Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Disclosure theory predicts that the likelihood of voluntary disclosures increases with the noise level in mandatory disclosures. We test this prediction by exploiting a unique setting where firms simultaneously provide two forecasts of the same metric—annual effective tax rates (ETRs). We find that managers are more likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts when mandatory ETR forecasts contain more noise due to tax complexity, suggesting that managers resort to voluntary disclosure when mandatory disclosure constrains their ability to convey private information. Using analysts’ ETR forecast revisions to assess the informativeness of the two ETR forecasts, we find that both forecasts are incrementally informative. In addition, analysts weight voluntary ETR forecasts more heavily, especially when voluntary ETR forecasts are non-GAAP based and when discrete items are present. Overall, we provide evidence on the relation between and the informativeness of voluntary and mandatory disclosures by examining two competing forecasts issued simultaneously.

ABSTRACT During the interactive process of issue resolution, client managers may develop expectations about the auditor’s position. We examine the effect that negative expectancy violations have on managers’ pre-negotiation positions and how relational familiarity can moderate this effect. Through a series of experiments, we find that, when the partner’s proposed adjustment is within the client’s original expectations, managers offer greater concessions to a more familiar partner than to a less familiar partner. However, depending on relational familiarity, client managers react to expectancy violations very differently. Managers react more severely when a more familiar partner violates expectations, offering lower negotiation concessions than when no violation occurs. In contrast, managers tend to ignore violations committed by a less familiar partner, offering similar negotiation concessions whether or not a violation has occurred. Furthermore, we find support for a practical intervention to repair damage from expectancy violations committed by more familiar partners.

ABSTRACT We examine outside board appointments of executives allegedly involved in governance failures—“tainted” executives—to shed light on appointing firms’ underlying motivations. Less attractive firms and those with greater advising needs are more likely to appoint tainted executives to their boards than other firms are. Tainted appointees are less likely to be placed on the nominating and governance committees than nontainted appointees. Tainted appointees have similar or better skill sets compared with nontainted appointees. Firms that appoint tainted executives to their boards display an improvement in operating performance in the postappointment period relative to the preappointment period and relative to a matched control sample. We do not find evidence of poor monitoring outcomes for these firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that board needs, not a conspicuous attempt to weaken monitoring, drive the appointment of tainted executives to boards. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34; K22; M41.

ABSTRACT Regulation is often proposed, developed, and finalized over a lengthy rule-making period prior to its adoption. We examine the period over which banking authorities discussed, adopted, and implemented Basel III to understand how firms respond to proposed regulation. We find evidence to suggest that affected banks not only lobbied rule-makers against it but also made strategic financial reporting changes and altered their business models in ways that reduced their exposure to the proposed rule prior to rule-makers finalizing the regulation. Further, our results indicate a sequential response, with banks responding through lobbying and strategic financial reporting prior to making business model changes. These findings highlight the interplay among firms’ financial reporting, business model, and political choices in response to proposed regulation and indicate that the appropriate date for an event study may be the regulation’s announcement date rather than its adoption or implementation dates. JEL Classifications: G14; G21; G28; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT We use posts on the investor-focused StockTwits social media network to generate new insights regarding investor disagreement, disclosure processing costs, and trading volume around earnings announcements. Using social media-based measures of disagreement, we find that both preannouncement disagreement and increases in disagreement around an earnings announcement are positively associated with trading volume. Drawing upon the disclosure processing costs literature, we provide evidence that the effects of disagreement increase when disclosure processing costs are lower. Our social media measures of disagreement remain significant after including traditional analyst earnings estimate measures of disagreement in the model. Our study provides new evidence on the importance of disclosure processing costs and is consistent with lower disclosure processing costs amplifying both the resolution of preannouncement disagreement and new disagreement about earnings information. Data Availability All data are available from the sources described in the text.

ABSTRACT Research suggests that employees work harder under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. We build on this literature by examining how the motivational advantage of penalty contracts depends on a common aspect of real-world contracts: payoff ambiguity. With payoff ambiguity, employees provide effort without knowing how much pay they will receive for a given level of performance. According to our theory, this ambiguity opens the door for employee optimism, which has contrasting effects under each contract frame. Results from an experiment support this theory, with an increase in ambiguity leading to less employee effort with penalty contracts (as employees optimistically expect small penalties) and more effort with bonus contracts (as employees optimistically expect large bonuses). We also find that these effects are stronger for more dispositionally optimistic employees. Overall, our results suggest that bonus contracts may be more motivating and penalty contracts less motivating than previously thought.

ABSTRACT We study the effect of executives’ pledges of integrity on firms’ financial reporting outcomes by exploiting a 2016 regulation that requires holders of Dutch professional accounting degrees to pledge an integrity oath. We identify chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) required to take the integrity oath and find that firms reduce income-increasing discretionary accruals after executives took the oath. These firms also reduce discretionary expenditures, indicating that oath-taking executives reduce overall earnings management and do not merely substitute accruals-based with real-activities earnings management. These effects are concentrated in firms where the CFO took the oath. Overall, our results indicate that integrity oaths for executives improve firms’ financial reporting quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.

ABSTRACT We address how value relevance of accounting information evolved as the new economy developed. Prior research concludes that accounting information—primarily earnings—has lost relevance. We consider more accounting items and find no decline in combined value relevance from 1962 to 2018. We assess evolution in each item’s value relevance and find increases, most notably for items related to intangible assets, growth opportunities, and alternative performance measures, which are important in the new economy. The number of relevant items also increases. We also consider separately new economy, old economy profit, and old economy loss firms. The trends are more pronounced for, but extend beyond, new economy firms. We base inferences on a nonparametric approach that does not require specifying the valuation relation. Taken together, our findings reveal an evolution to a more nuanced, but not declining, relation between accounting information and share price. JEL Classifications: C14; G10; G18; M40; M41.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the informativeness of special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) revenue forecasts. We document a positive association between the compound annual growth rate in revenue forecasts and abnormal returns, retail trading, and Twitter activity in the five-day window surrounding the disclosure of a merger announcement. By contrast, we find limited evidence that institutional investors and traditional information intermediaries respond to SPAC revenue forecasts. We also find evidence that SPAC revenue forecasts positively predict future operating underperformance, stock underperformance, and class action lawsuits. Overall, our results affirm the SEC’s concerns about the attractiveness of aggressive revenue projections to retail investors. JEL Classifications: G34; G32; M40; M48.

ABSTRACT I examine inspector-auditor interactions and test proposed changes to the existing inspection process using a stylized experiment with real-effort and repeated interactions. I first show that when holding incentives constant, if inspectors perceive incentives to request additional audit work, they escalate their deficiency assessments and request more additional audit work. I then show that increasing inspector-auditor discussions before inspectors formally assess auditors’ work tempers those heightened requests. For auditors, I find that, over time, they begin to anticipate inspectors’ requests and perform additional audit work before inspection. Supplemental analyses show that auditors view inspectors more positively when auditors may perform the inspector-requested work after inspection without added penalty, which is unlike the current inspection process. Inspectors view auditors similarly, regardless of the inspection process used. JEL Classifications: C91; M42; M48; M52.