Knowledge that Transforms

Existing evidence shows that risk aversion and trust are largely determined by environmental factors. We test whether one such factor is peer influence. Using random assignment of MBA students to peer groups and predetermined survey responses of economic attitudes, we find causal evidence of positive peer effects in risk aversion and no effects in trust. After the first year of the MBA program, the difference between an individual and her peers' average risk aversion has shrunk by 41%. Finding no peer effects in trust is consistent with recent research showing that distinct cognitive processes govern risk aversion and trust.

We examine a production-based asset-pricing model with an unobservable mean growth rate following a two-state Markov chain and with an ambiguity-averse representative agent. Our model requires a low coefficient of relative risk aversion to produce: (i) a high equity premium and volatile equity returns, (ii) a low and smooth risk-free rate, (iii) smooth consumption growth and volatile investment growth, (iv) countercyclical equity premium and market price of risk, (v) conditional heteroscedasticity in returns, and (vi) long-horizon predictability of excess returns.

We find that the stock market underreacts to stock-level liquidity shocks: liquidity shocks are not only positively associated with contemporaneous returns, but they also predict future return continuations for up to six months. Long-short portfolios sorted on liquidity shocks generate significant returns of 0.70% to 1.20% per month that are robust across alternative shock measures and after controlling for risk factors and stock characteristics. Furthermore, we show that investor inattention and illiquidity contribute to the underreaction: while both are significant in explaining short-term return predictability of liquidity shocks, the inattention-based mechanism is more powerful for the longer-term return predictability.

We examine the role of high-frequency traders (HFTs) in price discovery and price efficiency. Overall HFTs facilitate price efficiency by trading in the direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing errors, both on average and on the highest volatility days. This is done through their liquidity demanding orders. In contrast, HFTs' liquidity supplying orders are adversely selected. The direction of HFTs' trading predicts price changes over short horizons measured in seconds. The direction of HFTs' trading is correlated with public information, such as macro news announcements, market-wide price movements, and limit order book imbalances.

We argue and demonstrate that resource allocation within firms' internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing financial market dislocation. We estimate a structural model of internal capital markets to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision and illustrate how these forces interact with external capital market stress. The weaker (stronger) division obtains too much (little) capital, as though it is 12% (9%) more (less) productive than it really is. Out-of-sample simulated data are consistent with the actual data showing that internal capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16%–30%.

I solve in closed form for the optimal dynamic risk choice of a fund manager who is compensated with a high-water mark contract. The optimal risk choice depends on the ratio of the fund's assets under management to its high-water mark. If the manager's outside option value is low, investors' termination policy is strict, or management fees are high, then negative returns induce the manager into "derisking." Otherwise, he engages in "gambling." Having the option to walk away increases risk taking, though in many cases exercise is never optimal. In particular, leaving to restart at a proportionally smaller fund is always suboptimal.

We analyze the role of "directors from related industries" (DRIs) on a firm's board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream/downstream industries of the firm. DRIs are more likely when the information gap vis-à-vis related industries is more severe or the firm has greater market power. DRIs have a significant impact on firm value/performance, especially when information problems are worse. Furthermore, DRIs help firms handle industry shocks and shorten their cash conversion cycles. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms choose DRIs when the adverse effects due to conflicts of interest are dominated by the benefits due to DRIs' information and expertise.

In this paper, we study asset prices in a dynamic, continuous-time, and general-equilibrium endowment economy in which agents have "catching up with the Joneses" utility functions and differ with respect to their beliefs (because of differences in priors) and their preference parameters for time discount, risk aversion, and sensitivity to habit. A key contribution of our paper is to demonstrate how one can obtain a closed-form solution to the consumption-sharing rule for agents who have both heterogeneous priors and heterogeneous preferences without restricting the risk aversion of the two agents to special values. We solve in closed form also for the state-price density, the risk-free interest rate and market price of risk, the stock price, equity risk premium, and volatility of stock returns, the term structure of interest rates, and the conditions necessary to obtain a stationary equilibrium in which both agents survive in the long run. The methodology we develop is sufficiently general in that, as long as markets are complete, it can be used to obtain the sharing rule and state prices for models set in discrete or continuous time and for arbitrary endowment and belief updating processes.

Conventional wisdom suggests that high-reputation banks will generally produce good securities to maintain their long-run reputation. We show with a simple model that, when securities are complex a high-reputation bank may produce assets that underperform during market downturns. We examine this possibility using a unique sample of $10.1 trillion of CLO, MBS, ABS, and CDOs. Contrary to the conventional view, securities issued by more reputable banks did not outperform but, rather, had higher proportions of capital in default.

Fragility is affected by how the balance sheet composition of financial intermediaries, the precision of information signals, and market stress parameters all influence the extent of strategic complementarity among investors' strategies. A solvency and a liquidity ratio are required to control the likelihood of insolvency and illiquidity. The solvency requirement must be strengthened in the face of increased competition, whereas the liquidity requirement must be strengthened under more conservative fund managers and higher penalties for fire sales. Greater disclosure may aggravate fragility and require an increase in the liquidity ratio, so regulators should establish prudential and disclosure policies in tandem.