Between March and August 2020, S&P and Moody’s downgraded approximately 25% of collateral feeding into CLOs and only 2% of tranche values, with rating actions concentrating in junior tranches. Both S&P and Moody’s modeling indicate that the impacts should have been considerably larger, especially for higher-rated tranches. Neither changes in correlation nor the accumulation of pre-COVID-19 protective cushions can explain the downgrade asymmetry on upper tranches. Instead, CLO managers repositioned their collateral pools to dampen the negative credit shock and rating agencies incorporated qualitative adjustments in their CLO ratings. Important potential policy and market implications from these findings are discussed.

In this paper, we consider conditional measures of lead-lag relations between aggregate growth and industry-level cash flow growth in the United States. Our results show that firms in leading industries pay an average annualized return 3.6 higher than that of firms in lagging industries. Using both time-series and cross-sectional tests, we estimate an annual pure timing premium ranging from 1.2 to 1.7. This finding can be rationalized in a model in which (a) agents price growth news shocks, and (b) leading industries provide valuable resolution of uncertainty about the growth prospects of lagging industries.

A duty of loyalty prohibits fiduciaries from appropriating business opportunities from their companies. Starting in 2000, Delaware, followed by several other states, allowed boards to waive their duty. We show that public firms covered by waiver laws invest less in R&D, produce fewer and less valuable patents, and exhibit abnormally high inventor departures. Remaining innovation activities contribute less to firm value, a fact confirmed by the market reaction when firms reveal their curtailed internal growth opportunities by announcing acquisitions. Consistent with the laws’ intent to provide contracting flexibility to emerging firms, we find evidence of positive impacts for small firms.

We quantify the real implications of trade-offs between firm information disclosure and long-term investment efficiency. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which firm managers confront realistic incentives to misreport earnings and distort their real investment choices. The model implies a socially optimal level of disclosure regulation that exceeds the estimated value. Counterfactual analysis reveals that eliminating earnings misreporting completely through disclosure regulation incentivizes managers to distort real investment. Lower earnings informativeness raises the cost of capital, which results in a 5.7% drop in average firm value, but more modest effects on social welfare and aggregate growth.