[Strategic alliances are long-term contracts between legally distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. In this paper, I develop and test a model that helps explain why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally organized projects. I introduce managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets and show how strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations. The model generates a number of implications, which I test using a large sample of alliance transactions in conjunction with Compustat data.]

We examine the accuracy and contribution of the Merton distance to default (DD) model, which is based on Merton's (1974) bond pricing model. We compare the model to a “naïve” alternative, which uses the functional form suggested by the Merton model but does not solve the model for an implied probability of default. We find that the naïve predictor performs slightly better in hazard models and in out-of-sample forecasts than both the Merton DD model and a reduced-form model that uses the same inputs. Several other forecasting variables are also important predictors, and fitted values from an expanded hazard model outperform Merton DD default probabilities out of sample. Implied default probabilities from credit default swaps and corporate bond yield spreads are only weakly correlated with Merton DD probabilities after adjusting for agency ratings and bond characteristics. We conclude that while the Merton DD model does not produce a sufficient statistic for the probability of default, its functional form is useful for forecasting defaults.

Strategic alliances are long-term contracts between legally distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. In this paper, I develop and test a model that helps explain why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally organized projects. I introduce managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets and show how strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations. The model generates a number of implications, which I test using a large sample of alliance transactions in conjunction with Compustat data. , Oxford University Press.

[We have developed Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for inferences of continuous-time models with stochastic volatility and infinite-activity Lévy jumps using discretely sampled data. Simulation studies show that (i) our methods provide accurate joint identification of diffusion, stochastic volatility, and Lévy jumps, and (ii) the affine jump-diffusion (AJD) models fail to adequately approximate the behavior of infinite-activity jumps. In particular, the AJD models fail to capture the "infinitely many" small Lévy jumps, which are too big for Brownian motion to model and too small for compound Poisson process to capture. Empirical studies show that infinite-activity Lévy jumps are essential for modeling the S&P 500 index returns.]

We have developed Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for inferences of continuous-time models with stochastic volatility and infinite-activity Lévy jumps using discretely sampled data. Simulation studies show that (i) our methods provide accurate joint identification of diffusion, stochastic volatility, and Lévy jumps, and (ii) the affine jump-diffusion (AJD) models fail to adequately approximate the behavior of infinite-activity jumps. In particular, the AJD models fail to capture the “infinitely many” small Lévy jumps, which are too big for Brownian motion to model and too small for compound Poisson process to capture. Empirical studies show that infinite-activity Lévy jumps are essential for modeling the S&P 500 index returns.