[This article documents differences between the Q-sensitivity of investment of stand-alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerate firms. Unrelated segments exhibit lower Q-sensitivity of investment than stand-alone firms. This fact is driven by unrelated segments of conglomerate firms that tend to invest less than stand-alone firms in high-Q industries. This finding is robust to matching on industry, year, size, age, and profitability. The differences are more pronounced in conglomerates in which top management has small ownership stakes, suggesting that agency problems explain the investment behavior of conglomerates.]

This article documents differences between the Q-sensitivity of investment of stand-alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerate firms. Unrelated segments exhibit lower Q-sensitivity of investment than stand-alone firms. This fact is driven by unrelated segments of conglomerate firms that tend to invest less than stand-alone firms in high-Q industries. This finding is robust to matching on industry, year, size, age, and profitability. The differences are more pronounced in conglomerates in which top management has small ownership stakes, suggesting that agency problems explain the investment behavior of conglomerates.

We investigate product-market competition when managers maximize shareholder value rather than their expected discounted value of profits. If shareholders are imperfectly informed about future profitability, shareholder-value maximization can lead to either more or less aggressive product-market strategies. Lower rivals’ profits lead investors to believe that the firm’s costs are low relative to those of its rivals and that the industry’s prospects are poor. If the former (latter) inference dominates, each firm tries to lower (raise) its rivals’ profits to increase its own stock price. We also consider implications for corporate financial structure.

[We investigate product-market competition when managers maximize shareholder value rather than their expected discounted value of profits. If shareholders are imperfectly informed about future profitability, shareholder-value maximization can lead to either more or less aggressive product-market strategies. Lower rivals' profits lead investors to believe that the firm's costs are low relative to those of its rivals and that the industry's prospects are poor. If the former (latter) inference dominates, each firm tries to lower (raise) its rivals' profits to increase its own stock price. We also consider implications for corporate financial structure.]

We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which the government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These frictions motivate the government to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management favors programs that ameliorate market failures in bad times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs involving large government outlays when other government programs also require large outlays. These two risk management motives often conflict. Using the model, we explore how the attractiveness of different financial stability programs varies with the government’s fiscal burden and characteristics of the economy. Received December 19, 2016; editorial decision June 28, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.