Knowledge that Transforms

Although considerable research has examined the role of trust in interorganizational relationship (IOR) contracting, scholars have devoted less attention to how trust and distrust jointly influence this process. We propose and test a model wherein trust, based on partner reliability, is constrained to the IOR exchange context where it develops and does not generalize to other contexts. Distrust, rooted in value incongruence, more readily generalizes across exchange contexts. Results support these predictions. In addition, our analysis shows that trust and distrust combine such that managers decrease their preferences for highly specific focal‐context contracts only when in‐context trust is high and distrust is low. We discuss how these findings may provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between trust‐based and contract‐based IOR governance.

How CEOs affect strategy and performance is important to strategic management research. We show that sophisticated statistical analysis alone is problematic for establishing the magnitude and causes of CEO impact on performance. We discuss three problem areas that substantially distort the measurement and sources of a CEO performance effect: (1) the nature of performance time series, (2) confounding and (3) the discovery of many interactions associated with the CEO performance effect. We show that the aggregate of empirical research implies complex interdependency as the driver of the CEO performance effect. This suggests a ‘fit’ model requiring new research approaches.

Most research linking compensation to strategy relies on agency theory economics and focuses on executive pay. We instead focus on the strategic compensation of nonexecutive employees, arguing that while agency theory provides a useful framework for analyzing compensation, it fails to consider several psychological factors that increase costs from performance‐based pay. We examine how psychological costs from social comparison and overconfidence reduce the efficacy of individual performance‐based compensation, building a theoretical framework predicting more prominent use of team‐based, seniority‐based, and flatter compensation. We argue that compensation is strategic not only in motivating and attracting the worker being compensated but also in its impact on peer workers and the firm's complementary activities. The paper discusses empirical implications and possible theoretical extensions of the proposed integrated theory.

This study develops and tests theory about the context‐specificity and outcome‐dependence of experiential learning in acquisition processes. First, we investigate whether learning from experience gained in different acquisition contexts is limited to influencing subsequent outcomes of same‐context transactions. Second, we analyze whether learning patterns in response to prior successes and failures differ across acquisition contexts, depending on two properties of these contexts—the degree of structural variance and the level of stimulation of deliberate learning. Learning is assessed with respect to an underexplored organizational goal variable in acquisitions: completion of a publicly announced transaction. An analysis of 4,973 acquisition attempts in the newspaper industry in 1981–2008 largely supports our theory.

This paper examines the relative importance of platform quality, indirect network effects, and consumer expectations on the success of entrants in platform‐based markets. We develop a theoretical model and find that an entrant's success depends on the strength of indirect network effects and on the consumers' discount factor for future applications. We then illustrate the model's applicability by examining Xbox's entry into the video game industry. We find that Xbox had a small quality advantage over the incumbent, PlayStation 2, and the strength of indirect network effects and the consumers' discount factor, while statistically significant, fall in the region where PlayStation 2's position is unsustainable.

The aim of this paper is to extend recent reflection on the evolution of strategic management by analyzing the field's object of study: strategy. We show how the concept of strategy has formed the backbone of the development of strategic management as an academic field and how consensus regarding it has evolved in the academic community during the stages of its historical development. We also address changes in the structure of the definition as it evolved through the growth of internal consistency, the centrality degree of the key terms that have shaped it, and how this evolution fostered the emergence of new research topics during the development of the discipline.

Corporate governance scholars are increasingly interested in firms' social and environmental performance. Empirical research in this area, however, has moved forward in an uncoordinated fashion, producing fragmented and contradictory results. Our paper seeks to address this situation by adopting a fact‐based research approach that comprehensively explores the link between corporate governance and environmental performance. Specifically, we aim to understand how the relationships between and among the firms' owners, managers, and boards of directors influence environmental performance. We are particularly interested in understanding the interactions among these three key sets of actors. In the end, we offer some observations about governance practices and discuss the implications for theory.

Why do some innovators freely reveal their intellectual property? This empirical puzzle has been a focal point of debate in the R&D literature. We show that innovators may share proprietary technology with rivals for free—even if it does not directly benefit them—to slow down competition. By disclosing IP, innovators indirectly induce rivals to wait and imitate instead of concurrently investing in innovation, which alleviates competitive pressure. In contrast with the classical strategy view, our paper also shows that imitators may not always benefit from interfirm knowledge spillovers. Specifically, imitators may want to limit the know‐how that they can freely appropriate from innovators. Otherwise, innovators have fewer incentives to quickly develop new technologies, which, ultimately, reduces the pace and profits of imitation.

We argue that female representation in top management brings informational and social diversity benefits to the top management team, enriches the behaviors exhibited by managers throughout the firm, and motivates women in middle management. The result should be improved managerial task performance and thus better firm performance. We test our theory using 15 years of panel data on the top management teams of the S&P 1,500 firms. We find that female representation in top management improves firm performance but only to the extent that a firm's strategy is focused on innovation, in which context the informational and social benefits of gender diversity and the behaviors associated with women in management are likely to be especially important for managerial task performance.

Building a complex portfolio of products can be beneficial for young firms due to increased sales growth and competitiveness. Yet, the benefits from product portfolio complexity (PPC) are often outweighed by rising costs, leading to an inverted U‐shaped relationship between PPC and performance. Recent research has called for an increased understanding of how firms are able to better manage higher levels of PPC. We suggest that absorptive capacity and ambidexterity are vital to enhancing the benefits and mitigating the costs of increasing PPC. Using a sample of 215 young high technology firms, we find support for positive moderating effects of absorptive capacity and ambidexterity on the inverted U‐shaped relationship between PPC and firm performance.