Knowledge that Transforms

This paper explores the ability of investors and analysts to fully process available pension information when establishing prices and making earnings forecasts. I find that neither prices nor forecasts fully reflect the quantifiable future earnings effects of changes in pension information at the time it becomes publicly available in the firm's 10-K. Instead, the evidence suggests that investors and analysts only gradually incorporate this information into prices and forecasts as they observe the effects of the pension plan changes on subsequent quarterly earnings. The persistent tardiness of analysts to incorporate this relevant and economically significant information about earnings is surprising given that they are provided with pension information on a repeated and timely basis. Additionally, I find that the off-balance-sheet portion of the pension plan's funded status and the PBO are predictive of future returns while the on-balance-sheet portion of the funded status is not. This implies that investors do not accurately assess the long-run cash flow and earnings implications of these off-balance-sheet pension disclosures. The compensation rate is also predictive of future returns suggesting that it signals management's expectation of future performance.

We study the determinants of organizational slack in large decentralized firms and focus in particular on how management accounting systems (represented by business unit controllers) affect slack. We rely on an adverse selection model to derive several predictions and to motivate our tests. Consistent with this framework, we find that organizational slack (measured by achievability of business unit managers' performance targets) is higher in settings where business unit controllers focus relatively more on providing decision-making information to business unit managers than on providing information for corporate control. We also find that organizational slack is persistent over time and positively associated with business unit growth, our proxy for the extent of information asymmetry between corporate headquarters and local business unit management.

Complex financial statement misstatements that are difficult to diagnose are likely to be described by multiple cues that individually appear innocuous, but that together form an ominous pattern. Because individual auditors are likely to obtain only some of the cues forming the pattern, it is important to understand how well auditors interpret incomplete cue patterns. In this paper, I examine experimentally whether industry-specialist auditors develop problem representations about a seeded misstatement to facilitate interpretation of incomplete patterns. Overall, I find that matched specialists (i.e., those working in their industry) are able to interpret and fill in partialcue patterns, whereas mismatched specialists do not recognize the implications of even full patterns. Matched specialists respond to a partial-cue pattern that potentially indicates misstatement by developing more complete problem representations about the seeded misstatement, assessing higher risk of misstatement, and suggesting procedures that will be efficient and effective at discriminating the presence of the seeded misstatement. Despite higher assessments of misstatement risk when receiving a partial-cue pattern, mismatched specialists' problem representations are impoverished and suggested procedures do not indicate a focus on the seeded misstatement.

This study presents the results of an experiment that examines how two underlying characteristics of pro forma earnings announcements, pro forma emphasis and the presence of a quantitative reconciliation, influence nonprofessional investors' and analysts' reliance on pro forma disclosures. The results indicate that the emphasis management places on pro forma earnings, not the mere presence of pro forma earnings, influences nonprofessional investors' judgments and decisions, but that this influence is mitigated by the presence of a quantitative reconciliation. Further analysis reveals that the influence of pro forma emphasis on nonprofessional investors' judgments and decisions seems to be the result of an unintentional cognitive effect as opposed to the perceived informativeness of the earnings figure emphasized by management. Analysts' judgments and decisions were also affected by the presence of reconciliation, but in the opposite direction to those of nonprofessional investors. Specifically, the presence of a quantitative reconciliation led analysts to view pro forma earnings as more reliable, increasing their reliance on the pro forma disclosure in judging the earnings performance of the firm.

This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is particularly responsive to firms' reporting incentives. We document that private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management and that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management in private and public firms. We also provide evidence that private and public firms respond differentially to institutional factors, such as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection, and capital market structure. Moreover, legal institutions and capital market forces often appear to reinforce each other.

Prior research demonstrates that forecast optimism is, in part, a consequence of analysts' cognitive reactions to the scenarios managers use to communicate future plans. In two experiments, we examine whether counter-explanation (explaining why managers' plans could fail) reduces scenario-induced optimism. We find that when compared to analysts not asked to generate counter-explanations, analysts who complete the relatively easy task of generating few counter-explanations make less optimistic forecasts, but analysts who complete the relatively difficult task of generating many counter-explanations do not. Results demonstrate the usefulness of a cognitive, theory-based mechanism for reducing forecast optimism and suggest a boundary condition for the use of that mechanism.

Rotation of audit partners is one of the main policy initiatives that has been implemented in many jurisdictions around the world to deal with concerns about audit quality. The basis of any requirement limiting the tenure of audit partners is that there is a reduction in audit quality associated with long periods of tenure. Using data from Australia, where the audit partner can be identified and for a period where partner rotation was not mandatory, we examine the association between audit quality and long audit partner tenure. The three measures of audit quality examined are the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern audit opinion for distressed companies, the direction and amount of abnormal working capital accruals, and just beating (missing) earnings benchmarks. For long tenure observations we find a lower propensity to issue a going-concern opinion and some evidence of just beating (missing) earnings benchmarks, consistent with deterioration in audit quality associated with long audit partner tenure. There is no evidence of an association of long audit tenure with abnormal working capital accruals.

Following Sloan (1996), numerous studies document that the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than the cash flow component of earnings. Disagreement exists, however, as to the explanation for this result. One stream of literature follows Sloan's lead in arguing that this result is attributable to accounting distortions (Xie 2001; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Richardson et al. 2005). A second stream of literature argues that this result is attributable to a more general growth effect and that growth-related factors such as diminishing returns to new investment explain the lower persistence of accruals (e.g., Fairfield et al. 2003a; Cooper et al. 2005). We provide new evidence indicating that temporary accounting distortions are a significant contributing factor to the lower persistence of the accrual component of earnings. Our evidence indicates that the lower persistence of accruals extends to accruals that are unrelated to sales growth and that extreme accruals are systematically associated with alleged cases of earnings manipulation.

This study examines how accounting quality relates to firm-level capital investment efficiency. Our first hypothesis is that higher quality accounting enhances investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. Our second hypothesis is that this effect should be stronger in economies where financing is largely provided through arm's-length transactions compared with countries where creditors supply more capital. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses both across and within countries. They are robust to alternative econometric specifications, different measures of accounting quality and investment-cash flow sensitivity, and numerous control variables.

In the context of the statutory tax rate reductions enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, this paper investigates the degree to which capital market participants anticipate and correctly interpret temporary income effects of tax-motivated income shifting. We find evidence consistent with financial analysts' earnings forecasts failing to anticipate earnings management that shifts income from fourth quarters in higher tax rate years to immediately following first quarters of lower tax rate years. The evidence suggests that this failure is not the result of a decision to ignore the income shifting, but rather an inability to recognize temporary components of reported earnings. We also find evidence that market prices do not fully reflect the temporary income effects of tax-motivated income shifting, and that analyst inefficiency explains about half of the market inefficiency. We interpret these inefficiencies as potentially important costs of tax planning that could limit the ability of public firm managers to implement otherwise optimal tax strategies.