Knowledge that Transforms

Using trading data from a sports wagering market, we estimate individuals’ dynamic risk preferences within a prospect theory paradigm. This market’s experimental-like features facilitate preference estimation, and our long panel enables us to study whether preferences vary across individuals and depend on earlier outcomes. Our estimates extend support for experimental findings—mild utility curvature, moderate loss aversion, and probability overweighting of extreme outcomes—to a market setting and reveal that preferences are heterogeneous and history dependent. Applying our estimates to a portfolio choice problem, we show prospect theory can better explain the prevalence of the disposition effect than previously thought.

We propose a nonparametric method to study which characteristics provide incremental information for the cross-section of expected returns. We use the adaptive group LASSO to select characteristics and to estimate how selected characteristics affect expected returns nonparametrically. Our method can handle a large number of characteristics and allows for a flexible functional form. Our implementation is insensitive to outliers. Many of the previously identified return predictors don’t provide incremental information for expected returns, and nonlinearities are important. We study our method’s properties in simulations and find large improvements in both model selection and prediction compared to alternative selection methods.

We model the strategic interaction between fundamental investors and “back-runners,” whose only information is about the past order flow of fundamental investors. Back-runners partly infer fundamental investors’ information from their order flow and exploit it in subsequent trading. Fundamental investors counteract back-runners by randomizing their orders, unless back-runners’ signals are too imprecise. Surprisingly, a higher accuracy of back-runners’ order flow information can harm back-runners and benefit fundamental investors. As an application of the model, the common practice of payment for (retail) order flow reveals information about institutional order flow and enables back-runners to earn large profits.

Interbanking rates were, until recently, based on judgmental estimates of borrowing costs. We interpret this as a cheap-talk game that allowed banks to communicate nonverifiable information about their opportunity cost to potential counterparties. Under normal market conditions there is a welfare maximizing equilibrium where banks truthfully disclose their borrowing cost, but, in times of financial stress, only “coarse” equilibria survive. We take this prediction to the data and show that banks round more frequently if the risk of the bank increases. Rounding is also more frequent for the more liquid short-term rates and certain benchmark maturities.

Two main creditors exist in commercial real estate: arm’s-length investors and banks. We model commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) as the less informed source of credit. In equilibrium, these investors fund properties with a low probability of distress, and banks fund properties that may require renegotiation. As a natural experiment, we test the model using the collapse of the CMBS market during 2007–2009, when banks funded both collateral types. Our results show that properties likely to have been securitized were less likely to default or be renegotiated. This suggests that securitization in this market funds safe collateral.

We examine the role of cultural heritage in shaping U.S. CEOs’ attitudes toward uncertainty, in the context of their corporate acquisition decisions. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty-avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, uncertainty-averse CEOs prefer targets in familiar industries and targets that can be more easily integrated. The emphasis on cultural identity by CEOs’ parents and the ethnic composition of CEOs’ early life environment significantly influence the cultural transmission process. Cultural differences about uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time.

What is the economic role played by arrangers of leveraged loans, and what are the risks they face? We provide evidence that arrangers solve a demand discovery problem. Investors have incentives to feign little interest in the loan to obtain better terms. To deter such behavior, arrangers underprice hot deals and ration investors on cold deals. The risk associated with demand discovery is often shared between borrowers and arrangers. One implication is that to ration investors on cold deals, arrangers retain larger loan shares. This motive for retention is different from the monitoring incentive motive previously considered in the literature.

We show that in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneity in risk aversion or belief, shifting wealth from an agent who holds comparatively fewer stocks to one who holds more reduces the equity premium. From an empirical view, the rich hold more stocks, so inequality should predict excess stock market returns. Consistent with our theory, we find that when the U.S. top (e.g., 1%) income share rises, subsequent 1-year excess market returns significantly decline. This negative relation is robust to controlling for classic return predictors, predicting out-of-sample, and instrumenting inequality with estate tax rate changes. It also holds in international markets.

Using health shocks to identify financial distress situations, I document that peer distress leads to a decline in individual leverage and debt on average. Individual leverage declines by 5.7% and remains deflated for at least five years following peer distress. This decline occurs as individuals borrow less on the intensive margin, pay higher fractions of their debt and save more while their income remains unchanged. As a result, individuals are less likely to default during the period following peer distress. The heterogeneity in responses highlight the role of changes in beliefs and preferences as the underlying mechanism.

This paper studies whether house prices reflect belief differences about climate change. We show that in an equilibrium model of housing choice in which agents derive utility from ownership in a neighborhood of similar agents, prices exhibit different elasticities to climate risk. We use comprehensive transaction data to relate prices to inundation projections of individual homes and measures of beliefs about climate change. We find that houses projected to be underwater in believer neighborhoods sell at a discount compared to houses in denier neighborhoods. Our results suggest that house prices reflect heterogeneity in beliefs about long-run climate change risks.