Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Oversight responsibilities for many audit committees (ACs) are evolving to include some of the hottest topics in the boardroom: enterprise risk management, cybersecurity, and environmental, social, and governance reporting. However, certain ACs avoid overseeing these evolving areas, creating significant variation across boards in the assignment of responsibilities. In this study, we seek to understand how ACs respond when environmental changes create new evolving risks that may extend the boundary of their traditional domain. To do so, we interview a diverse set of 29 AC members from U.S. publicly traded companies. We analyze our data through the theoretical lens of collaborative boundary work to identify how ACs respond by extending, blurring, or maintaining their perceived oversight boundaries, the related implications of these decisions, and their key tactics employed to manage AC workload. Our findings should be of interest to boards, investors, and regulators tasked with monitoring AC effectiveness. JEL Classifications: G34; M41; M42.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether meeting Wall Street’s expectations affects rank-and-file employees’ satisfaction. Controlling for firms’ underlying financial performance, we find that those currently working for firms that meet or marginally beat analysts’ forecasts experience increased job satisfaction. This positive effect is concentrated among employees who are less transient, receive more nonexecutive stock options, or are more unionized. Furthermore, the positive effect exists only when employees do not incur higher costs associated with reaching the threshold because they overwork, suffer from labor law violations, or experience layoffs. Lastly, more senior or highly skilled employees respond more strongly when their employer meets Wall Street’s expectations. These results suggest that the effect of meeting earnings targets on employee satisfaction is significant when employees’ incentives align more with those of their employer or when employees are not unduly pressured. Data Availability: Data are commercially available. JEL Classifications: M41.

ABSTRACT We examine how common media holding companies impact the uniqueness of business press content. Consistent with common media holding companies reducing the diversity of perspectives among journalists, we find that media outlets are more likely to cover the same earnings announcement and utilize more similar tone and content when they belong to a common holding company. We provide evidence that these effects are enhanced by outlet reach and economic incentives to share content. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with coverage by common media holding companies impeding price formation. Overall, our findings suggest that content within common media holding companies is less diverse and that this may have negative implications for markets. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49; G10; G14; L82.

ABSTRACT Firms’ use of accounting discretion to report a smooth earnings profile is commonly believed to be pervasive. We examine whether smoothing, at least partly, reflects managerial attempts to avert unhealthy pressures from outsiders who cannot fully disentangle the impact of transitory shocks from sustainable trends in value creation. Using variation in firms’ ability to hedge foreign currency (forex) exposure through derivatives, we find that firms are less likely to smooth earnings when they can better shield their business from extraneous forex fluctuations. Our findings inform the debate on discretion in accounting rules and illustrate how markets that facilitate efficient reallocation of risk can shape the informational properties of accounting output. JEL Classifications: F31; G32; M41.

ABSTRACT Firms commonly employ leaderboards within their peer-to-peer recognition programs. We experimentally investigate how ranking basis—variation in the measure firms use to determine leaderboard rankings—affects employees’ proactive helping behavior. We find that leaderboards ranking employees based on the number of times peer-to-peer recognition is received decrease proactive helping compared with when no leaderboard is provided. Conversely, leaderboards ranking employees based on the number of times peer-to-peer recognition is given increase proactive helping compared with when no leaderboard is provided. These findings underscore the influence of ranking basis on shaping motives linked to proactive helping behavior. Furthermore, these findings highlight for firms the importance of judiciously selecting a ranking basis when utilizing peer-to-peer recognition leaderboards. JEL Classifications: C92; D91; M41; M54.

ABSTRACT We describe the development of public company auditing in the U.S. in the early 20th century to gain perspective on current developments in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) assurance. Using a broad sample of historical annual reports spanning four decades, we document three facts: first, the spread of public company auditing occurred steadily over the span of several decades. Second, audit services were initially heterogeneous but became standardized through the audit profession’s efforts and interactions with private and public actors. Third, the role of regulation in those early developments was seemingly limited to codifying existing practices, as the first federal audit regulation was introduced only late in the development of the profession and did not significantly impact capital markets. Our historical evidence helps us understand how we arrived at today’s widely accepted and highly regulated financial audits. It uncovers parallels to and offers lessons for current developments in ESG assurance. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G18; G34; M42.

ABSTRACT We examine how managers’ incentives to minimize litigation risk interact with the unique features of environmental information to shape disclosure decisions. We rely on peer firms’ lawsuits to generate variation in environmental disclosure litigation risk, consistent with prior research and anecdotal evidence suggesting that firms perceive an increase in environmental disclosure litigation risk after a peer firm is sued for related disclosures. Although we provide mixed evidence around changes in total environmental disclosure in response to peer lawsuits, we offer robust evidence that firms provide more forward-looking (and less historical) environmental disclosures in their conference calls in response to peers’ environmental disclosure lawsuits. Our evidence is consistent with firms providing less verifiable disclosures to minimize the risk of being sued for misrepresenting their environmental information. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K22; M14; M41.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the impact of accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) on the compensation policies of nonaccused firms. The investigation focuses on releases in which the SEC mentions top executives’ pursuit of wealth through compensation schemes (i.e., compensation mentioned releases (CMRs)). Using a sample of AAERs from 1992 to 2021, I find that peer firms learn from these CMRs and significantly reduce their CEO’s delta and vega following CMRs. Peer firms also decrease their performance share grants and extend the vesting periods for option grants, resulting in a decrease in the convex payoff structure of CEO pay. Furthermore, I find evidence that peer firms reduce their CEO’s risk-taking incentives to circumvent litigation and prevent misreporting and shareholder scrutiny. Overall, the findings indicate that information describing one firm’s misreporting could affect the compensation policies of other firms, suggesting that regulatory enforcement accompanied by public awareness can effectively shape corporate behaviors. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: J33; G34; G58; M41; M52.

ABSTRACT Agents often inflate measured performance by distorting operating decisions (e.g., real earnings management) and/or reporting decisions (e.g., accruals management). Across four studies, we find that public judgments of distortion’s acceptability largely reflect assessments of how harmful and norm-violating the distortion is. Judgments of operating distortion primarily reflect assessments of harm, whereas judgments of reporting distortion primarily reflect assessments of norm violation. These results are consistent with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Gray, Waytz, and Young 2012; Schein and Gray 2018). We also find that those who perceive an accounting system as more unfairly withholding an agent’s bonus assess distortion (especially reporting distortion) to be less norm-violating. Those who perceive the performance measure as less appropriate for capturing the value of performance to stakeholders assess distortion (especially operating distortion) to be more harmful. Assessments of distortions’ harm and norm violation explain a substantial portion of the variation in acceptability judgments.

ABSTRACT The Big 4 auditors are inspected annually by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), with the summarized findings (labeled “audit deficiencies”) being publicly available on its website. Although the PCAOB claims that its inspection findings and process are designed to increase audit quality, there is limited empirical evidence to support this claim. We examine whether changes in revenue-deficient audit engagements are associated with subsequent year changes in client revenue quality. A revenue-deficient audit engagement is an inspected engagement that has at least one revenue-related audit deficiency. To infer audit quality, we link year-over-year changes in revenue-deficient audit engagements to the subsequent year’s change in engagement-level revenue quality—a common financial reporting quality proxy. We predict that audit firms will react asymmetrically to changes in revenue-deficient audit engagements: increases will prompt audit quality improving actions, but decreases will not. Our results support our prediction. JEL Classifications: M42.