Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A, we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

ABSTRACT We integrate fundamental analysis with mean-variance portfolio optimization to form fully optimized fundamental portfolios. We find that fully optimized fundamental portfolios produce large out-of-sample factor alphas with high Sharpe ratios. They substantially outperform equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of stocks in the extreme decile of expected returns, an approach commonly used in fundamental analysis research. They also outperform the factor-based and parametric portfolio policy approaches used in the prior portfolio optimization literature. The relative performance gains from mean-variance optimized fundamental portfolios are persistent through time, robust to eliminating small capitalization firms from the investment set, and robust to incorporating estimated transactions costs. Our results suggest that future fundamental analysis research could implement this portfolio optimization approach to provide greater investment insights. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; G17.

ABSTRACT Does accounting regime play a role in the well-documented phenomenon of overbidding in M&As? The 2001 regulatory change from a goodwill amortization to a non-amortization regime (SFAS 142) affords us a quasi-experimental setting for testing the consequences of M&A accounting rules for acquirers' bidding decisions. Relying on a novel approach to modeling optimal bidding, our primary finding indicates a significant increase in overbidding in the post-2001 period, suggesting that M&A accounting has real consequences for bidding decisions, and that this result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. In addition, supplementary tests show that overbidding is more pronounced in pooling versus purchase transactions, and that the accounting regime's implications for overbidding and acquisition premium are distinct. Overall, our findings shed light on the role accounting plays in shaping managerial decisions—and, ultimately, shareholder wealth—in an important corporate setting. They may thus inform researchers, corporate boards, and standards setters. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34, M41.

ABSTRACT Prior literature presents various perspectives on the role of financial reporting. One view is that mandatory periodic reporting disciplines managers and encourages timely voluntary disclosure. We examine this “confirmation hypothesis” using the shock to financial reporting quality experienced by Arthur Andersen clients forced to switch auditors. Consistent with the confirmation hypothesis, we find that former Andersen clients increase disclosure after they change auditors. They increase forecasting frequency and enhance forecasting precision and specificity. We present additional cross-sectional evidence that shows Arthur Andersen clients with larger increases in financial reporting quality increased their disclosure by relatively more, even within the sample of Arthur Andersen clients. We supplement our main findings with a battery of tests to reduce the possibility that alternative shocks and uncertainty drive our results. Our findings support complementarity between financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosures.

ABSTRACT The government requires its suppliers to have certain internal information processes to reduce uncertainty about their ability to fulfill their commitments. I argue that these requirements improve suppliers' internal information, which leads to better external reporting. Using a dataset of U.S. government contracts, I find a positive relation between government contract awards and firms' external reporting quality. Consistent with procurement-related requirements driving this relation, I find that firms improve their external reporting when they begin contracting with the government, and that the magnitude of the improvement varies predictably with contract characteristics imposing greater requirements on contractors' internal information processes. Finally, I use the establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board in 1970 as a shock to contractors' internal information requirements, and find greater improvements in external reporting among firms subject to the CASB. Overall, these results suggest that the government as a customer contributes to shaping firms' information environments.

ABSTRACT We examine whether firms benchmark annual equity grants to compensation peers and whether meeting the participation constraint is a motive. Studying CEO equity grants over the period of 2006–2016 and compensation peers disclosed by the firm, we find that equity grants by these peers significantly determine a firm's equity grants. We find no evidence that the relation between a firm's and its peers' CEO equity grants is an indirect outcome of meeting peer total compensation levels. In contrast, we show that firms are more likely to meet peer equity grant levels when the labor market is more competitive and when losing key personnel is a risk factor. We also find that CEO turnover is more likely when the CEO receives lower equity grants than peers. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that benchmarking equity grants helps firms satisfy the participation constraint, which varies with performance. Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34; J33; J40; M12; M52.

ABSTRACT The ability to detect misreporting is an important aspect of financial reporting regulation. I derive a measure of SEC error detection rates using information from comment letter reviews. Conditional on the SEC issuing a comment letter, I find that the review team detects an error resulting in a restatement in 4.6 percent of cases, while firms eventually restate financial reports for 13.6 percent of periods under review. My measure of SEC error detection rates is the ratio of reviews that detect an error to total reviews that could have detected an error. I document a positive association between detection rates and review team size. Using a novel approach to identify examiner characteristics, I show that this association is driven by the number of accountants on the review team. I find an economically insignificant association between individual examiner performance and economic or career incentives. JEL Classifications: G18; M41; M48. Data Availability: The examiner characteristics data used in this study are available upon request. All other data are available from the sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT The Dodd-Frank Act allows the SEC to choose either an administrative proceeding or a federal court as an enforcement venue for resolving violations of federal securities laws. I examine determinants and consequences of the SEC's choice of enforcement venue after the Dodd-Frank Act. Results show that material cases are 28–35 percent more likely to be assigned to federal courts, and politically connected defendants are about 14 percent more likely to be routed to administrative proceedings. While monetary penalties by venue are statistically indifferent, politically connected defendants in administrative proceedings are associated with lower penalties. Additionally, I find that administrative proceedings process cases 27 times faster than federal courts. Results suggest the SEC's private incentives affect enforcement venue selection and possibly enforcement outcomes. The SEC is more likely to use administrative proceedings when political and economic costs are greater, and use federal courts when political and economic benefits are greater. JEL Classifications: G18; G28; G38; M41; M48; D72.

ABSTRACT Economic incentives are fundamental for understanding auditor behavior. In this paper, we investigate the association between the extent of partners' fee-based compensation, partners' observable net wealth, and audit quality. Using a sample of Belgian Big 4 audit firms and their predominantly private clients, our results suggest a negative association between audit quality and partner fee-based compensation, and a positive association between audit quality and partner observable net wealth. Moreover, our results show that the latter association is most significant when a partner is carrying a lot of debt, which indicates that a partner's financial situation may affect audit quality. The extent of fee-based incentives also varies among partners of the same audit firm. Furthermore, partner and client characteristics differ based on the extent of fee-based compensation. Our findings should be of interest to regulators and audit firms, as they suggest that audit partners' economic incentives significantly affect audit quality. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; D81.

ABSTRACT We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms during 2008–2014. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for “fresh-look” benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use “shadowing” in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence work at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations. JEL Classifications: J01; J44; L84; M21; M42.