We characterize the unique equilibrium in an economy populated by strategic CARA investors who trade multiple risky assets with arbitrarily distributed payoffs. We use our explicit solution to study the joint behavior of illiquidity of option contracts. Option bid-ask spreads are proportional to risk aversion and risk-neutral variances of option payoffs. Spreads may decrease in risk aversion, physical variance, open interest, and increase after earnings announcements in a result contrary to conventional wisdom. All these predictions are confirmed empirically using a large panel data set of U.S. stock options.

This paper studies simultaneous multilateral search (SMS) in over-the-counter markets: When searching, a customer simultaneously contacts several dealers and trades with the one offering the best quote. Higher search intensity (how often one can search) improves welfare, but higher search capacity (how many dealers one can contact) might be harmful. When the market is in distress, customers might inefficiently favor bilateral bargaining (BB) over SMS. Such a preference for BB speaks to the sluggish adoption of SMS trading, like request-for-quote protocols, in over-the-counter markets. Furthermore, a market-wide shift to SMS may not be socially optimal.