We develop an equilibrium model with moral hazard, which arises because some productivity shocks are privately observed by firm managers only. We characterize the optimal contract and its implications for firm size, growth, and managerial pay-performance sensitivity and exploit them to quantify the severity of the moral hazard problem. Our estimation suggests that unobservable shocks are relatively modest and account for about 10% of the total variation of firm output. Nonetheless, moral-hazard-induced incentive pay is quantitatively significant and accounts for 50% of managerial compensation. Eliminating moral hazard would result in about a 1% increase in aggregate output.

Bank-created money, shadow-bank money, and Treasury bonds all satisfy investors’ demand for liquidity. We measure the quantity of these forms of liquidity and their corresponding liquidity premium in a sample from 1934 to 2016, estimating the substitutability of these assets and the liquidity per unit delivered by each asset. Treasuries and bank transaction deposits are imperfect substitutes, in contrast to perfect substitutes found by Nagel (2016). Bank and nonbank non-transaction deposits are closer substitutes for Treasuries. Our empirical results inform theories of the monetary transmission mechanism running through shifts in asset supplies and models of the coexistence of the shadow banking and regulated banking system.

We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. We show that the proof-of-work system may lead to a situation in which some large firms in the blockchain industrial ecosystem—blockchain conglomerates—capture the governance of the blockchain.

We investigate the link between exchange-traded funds and real investment. Cross-sectionally, higher ETF ownership is associated with an increased sensitivity of real investment to Tobin’s q and a heightened ability of stock returns to forecast future earnings. Inclusion of stocks in industry ETFs enhances investment-q sensitivity and implies greater incorporation of earnings information into prices prior to public releases. Greater nonmarket ETF ownership leads to increased (reduced) reliance of real investment on own (peers’) stock prices. Overall, the evidence is consistent with ETFs positively affecting real investment efficiency via greater flows of information.