Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper we argue that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors generates conservatism in financial statements. Conservatism reduces the manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. This increases firm and equity values. Our empirical tests are consistent with our proposition that information asymmetry is significantly positively related to conservatism after controlling for other demands for conservatism. Further, our tests are more consistent with our prediction that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead to changes in conservatism than the FASB's proposition that conservatism produces information asymmetry among equity investors. An important implication is that, if the FASB was successful in meeting its stated goal of eliminating conservatism, then it would increase information asymmetry between investors, not reduce it. This outcome is inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts.

ABSTRACT: We examine the determinants and consequences of earnings management by firms in the context of their relationships with suppliers and customers. We find that industry-level proxies for relationship-specific investments by suppliers/customers are positively associated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals, volatility of earnings, and the frequency of large earnings increases. We also find that firm-level proxies for the intensity of relationship-specific investments by actual suppliers are positively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In addition, earnings management by the firm in one period is positively related to the magnitude of R&D investments by suppliers and customers in the next period. However, we find that earnings management adversely affects the duration of customer-supplier relationships. Overall, our findings suggest that earnings management is used opportunistically to influence the perception of suppliers/customers about the firm’s prospects.

ABSTRACT: A report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2003 identified auditors’ industry expertise as a critical factor for firms choosing an auditor, and highlighted the extreme levels of auditor concentration in some industries. We posit that the investment opportunity set (IOS) plays a fundamental role in determining whether an industry is an attractive target for auditor specialization. When industry-specific IOS is high, specialist auditors make costly investments in industry-specific knowledge, allowing them to offer a differentiated product and to create entry barriers for other audit firms. When the IOS of firms within an industry is relatively homogeneous, auditors can transfer such knowledge across clients in the industry more easily, resulting in cost savings and scale economies. However, greater homogeneity of IOS in an industry can also increase a client’s aversion to sharing an auditor with its competitors because of concerns about transfers of proprietary information, suggesting that industries with relatively homogeneous IOS are less likely to be dominated by a single auditor. We show that auditor concentration in an industry relates positively to both the level and homogeneity of IOS in the industry, while auditor dominance relates negatively to industry IOS homogeneity. Further, we find that audit fees are positively associated with both levels and homogeneity of industry IOS.

Prior research indicates that audit and tax professionals' judgments are influenced by their client's preferences, both directly and indirectly (via information search). In an experiment with tax professionals as participants, we examine whether high practice risk (i.e., exposure to monetary and nonmonetary costs of making inappropriate recommendations) mitigates these effects. We find that, when facing a client with low practice risk, professionals' search is biased in a manner that leads judgments to be consistent with client preference; however, search is less biased when facing a client with high practice risk, and resulting judgments are less consistent with client preference. We also find that, after controlling for the impact of information search, professionals tend to adjust their recommendations away from the client-preferred position, regardless of practice risk. This study sheds light on the direct and indirect paths by which client preference and practice risk affect professionals' judgments.

ABSTRACT: This study tests whether nai¨ve trading by individual investors, or some class of individual investors, causes post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Inconsistent with the individual trading hypothesis, individual investor trading fails to subsume any of the power of extreme earnings surprises to predict future abnormal returns. Moreover, individuals are significant net buyers after both negative and positive extreme earnings surprises, consistent with an attention effect, but not with their trades causing PEAD. Finally, we find no indication that trading by individuals explains the concentration of drift at subsequent earnings announcement dates.

We empirically examine the effects of intensified scrutiny over non-GAAP reporting on the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions. We find that, on average, exclusions are of higher quality (i.e., more transitory) following intervention by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into non-GAAP reporting. We further find that firms that stopped releasing non-GAAP earnings numbers after the SEC intervention had lower quality exclusions in the pre-intervention period. These results are consistent with the SEC's objectives of improving the quality of non-GAAP earnings figures. However, when we decompose total exclusions into special items and other exclusions, we find evidence that the quality of special items has decreased in the post-intervention period, which suggests that managers adapted to the new disclosure environment by shifting more recurring expenses into special items. This suggests that there may be unintended consequences arising from the heightened scrutiny over non-GAAP reporting.

