Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the impact of the confirmatory bias on financial markets. We propose a model in which some traders may ignore new evidence inconsistent with their favorite hypothesis regarding the state of the world. The confirmatory bias provides a unified rationale for several existing stylized facts, including excess volatility, excess volume, and momentum. It also delivers novel predictions for which we find empirical support using data on analysts’ earnings forecasts: traders update beliefs depending on the sign of past signals and previous beliefs, and, at the stock level, differences of opinion are larger when past signals have different signs. Received May 7, 2014; editorial decision September 12, 2016 by Editor David Hirshleifer.

The paper estimates a model that allows for shifts in the aggressiveness of monetary policy and time variation in the distribution of macroeconomic shocks. These model features induce variations in the cyclical properties of inflation and the riskiness of bonds. The estimation identifies inflation as procyclical from the late 1990s, when the economy shifted toward aggressive monetary policy and experienced procyclical macroeconomics shocks. Since bonds hedge stock market risks when inflation is procylical, the stock-bond return correlation turned negative in the late 1990s. The risks of encountering countercyclical inflation in the future could lead to an upward-sloping yield curve, like in the data.Received September 11, 2016; editorial decision January 2, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

This paper examines the effects of a shock to the stock-price formation process on the design of executive incentive contracts. We find that an exogenous removal of short-selling constraints causes firms to convexify compensation payoffs by granting relatively more stock options to their managers. We also find that treated firms adopt new antitakeover provisions. These results suggest that when firms face the threat of bear raids, they incentivize managers to take actions that mitigate the adverse effects of unrestrained short selling. Overall, this paper provides causal evidence that financial markets affect incentive contract design. Received May 13, 2015; editorial decision October 17, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from broker-dealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts. Received June 23, 2015; editorial decision December 20, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

In line with the psychological theory of place attachments, managers favor hometown workers over others. Consistent with this prediction, I find that following periods of industry distress, establishments located near CEOs’ childhood homes experience fewer employment and pay reductions and are less likely to be divested relative to other firm establishments. While it is not possible to directly test whether this employment bias destroys firm value, managers only implement these policies when governance is weak, suggesting that this favoritism is suboptimal. Together, these results provide direct evidence of employee favoritism and show that idiosyncratic manager styles impact corporate employment decisions. Received December 23, 2013; editorial decision January 3, 2017 by Editor Alexander Ljungqvist.

I exploit the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 as a shock to U.K. firms’ cost of doing business. Around the Act’s passage, U.K. firms operating in high-corruption countries experience a drop in firm value, while their non-U.K. competitors in these countries encounter an increase. U.K. firms respond to the Act by reducing the expansion of their subsidiary network into perceptively corrupt countries. Moreover, their sales and merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in such countries declines. In sum, bribes facilitate doing business in certain countries. Imposing unilateral antibribery regulations on some firms benefits their unregulated competitors. Received March 2, 2015; editorial decision November 2, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We survey companies and find that many use incorrect tax rate inputs into important corporate decisions. Specifically, many companies use an average tax rate (the GAAP effective tax rate, ETR) to evaluate incremental decisions, rather than using the theoretically correct marginal tax rate. We find evidence consistent with behavioral biases (heuristics, salience) and managers' educational backgrounds affecting these choices. We estimate the economic consequences of using the theoretically incorrect tax rate and find that using the ETR for capital structure decisions leads to suboptimal leverage choices and using the ETR in investment decisions makes firms less responsive to investment opportunities.

We show that municipalities’ financial constraints can have a significant impact on local employment and growth. We identify these effects by exploiting exogenous upgrades in U.S. municipal bond ratings caused by Moody’s recalibration of its ratings scale in 2010. We find that local governments increase expenditures because their debt capacity expands following a rating upgrade. These expenditures have an estimated local income multiplier of 1.9 and a cost per job of $20,000 per year. Our findings suggest that debt-financed increases in government spending can improve economic conditions during recessions.

Short-lived arbitrage opportunities arise when prices adjust with a lag to new information. They are toxic because they expose dealers to the risk of trading at stale quotes. Hence, theory implies that more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and faster responses to these opportunities should impair liquidity. We provide supporting evidence using data on triangular arbitrage. As predicted, illiquidity is higher on days when the fraction of toxic arbitrage opportunities and arbitrageurs’ relative speed are higher. Overall, our findings suggest that the price efficiency gain of high-frequency arbitrage comes at the cost of increased adverse selection risk. Received March 25, 2015; editorial decision September 21, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

This paper exploits the federal preemption of national banks in 2004 from local laws against predatory lending to gauge the effect of the supply of credit on the real economy. First, the preemption regulation resulted in an 11% increase in annual lending in the 2004–2006 period, which is associated with a 3.3% rise in annual house price growth rate and a 2.2% expansion of employment in nontradable sectors. This was followed by a sharp decline in subsequent years. Furthermore, we show that the increase in the supply of credit reduced delinquencies during boom years, but increased them in bust years. Received June 7, 2015; editorial decision December 22, 2016 by Editor Robin Greenwood.