We study the impact of FinTech competition in payment services when a monopolist bank uses payment data to learn about consumers’ credit quality. Competition from FinTech payment providers disrupts this information spillover. The bank’s price for payment services and its loan offers are affected. FinTech competition promotes financial inclusion, may hurt consumers with a strong bank preference, and has an ambiguous effect on the loan market. Both FinTech data sales and consumer data portability increase bank lending, but the effects on consumer welfare are ambiguous. Under mild conditions, consumer welfare is higher under data sales than with data portability

We document that finance companies and FinTech lenders increased lending to small businesses after the 2008 financial crisis. We show that most of the increase substituted for a reduction in bank lending. In counties in which banks had a larger market share before the crisis, finance companies and FinTech lenders increased their lending more. We find no effect of reduced bank lending on employment, wages, and new business creation by 2016. Our results suggest that finance companies and FinTech lenders are major suppliers of credit to small businesses and played an important role in the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis

Amid the emerging dominance of nonbanks, small banks use key financing advantages to persist in the mortgage market. We provide evidence of the heterogeneous impact of two shocks to the supply of mortgage credit: postcrisis regulatory burden and GSE financing cost changes. Small banks exploit regulation disproportionately affecting the largest four banks (Big4) and their ability to lend on balance sheet to strongly substitute for the retreating Big4. The erasure of guarantee fee (g-fee) discounts for large lenders facilitates small bank growth in GSE lending. Small banks also grow balance sheet loans in areas more exposed to g-fee hikes.