Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Most research on non-GAAP financial measures focuses on earnings or earnings per share, although non-GAAP revenue disclosure has recently attracted SEC scrutiny. It is unclear ex ante what non-GAAP adjustments could improve revenue's usefulness because, unlike earnings, revenue is a top-line number related primarily to core (i.e., persistent) business activities. We present the first archival analysis of non-GAAP revenues using a large, hand-collected sample of disclosures from 2015 to 2018. Approximately one in five earnings announcements contains a non-GAAP revenue disclosure, focused on revenue growth. Our evidence suggests that firms disclose non-GAAP revenue when GAAP revenue is incomparable with prior periods, and not to compensate for poor GAAP performance. Furthermore, non-GAAP revenue growth predicts future revenue growth better than GAAP revenue growth, and the market responds to this information. Overall, non-GAAP revenue disclosures are motivated by economic fundamentals rather than opportunism, on average, and they provide investors with relevant information.

ABSTRACT When a firm's input supplier can acquire and misreport private information to gain an edge in negotiations, we show that the firm can blunt the supplier's informational advantage by permitting inefficiencies in its own internal production. Specifically, we establish that a modest increase in the cost of the input(s) a firm makes internally credibly commits it to be more aggressive in negotiations with a supplier for the input(s) the firm buys. Recognizing that its potential information rents will be limited, the supplier, in turn, becomes less aggressive in information acquisition. The paper fully characterizes the equilibrium—the firm's investments, the supplier's information acquisition and reporting decisions, and the terms of trade—to demonstrate that often-maligned internal bloat can be an endogenous facilitator of efficient outsourcing.

ABSTRACT We examine whether lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower's earnings as inputs when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. We find that, among debt contracts that include an earnings covenant, earnings thresholds are set closer to analyst forecasts when analysts have historically issued more accurate earnings forecasts. These results are robust to firm fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. Further, we find that, following a plausibly exogenous decline in the availability of analyst earnings forecasts, debt contracts are less likely to include earnings covenants. Our evidence is consistent with lenders using analyst earnings forecasts as an input when establishing debt covenant thresholds and suggests sell-side analysts play a role in debt contracting.

ABSTRACT While accounting research has extensively examined initial guidance disclosures, the disclosures that managers make when initial forecasts become materially inaccurate have received much less attention. These updates are unique because managers are communicating that their initial forecasts are no longer correct. In this context, we examine how earnings forecast withdrawals affect managers' reporting reputation, relative to earnings revisions and nondisclosure. While managers face immediate negative market consequences after withdrawals, they enjoy reputational benefits (in the form of improved credibility) in the long run when guidance updates resume. In contrast, reporting reputation does not improve for managers who revise forecasts or for those who choose not to update at all. Difference-in-differences analyses confirm this incremental boost to credibility that is associated with withdrawals. This evidence suggests disclosing what managers do not know may be as important as disclosing what they do know when building a reporting reputation.

ABSTRACT We investigate the consequences for non-promoted executives (NPEs) in CEO tournaments. We find that NPEs' total incentives decrease following the end of a tournament based on evidence of their reduced future promotion prospects and limited adjustments to their compensation. Consistent with the theory that NPEs leave in response to this loss in incentives, results indicate that turnover is higher for NPEs who: (1) are ex ante more competitive for promotion, (2) compete in open tournaments without an heir apparent versus closed tournaments with an heir apparent winner, and (3) compete in tournaments with an outsider versus insider winner. Departed NPEs' subsequent career outcomes suggest that the labor market assesses NPEs who leave after open tournaments more favorably than those who leave after closed tournaments and tournaments with an outsider winner. Overall, evidence suggests that promotion tournaments can weed out low-quality managers, but also cause the unintended turnover of high-quality managers. JEL Classifications: J01; M12; M41; M51.

ABSTRACT We provide the first comprehensive analysis of the properties of investment recommendations generated by “Robo-Analysts,” which are human analyst-assisted computer programs conducting automated research analysis. Our results indicate that Robo-Analyst recommendations differ from those produced by traditional “human” research analysts across several important dimensions. First, Robo-Analysts produce a more balanced distribution of buy, hold, and sell recommendations than do human analysts and are less likely to recommend “glamour” stocks and firms with prospective investment banking business. Second, automation allows Robo-Analysts to revise their recommendations more frequently than human analysts and incorporate information from complex periodic filings. Third, while Robo-Analysts' recommendations exhibit weak short-window return reactions, they have long-term investment value. Specifically, portfolios formed based on the buy recommendations of Robo-Analysts significantly outperform those of human analysts. Overall, our results suggest that automation in the sell-side research industry can benefit investors. JEL Classifications: G14; G24.

ABSTRACT We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder's information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner's curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival's participation. In turn, an endogenous disclosure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders' payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare, but increasing shareholders' payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure. JEL Classifications: D44; D82; G34; M41.

ABSTRACT Market prices and trading are important information constructs that reveal information to market participants. I study how the observability of market prices and trading (hereafter, market transparency) affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable. I find that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices/trading become observable, suggesting that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. This effect is stronger for firms whose revealed prices contain more new information, and it is more pronounced for the disclosure of bad news. I corroborate my results using (1) a controlled experiment, in which prices/trading were revealed for randomly selected bonds, and also (2) relevant threshold rules. Together, my results suggest that increased market transparency improves investors' access to information not only directly, by revealing the information contained in returns/trading, but also indirectly, by increasing corporate disclosure.

ABSTRACT This paper studies whether and how mandatory nonfinancial disclosure affects firms' real decisions. I exploit a disclosure regulation enacted in California, which mandates that firms disclose how they conduct due diligence to address their suppliers' human rights abuses. I find that treated firms increase their supply chain due diligence, and their suppliers' human rights performance improves following the regulation. The effects are stronger when firms face greater pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and socially conscious shareholders, when customers have greater incentives to use the newly disclosed information, and when the regulation leads to a larger increase in information comparability. Collectively, the results suggest that mandatory nonfinancial disclosure can affect firms' real decisions through market mechanisms and that stakeholder responses play a key role. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G18; G38; J80; K22; K31; K38; L23; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT We examine how increased competition stemming from an innovation in financial technology influences sell-side analyst research quality. We find that firms added to Estimize, an open platform that crowdsources short-term earnings forecasts, experience a pervasive and substantial reduction in consensus bias and a limited increase in consensus accuracy relative to matched control firms. Long-term forecasts and investment recommendations remain similarly biased, alleviating the concern that the documented reduction in bias is a response to broad economic forces. At the individual analyst level, we find that bias reduction is more pronounced among close-to-management analysts, and that more biased analysts respond by reducing their coverage of Estimize firms. The collective evidence suggests that competition from Estimize improves sell-side research quality by discouraging strategic bias.