In this issue Bauerschmidt critiques a recent Strategic Management Journal paper dealing with the absence of strategy. In this paper (Inkpen and Choudhury, 1995), we argued that strategy absence should be viewed as a legitimate phenomenon of interest. Bauerschmidt maintained that we failed to instill a new strategy paradigm and challenged our arguments as a rhetorical ploy. Unfortunately, Bauerschmidt misinterpreted our intended message. Although we challenged the conventional wisdom that every firm must have an articulated strategy, instilling a new paradigm was not our objective. Our main argument was that the concept of absence may help strategy researchers better understand existing paradigms.

Abstract Knowledge is too problematic a concept to make the task of building a dynamic knowledge‐based theory of the firm easy. We must also distinguish the theory from the resource‐based and evolutionary views. The paper begins with a multitype epistemology which admits both the pre‐ and subconscious modes of human knowing and, reframing the concept of the cognizing individual, the collective knowledge of social groups. While both Nelson and Winter, and Nonaka and Takeuchi, successfully sketch theories of the dynamic interactions of these types of organizational knowledge, neither indicates how they are to be contained. Callon and Latour suggest knowledge itself is dynamic and contained within actor networks, so moving us from knowledge as a resource toward knowledge as a process. To simplify this approach, we revisit sociotechnical systems theory, adopt three heuristics from the social constructionist literature, and make a distinction between the systemic and component attributes of the actor network. The result is a very different mode of theorizing, less an objective statement about the nature of firms ‘out there’ than a tool to help managers discover their place in the firm as a dynamic knowledge‐based activity system.

Empirical studies using Federal Trade Commission Line of Business data have reported that industry membership explains between 17 percent and 20 percent of financial performance variance among firms. This study attempts to replicate these findings using an alternative sample and a methodology based on executives' perceptions. The results support those reported in previous studies, with industry factors explaining about 20 percent of overall performance variance. Moreover, the analysis produces empirically derived industry factors, and examines their relative power in explaining industry performance variance.

This commentary was distributed at the Mexico City meeting of the Strategic Management Society, and forms the basis for the Call for Papers made for the 1996 SMS meeting to be held in Phoenix, Arizona, USA, November 10–13, 1996 at The Pointe Hilton Resort. The Editors of the SMJ thought it worth drawing to our readers' attention and offer it here as an interesting perspective on our field, the issues it now faces, and by implication, what research and practice must confront over the years ahead.

This paper combines the statistical insights of dynamic strategic group analysis with the qualitative richness of historical analysis to explore the modes of entry, expansion paths, and competitive postures of European firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. Patterns of entry and market development over a 20-year period are analyzed. The roles of strategic assets and competencies in determining both the entry strategy and the final competitive posture of these firms in the U.S. market are discussed.

It has been widely argued that the purpose of corporate restructuring during the 1980s was to produce a population of more industry-specialized, competitive firms in response to intensifying global competition. A number of studies show that corporate restructuring resulted in increased corporate focus during the 1980s. However, no study has yet examined whether corporate restructuring resulted in increased specialization at the industry level during the 1980s. This study examines this issue. First, we examine whether or not aggregate industry specialization increased during the 1980s. That is, we ask: did the average firm in any given U.S. industry become more or less specialized to that industry during the 1980s? Second, we examine whether corporate restructuring was a significant determinant of change in aggregate industry specialization during the 1980s. Using a sample of 686 four-digit SIC industries and 64 two-digit industry groups, this study finds that aggregate industry specialization declined very slightly at both the four-digit and two-digit level between 1981 and 1989. This study also finds that sell-offs of establishments through corporate control transactions or interfirm asset sales had no significant effect on aggregate industry specialization.

It has been widely argued that the purpose of corporate restructuring during the 1980s was to produce a population of more industry-specialized, competitive firms in response to intensifying global competition. A number of studies show that corporate restructuring resulted in increased corporate focus during the 1980s. However, no study has yet examined whether corporate restructuring resulted in increased specialization at the industry level during the 1980s. This study examines this issue. First, we examine whether or not aggregate industry specialization increased during the 1980s. That is, we ask: did the average firm in any given U.S. industry become more or less specialized to that industry during the 1980s? Second, we examine whether corporate restructuring was a significant determinant of change in aggregate industry specialization during the 1980s. Using a sample of 686 four-digit SIC industries and 64 two-digit industry groups, this study finds that aggregate industry specialization declined very slightly at both the four-digit and two-digit level between 1981 and 1989. This study also finds that sell-offs of establishments through corporate control transactions or interfirm asset sales had no significant effect on aggregate industry specialization.

Abstract The explosion of interest in knowledge and its management reflects the trend towards ‘knowledge work’ and the Information Age, and recognition of knowledge as the principal source of economic rent. The papers in this Special Issue represent an attempt by strategy scholars (and some outside our traditional field) to come to terms with the implications of knowledge for the theory of the firm and its management. They are the product of a convergence of several streams of research which have addressed management implications of knowledge, including the management of technology, the economics of innovation and information, resource‐based theory, and organizational learning. At the theoretical level, knowledge‐centered approaches of Penrose, Arrow, Hayek and others have been enriched by contributions from evolutionary economists (notably Nelson and Winter) and epistemologists (notably M. Polanyi). At the empirical level, research into innovation and its diffusion originated by Mansfield, Griliches and others has been extended through studies which investigate tacit as well as explicit knowledge, and explore knowledge transfer within as well as across firms.