected investors in the firm and the perceived quality of firm management by the connected investors.

This article studies the central role of the credit market. We show that the credit market facilitates optimal risk sharing by allowing less risk-averse investors to take on levered positions and consume more risk. The equilibrium amount behaves procyclically when aggregate consumption is low but countercyclically when it is high. The varying size of the credit market modifies the amount of risk sharing, which in turn influences asset prices such as expected stock returns, stock return volatility, and the term structure of interest rates. Our article provides a frictionless benchmark for the role and the behavior of the credit market. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We use forward-looking information from option prices to estimate option-implied correlations and to construct an option-implied predictor of factor betas. With our implied market betas, we find a monotonically increasing risk-return relation, not detectable with standard rolling-window betas, with the slope close to the market excess return. Our implied betas confirm a risk-return relation consistent with linear factor models because, when compared to other beta approaches: (i) they are better predictors of realized betas, and (ii) they exhibit smaller and less systematic prediction errors. The predictive power of our betas is not related to known relations between option-implied characteristics and returns. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.