In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of pre-production commitments made by firms competing in oligopoly markets and disclosure of such commitments. By commitments we refer to any device that provides a strategic incentive to alter production choices. Examples include forward contracts, capital structure, research and development investment, terms of compensation, and cost allocation. If the only purpose underlying commitment is to gain a strategic advantage in product market competition, then the result with disclosure can be characterized by Stackelberg warfare. Many potential commitments have non-strategic effects, implying a trade-off when optimizing, with imperfect achievement of both strategic (deterring rival production) and non-strategic goals. However, given disclosure, we show that in the limit as the number of commitment devices becomes large, firms achieve full Stackelberg warfare and total realization of non-strategic goals. Disclosure in this context is social welfare enhancing.

ABSTRACT: Prior research finds that earnings restatements are linked to CEOs’ excessive option-based compensation and equity holdings. In this paper, we investigate whether firms that experience earnings restatements recontract with their CEOs to reduce their option-based compensation and if so, whether this leads to improved firm performance. Based on 289 restatement firms over the period 1997–2001, we find that the proportion of CEOs’ compensation in the form of options declines significantly in the two years following the restatement. Furthermore, we document that this reduction is accompanied by a decrease in the riskiness of investments, as reflected in lower stock return volatility and subsequent improvements in operating performance. Our results suggest that a decrease in option-based compensation reduces CEOs’ incentives to take excessively risky investments, resulting in improved profitability. Overall, our findings provide insights into the design and efficacy of CEO compensation contracts.

The objective of this study is to provide evidence on how technological innovation conditions underlying the firm's investments drive earnings growth and, hence, market value of equity. Technologies develop and flourish or die out through the combined investment decisions of those firms doing the inventing, and those firms that adopt those inventions, and thereby help to spread (or diffuse) the innovations into wider use. Hence, technology is important for the investment decisions of all firms, regardless of whether they patent. We focus on three aggregate measures of technological innovation conditions: the success rate of past technological investments, technology complexity, and the technology development period. We use the interactions between each of these three conditions with earnings to capture the combined effect on market value of a firm's technological innovation environment. Our sample comprises 12,594 U.S. firm years for the period 1990–2000 including firms actively producing new technologies and firms that adopt technologies for their processes and products. Our primary and additional tests suggest that the interactions capture value-relevant information not reflected in commonly used variables including industry, research and development, sales, general, and administration expenses, risk, and growth. We also triangulate our results by providing evidence that aggregate technological innovation conditions predict future earnings and are, hence, instrumental in the earnings-generation process. This paper extends the valuation literature by (1) developing a generalizable framework that explains how technological innovation conditions link to future earnings and therefore map into the market value of equity; (2) developing aggregate measures of technological innovation conditions that are relevant for estimating future earnings and value for all firms; and (3) providing detailed empirical evidence on the relation between these aggregate measures and the market value of equity and earnings for all firms not just those that patent.

DuPont analysis, a common form of financial statement analysis, decomposes return on net operating assets into two multiplicative components: profit margin and asset turnover. These two accounting ratios measure different constructs and, accordingly, have different properties. Prior research has found that a change in asset turnover is positively related to future changes in earnings. This paper comprehensively explores the DuPont components and contributes to the literature along three dimensions. First, the paper contributes to the financial statement analysis literature and finds that the information in this accounting signal is in fact incremental to accounting signals studied in prior research in predicting future earnings. Second, it contributes to the literature on the stock market's use of accounting information by examining immediate and future equity return responses to these components by investors. Finally, it adds to the literature on analysts' processing of accounting information by again testing immediate and delayed response of analysts through contemporaneous forecast revisions as well as future forecast errors. Consistent across both groups of market participants, the results show that the information is useful as evidenced by associations between the DuPont components and stock returns as well as analyst forecast revisions. However, I find predictable future forecast errors and future abnormal returns indicating that the information processing does not appear to be complete. Taken together, the analysis indicates that the DuPont components represent an incremental and viable form of information about the operating characteristics of a firm.