Knowledge that Transforms

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. We show that the FRM market share is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods in which private securitization markets are well functioning.

We estimate a dynamic investment model in which firms finance with equity, cash, or debt. Misvaluation affects equity values, and firms optimally issue and repurchase overvalued and undervalued shares. The funds flowing to and from these activities come from investment, dividends, or net cash. The model fits a broad set of data moments in large heterogeneous samples and across industries. Our parameter estimates imply that misvaluation induces larger changes in financial policies than investment. The investment responses are strongest for small firms but nonetheless modest. Managers' rational responses to misvaluation increase shareholder value by up to 4%.

I use industry-level returns in foreign markets to examine the hypothesis that value-relevant foreign information slowly diffuses into the stock prices of U.S. multinational firms. A trading strategy that exploits foreign information generates abnormal returns of 0.8% monthly. I find that the market responds more slowly in periods with lower media coverage of foreign news and to information from more linguistically and culturally distant countries. These results suggest that both investors' inattention and lack of understanding of foreign information slow the incorporation of new information into prices. I further separate these two mechanisms by examining market responses to earnings surprises.

In housing markets, neighborhood characteristics are a key source of information heterogeneity: sellers are usually better informed about neighborhood values than buyers are, but some sellers and buyers are better informed than their peers are. Consistent with predictions from a new framework for analyzing such markets with heterogeneous assets and differentially informed agents, we find that changes in the composition of sellers toward more informed sellers and sellers with a larger supply elasticity predict subsequent house price declines. This effect is larger for houses with more price exposure to neighborhood characteristics, and smaller for houses bought by buyers that are more informed.

Some fundamental questions regarding equity-index return dynamics are difficult to address due to the latent character of spot volatility. We exploit tick-by-tick option quotes to compute a novel “Corridor Volatility” index which may serve as an observable proxy for short-term volatility. Exploiting this index, we find that equity-index volatility jumps are common, symmetrically distributed, and cojump with the underlying returns. Moreover, the return-volatility asymmetry is more pronounced than is generally recognized and is in force for both diffusive and jump innovations in volatility. Finally, the index performs admirably during turbulent market conditions, constituting a useful real-time gauge of market stress.

We investigate whether and how an exogenous and unprecedented improvement in non-U.S. firms' financial-reporting quality affects post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). We find that PEAD declines after the information shock, and this decrease is more pronounced for firms with fewer concurrent earnings announcements, greater institutional holdings, and lower limits to arbitrage. In addition, the decrease in PEAD is driven by firms with greater changes in financial reporting, an increase in analyst forecast accuracy and institutional ownership, and a decrease in limits to arbitrage. These findings support the mispricing explanation of PEAD, in particular the limited attention hypothesis, in an international setting.

We hypothesize that cognitive limitation may be manifested in a disproportionately large volume of limit orders submitted at round-number prices if investors use these numbers as cognitive shortcuts. Using detailed limit order data in the Taiwan Futures Exchange, we find that investors with lower cognitive abilities, defined as higher limit order submission ratios at round numbers, suffer greater losses in their round-numbered and non-round-numbered limit orders, market orders, and round-trip trades. The positive correlation between cognitive ability and investment performance is monotonic and robust across futures and options markets. In addition, past trading experience helps mitigate cognitive limitation.

We show that name-induced stereotypes affect the investment choices of U.S. mutual fund investors. Managers with foreign-sounding names have about 10% lower annual fund flows, and this effect is stronger among funds with investor clienteles more likely to be suspicious of foreigners. Foreign-named managers experience lower appreciation (greater decline) in flows following good (bad) performance. Following 9/11, flows to funds with managers with Middle-Eastern-sounding names declined abnormally. In an experimental setting in which skill differences are absent, individuals allocate 11% less money to an index fund managed by a foreign-named manager. This gap widens following the Boston marathon bombings.

We study the role of information in asset-pricing models with long-run cash flow risk. When investors can distinguish short- from long-run consumption risks (full information), the model generates a sizable equity risk premium only if the equity term structure slopes up, contrary to the data. In general, the short- and long-run components are unidentified. We propose a sparsity-based bounded rationality model of long-run risk that is both parsimonious and fully identified from historical data. In contrast to full information, the model generates a sizable market risk premium simultaneously with a downward-sloping equity term structure, as in the data.

We document that announcement-period abnormal returns of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) equity investments in publicly traded firms are positive but lower than those of comparable private investments. Further, SWF investment targets suffer from declining return on assets and sales growth over the following three years. Our results are robust to controls for target and deal characteristics and are not driven by SWF target selection criteria. Larger discounts are associated with SWFs taking seats on boards of directors and with SWFs under strict government control acquiring greater stakes, supporting the hypothesis that political influence negatively affects firm value and performance.