Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the reputational impact of an audit office issuing adverse internal control opinions (adverse ICOs). While prior research has examined how clients that receive an adverse ICO respond, we focus on clients that did not receive an adverse ICO. We find that audit offices that issue more adverse ICOs experience lower growth and that this effect is stronger when the adverse ICO is associated with a more visible client or refers to an entity-level control weakness. Finally, we find that clients are less likely to select auditors that have a history of issuing adverse ICOs, and auditors are able to recoup some of their lost growth when they issue fewer adverse ICOs. Our results indicate that the market for audit services penalizes auditors for disclosing information critical of management, which undermines the value of direct-to-investor auditor communications and provides insight into potential longer-term implications of the expanded auditor's report.

We examine whether board demographic diversity enhances cognitive diversity (measured as director dissent in the boardroom) and monitoring. At the director level, we find that individual directors who are dissimilar relative to other board members in terms of tenure and experience are more likely to dissent. At the board level, boards composed of directors who have heterogenous tenure, experience, and gender are more likely to dissent. We also find that stock market reactions to director resignation announcements are more negative for directors who have ever dissented than for other directors. Moreover, following dissent-driven proposal rejections, firms experience an improvement in value and internal governance and a decrease in risk. The results suggest that directors who have diverse qualifications and skillsets as well as the inclusion of female directors enhance cognitive diversity, and that this enhanced cognitive diversity helps increase firm value and monitoring effectiveness.

Short sellers assist in impounding negative news more quickly into stock prices and improve price informativeness. However, there is a lack of consistent evidence about whether short sellers trade predominantly in anticipation of, or in response to, a public information release. To shed light on this question, we exploit Reg SHO, which reduced the constraints faced by short sellers for a subsample of U.S. firms, to examine price informativeness before, during, and after earnings announcements. We show that relative to control firms, pilot firms have greater (less) price informativeness before (during) earnings announcements, suggesting that short sellers trade in anticipation of public earnings news, rather than in response to the public news. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

A dedicated investor relations (IR) function facilitates direct and ongoing dialog between management and shareholders. This paper examines whether this form of engagement mitigates activism that relies upon support from other shareholders. We find that IR engagement is associated with increased investor confidence in management and the board, as well as a lower likelihood of activism, with this deterrent effect becoming stronger when there are fewer frictions surrounding the development of mutual understanding and trust with investors. We also find that when firms do experience an activist campaign, firms with IR engagement have less costly and contentious campaigns, including a lower likelihood of CEO turnover, than those without such a commitment. Taken together, our findings suggest that direct and ongoing IR engagement is an important factor in achieving mutual understanding and trust between the firm and its shareholders, which deters activist investors and mitigates the costly escalation of initiated campaigns.

This study examines how activity-based costing (ABC) cost driver framing affects suppliers' ability to increase their bargaining power when negotiating with powerful customers. Results of an experiment show that suppliers with the potential to contribute to increasing joint profits (high contribution potential) earn a higher share of joint profits than suppliers with low contribution potential. High contribution potential suppliers have higher bargaining power because of their ability to increase customers' dependence on negotiated agreements. However, the advantage of having high contribution potential is reduced when suppliers are provided with externally framed cost drivers (costs represented as being driven by customers' activities) instead of internally framed cost drivers (costs represented as being driven by suppliers' activities). Analyses of negotiators' behavior show that suppliers with high contribution potential and internally framed cost drivers use more integrative tactics to increase joint profits, allowing them to earn higher shares of joint profits.

We examine the effect of foreign employment on two outcomes—income shifting and the tax uncertainty of foreign transactions. Using a hand-collected sample of employment disclosures, we partition our sample into firm-years with a higher or lower degree of foreign employment. Using two distinct income shifting models, we document that, on average, a high degree of foreign employment is associated with greater tax-motivated income shifting out of the U.S. We also posit and find that a high degree of foreign employment enhances the economic substance of foreign transactions, reducing the tax uncertainty associated with foreign income. We conduct additional analyses to mitigate selection bias concerns, and we use exogenous changes to the costs and benefits of income shifting using foreign employment to strengthen identification. Our results highlight firms' use of employees as part of a tax-efficient supply chain and how foreign employment enhances income shifting opportunities between jurisdictions.

We investigate how institutional (non-commercial bank) investors that simultaneously invest in a firm's debt and equity (dual-holders) influence the firm's voluntary disclosure. Because institutional dual-holders trade on private information gleaned through lending relationships, we predict and find that borrowers increase earnings forecast disclosure to reduce these investors' information advantage following the origination of loans with their participation. We also show that the increase in disclosure is stronger when the access to a borrower's private information endows dual-holders with a greater information advantage and when the consequences of this access are likely to be more pronounced. We further find that institutional dual-holders earn excess returns when trading equity of non-guider firms following loan origination, but not when firms issue guidance, confirming that earnings disclosure helps level the playing field among investors. Our findings highlight that firms actively use disclosure to mitigate the adverse effect of dual-holders on their information environment.

Studies find evidence that opportunistic reporting often accompanies fair value measurement. However, research has not determined whether the source of this opportunism is the estimate of fair value. Using detailed information on insurers' investment holdings, we separate the use of fair value measurement discretion from the application of non-measurement-related discretion in accounting for impairments of financial assets. Our evidence contradicts the view that fair value measurement discretion plays a large role in opportunistic avoidance of impairment recognition for investment securities. Instead, managers appear to avoid recording impairment losses by opportunistically applying subjective criteria regarding perceived loss persistence and intent to hold. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Auditing standards vary in their degree of prescriptive language—for example, stating that auditors “could” versus “should” do certain procedures. We posit that more prescriptive language primes an implemental mindset, thereby creating a feeling of regulatory fit with objective verification tasks and improving auditors' performance on these tasks. In an experiment with audit students, we find that participants who apply a more (versus less) prescriptive auditing standard perform better on a subsequent, unrelated ticking-and-tying task, and this effect is larger for participants who identify less with the audit profession. Theory-consistent evidence indicates that the interaction of regulatory fit and professional identity improves performance via increased motivation. Our study provides evidence that features of the audit environment prime mindsets, that these primed mindsets can affect performance on low-level tasks, and that the effect of regulatory fit for low-level tasks is particularly important for those who identify less with the audit profession.

This study examines whether audit adjustments are a mechanism that links the effect of mandatory internal control audits (MICAs) on financial reporting quality. We argue that the requirement for auditors to publicly disclose internal control weaknesses exacerbated auditor-client conflicts and that this resulted in auditors being less likely to detect (and correct) misstatements in their clients' pre-audit financial statements. Consistent with this argument, we find significant reductions in audit adjustments following the staggered introduction of MICAs using data from China. We find the reductions in audit adjustments are associated with significant increases in material misstatements following the introduction of MICAs. In contrast, we find that the introduction of MICAs led to a significant reduction in material misstatements among clients that did not experience reductions in audit adjustments. Overall, the two effects offset each other, which explains why financial reporting quality did not improve, on average, following the introduction of MICAs.