We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank’s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank’s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research.

We study firms' investment in internal controls to reduce accounting manipulation. We first show that peer managers' manipulation decisions are strategic complements: one manager manipulates more if he believes that reports of peer firms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, one firm's investment in internal controls has a positive externality on peer firms. It reduces its own manager's manipulation, which, in turn, mitigates the manipulation pressure on managers at peer firms. Firms do not internalize this positive externality and, thus, underinvest in their internal controls over financial reporting. The problem of underinvestment provides one justification for regulatory intervention in firms' internal controls choices.

We propose a model to study how auditing standards affect audit quality. We posit that both auditors' incentives and expertise are relevant for audit effectiveness. Auditing standards are useful in mitigating the auditors' possible misalignment of interest with investors. However, auditing standards also restrict auditors' exercise of professional judgment, which, in turn, leads to compliance mentality and reduces auditors' incentives to become competent in the first place. We identify the conditions under which stricter auditing standards increase or decrease audit quality. Moreover, stricter auditing standards always increase audit fees, but can benefit auditors at firms' expense. The model also generates many testable empirical predictions.

In this paper, we analyze the social value of accounting objectivity in maintaining financial stability. Building on an early influential accounting study by Ijiri and Jaedicke (1966), we operationalize two informational properties, accuracy (free of collective bias) and objectivity (degree of consensus), in a correlated information structure and embed them into a model of runs on financial institutions. We show that when compared with the accuracy property, the objectivity property exhibits an advantage in mitigating inefficient panic-based runs. In fact, it is possible that improving objectivity discourages such runs, whereas improving accuracy encourages them. Our model also sheds light on the design of optimal accounting systems to enhance objectivity. We find that to generate a more objective accounting report, accounting systems should be designed to be less vulnerable to intentional managerial intervention.

We study the economic impacts of adopting harmonized accounting standards when firms’ investments exhibit beauty contest features. We model harmonized accounting standards as common/correlated noises in firms’ accounting reports. We show that while more harmonized accounting standards have ambiguous effects on the reports’ informativeness in representing firms’ underlying fundamentals, they always reduce their usefulness in forecasting aggregate investments. Therefore, the stronger the beauty contest features, the more important the forecasts about the aggregate investment, thus calling for less harmonized accounting standards. We also find that, absent beauty contest features, mandatory adoption of harmonized accounting standards can be unnecessary; however, such a mandate is warranted when beauty contest features are strong as firms, when left on their own, would not voluntarily do so. Taken together, our results provide both a justification for and identification of an unintended consequence of the recent mandates toward adopting harmonized accounting standards.

Corporate managers are often better informed than outside investors about the uncertain future benefits of investments. However, information about investment prospects is not verifiable and therefore not amenable to direct disclosure, but instead inferred by investors from other accounting disclosures. Given this situation, we study the normative question of how the market’s perceptions of uncertainty and its beliefs about the expected level of future benefits of investment should factor into mandatory financial reports of investment expenditures. We establish a threshold of uncertainty in future benefits beyond which it is better to aggregate investment expenditures with cash flow from ongoing operations, rather than measuring and reporting the two separately. We obtain the surprising result that the higher the expectation of future benefits, the lower this uncertainty threshold should be.

This paper examines banks' choice between fair-value and historical-cost accounting when reported accounting information is used in capital requirement regulation. We center our analysis on a key difference between fair-value and historical-cost accounting: the frequency with which asset value changes are reported. We show that the elasticity of banks' loan returns to aggregate lending is a critical determinant of the interaction between capital adequacy requirements and accounting choices. If lending returns are inelastic, then higher capital requirements reduce fair-value usage. By contrast, higher capital requirements encourage fair value if capital requirements are low and lending returns are sufficiently elastic. In equilibrium, banks may elect different accounting choices, and we find that mandating uniform adoption of historical cost (fair value) is desirable when capital requirements are loose (tight). Our study offers many other implications about fundamental links between accounting and prudential choices.

We study the interaction between interbank competition and accounting information quality and their effects on banks' risk-taking behavior. We identify an endogenous false-alarm cost that banks incur when forced to sell assets to meet capital requirements. We find that when the interbank competition is less intense, an improvement in the quality of accounting information encourages banks to take more risk. Keeping the banks' investments in loans constant, the provision of high-quality accounting information reduces the false-alarm cost of assets sales and improves the discriminating efficiency of the capital requirement policy. When considering the banks' endogenous investment decisions, however, this improvement in discriminating efficiency causes excessive risk-taking, because banks respond by competing more aggressively in the deposit market, and the increase in deposit costs motivates banks to take more risk. Our paper shows that improving information quality increases risk-taking with mild competition, but has no effect under fierce competition.

This paper studies the value of a firm’s internal information when the firm faces an adverse selection problem arising from unobservable managerial abilities. Although more precise information allows the firm to make ex post more efficient investment decisions, noisier information has an ex ante screening effect that allows the firm to attract on-average better managers. The tradeoff between more effective screening of managers and more informed investment implies a nonmonotonic relationship between firm value and information quality. A marginal improvement in information quality does not necessarily lead to an overall improvement in firm value.