This theory can explain why bank debt is universally senior, consistent with the presence of conflict lawyers) and absolute priority violations in financial distress: better organized banks would more strongly contest priority in financial distress if they were junior. Because "deterrence can reduce creditors' total expenses in a priority contest, the ex post stronger lobbyist/litigant should be senior ex ante. For equivalent reasons, the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and/or implicit contracts, and can even suggest one rationale for the absolute priority rule (APR). This article further shows that Chapter HI creditor reimbursement procedures can lower overall costs. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Recent studies show that when a regression model is used to forecast stock and bond returns, the sample R^2 increases dramatically with the length of the return horizon. These studies argue, therefore, that long-horizon returns are highly predictable. This article presents evidence that suggests otherwise. Long-horizon regressions can easily yield large values of the sample R^2, even if the populations R^2 is smaller or zero. Moreover, long-horizon regressions with a small or zero population R^2 can produce t-ratios that might be interpreted as evidence of strong predictability. In general, the analysis provides little support for the view that long-horizon returns are highly predictable.

A simple time-series market microstructure model is constructed within which existing models of spread components are reconciled. We show that existing models fail to decompose the spread into all its components. Two alternative extensions of the simple model are developed to identify all the components of the spread and to estimate the spread at which trades occur. The empirical results support the presence of a large order processing component and smaller, albeit significant, adverse selection and inventory components. The spread components differ significantly according to trade size and are also sensitive to assumptions about the relation between orders and trades.

Asymmetric information between banks and firms can preclude financing of valuable projects. Trade credit can alleviate this problem by incorporating in the lending relation the private information held by suppliers about their customers. Incentive compatibility conditions prevent collusion between two of the agents (e.g., the buyer and the seller) against the third (e.g., the bank). Consistent with the empirical findings of Petersen and Rajan (1995), firms without relationships with banks resort more to trade credit, and sellers with greater ability to generate cash flows provide more trade credit. Finally small firms react to monetary contractions by using trade credit, consistent with the empirical results of Nilsen (1994).

This article provides a Markov model for the term structure of credit risk spreads. The model is based on Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), with the bankruptcy process following a discrete state space Markov chain in credit ratings. The parameters of this process are easily estimated using observable data. This model is useful for pricing and hedging corporate debt with imbedded options, for pricing and hedging OTC derivatives with counterparty risk, for pricing and hedging (foreign) government bonds subject to default risk (e.g., municipal bonds), for pricing and hedging credit derivatives, and for risk management.

This article develops and tests a structural model of intraday price formation that embodies public information shocks and microstructure effects. We use the model to analyze intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads, price volatility, transaction costs, and return and quote auto-correlations, and to construct metrics for price discovery and effective trading costs. Information asymmetry and uncertainty over fundamentals decrease over the day, although transaction costs increase. The results help explain the U-shaped pattern in intraday bid-ask spreads and volatility, and are also consistent with the intra-day decline in the variance of ask price changes.

Using the model structure of Easley and O'Hara (Journal of Finance, 47, 577–604), we demonstrate how the parameters of the market-maker's beliefs can be estimated from trade data. We show how to extract information from both trade and no-trade intervals, and how intraday and interday data provide information. We derive and evaluate tests of model specification and estimate the information content of differential trade sizes. Our work provides a framework for testing extant microstructure models, shows how to extract the information contained in the trading process, and demonstrates the empirical importance of symmetric information models for asset prices

In addition to borrowing from financial institutions, firms may be financed by their suppliers. Although there are many theories explaining why non-financial firms lend money, there are few comprehensive empirical tests of these theories. This paper attempts to fill the gap. We focus on a sample of small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited. We find evidence that firms use trade credit relatively more when credit from financial institutions is not available. Thus while short term trade credit may be routinely used to minimize transactions costs, medium term borrowing against trade credit is a form of financing of last resort. Suppliers lend to firms no one else lends to because they may have a comparative advantage in getting information about buyers cheaply, they have a better ability to liquidate goods, and they have a greater implicit equity stake in the firm's long term survival. We find some evidence consistent with the use of trade credit as a means of price discrimination. Finally, we find that firms with better access to credit from financial institutions offer more trade credit. This suggests that firms may intermediate between institutional creditors and other firms who have limited access to financial institutions

This article shows (1) how entry and exit of firms in a competitive industry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capital structure, and (2) how, given a trade-off between tax advantages and agency costs, a firm will optimally adjust its leverage level after it is set up. We derive simple pricing expressions for corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand for industry output plays a crucial role. When a firm optimally adjusts its leverage over time, we show that total firm value comprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixed capital structure, plus a continuum of options for marginal increases in debt.