Knowledge that Transforms

Prior research documents that firms tend to beat three earnings benchmarks—zero earnings, last year's earnings, and analyst's forecasted earnings—and that there are both equity market and compensation-related benefits associated with beating these benchmarks. This study investigates whether and under what conditions beating these three earnings benchmarks reduces a firm's cost of debt. I use two proxies for a firm's cost of debt: credit ratings and initial bond yield spread. Results suggest that firms beating earnings benchmarks have a higher probability of rating upgrades and a smaller initial bond yield spread. Additional analyses indicate that (1) the benefits of beating earnings benchmarks are more pronounced for firms with high default risk; (2) beating the zero earnings benchmark generally provides the biggest reward in terms of a lower cost of debt; and (3) the reduction in the cost of debt is attenuated but does not disappear for firms beating benchmarks through earnings management. In sum, results suggest that there are benefits associated with beating earnings benchmarks in the debt market. These benefits vary by benchmark, firm default risk, and method utilized to beat the benchmark. Among other implications, this evidence suggests that the relative importance of specific benchmarks differs across the equity and bond markets.

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a new index to extract forward-looking information from security prices and infer market participants’ expectations of future earnings. The index, called market-adapted earnings (MAE), utilizes stock returns and fundamental accounting signals to estimate market expectations of future earnings at the firm level. MAE outperforms time-series models (e.g., random-walk) in predicting future earnings. Results demonstrate the usefulness of MAE for firms that have no analyst following.

This paper examines whether industry efforts to decrease managerial discretion, increase uniformity, and improve transparency of a non-GAAP performance measure change voluntary disclosure and market perceptions. We find that the frequency of REITs meeting or beating analysts' expectations of funds from operations (FFO) decreases following explicit industry initiatives to discourage manipulation. Concurrent with this shift, we find that the information content of FFO to investors increased, particularly for firms reporting a reconciliation of FFO with GAAP earnings. We also examine firms in other industries to assess alternative explanations for these results, such as SEC intervention. Collectively, our findings suggest that industry guidance about non-GAAP performance curtailed managers' opportunistic reporting. Furthermore, the market response to FFO is consistent with investors perceiving less manipulation and greater reliability. Our evidence also supports the SEC's subsequent requirement that all non-GAAP disclosures be reconciled to the nearest GAAP measures.

ABSTRACT: We present a theory that poor matching manifests as noise in the economic relation of advancing expenses to earn revenues. As a result, poor matching decreases the correlation between contemporaneous revenues and expenses, increases earnings volatility, decreases earnings persistence, and induces a negative autocorrelation in earnings changes. The empirical tests document these effects in a sample of the 1,000 largest U.S. firms over the last 40 years. We find a clear and economically substantial trend of declining contemporaneous correlation between revenues and expenses, increased volatility of earnings, declining persistence of earnings, and increased negative autocorrelation in earnings changes. The combined evidence suggests that accounting matching has become worse over time and that this trend has a pronounced effect on the properties of the resulting earnings. This evidence also suggests that the standard-setters’ stated goal of moving away from matching and toward more fair-value accounting is likely to continue and deepen the identified trends in the properties of earnings.

This paper examines whether stock-option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock-price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior option grant studies explore only general downward earnings management (Balsam et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2003), but our study is the first to explore whether option grants encourage missed earnings targets. Indeed, if missed targets drive the prior results, then the literature has failed to document an important negative outcome of stock-option incentives. We use quarterly and annual data for fixed-date options granted after firms announce they have missed earnings targets. We find that firms that miss earnings targets have larger and more valuable subsequent grants. Further, we find that the likelihood of missing earnings targets for firms that manage earnings downward increases with stock-option grants. To control for the possibility that firms miss earnings targets for operational reasons, we only include firms that likely managed earnings downward (Dechow et al. 1995; Phillips et al. 2003). Backdating or opportunistic timing of grants cannot explain our results because we include only fixed-date grants. While many studies explicitly consider whether and why managers meet or beat earnings targets, ours is the first study to find that some managers may seek to miss earnings targets (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).

The purpose of this study is to examine the frequency, determinants, and implications of misreported fundraising activities. We compare state telemarketing campaign reports with the associated information from nonprofits' annual Form 990 filings to directly test nonprofits' revenue and expense recognition policies. Using a conservative approach that understates the extent to which nonprofit organizations violate the reporting rules, our study indicates that 74 percent of the regulatory filings from nonprofit organizations fail to properly report telemarketing expenses. Smaller nonprofits, less monitored firms, and those with less accounting sophistication are more likely to inappropriately report telemarketing costs as a component of net revenues rather than as expenses. Nonprofits that use external accounting services are more likely to properly classify the cost of their telemarketing campaigns as professional fundraising fees.

ABSTRACT: Auditors often receive summary information or conclusions from management about account balances or internal controls. They must then gather evidence to assess whether this information is fairly stated. In such situations, management can be considered the “first mover” and the auditor the “second mover.” When auditors are the second mover, they are vulnerable to the curse of knowledge bias—the inability to ignore previously processed information (Fischhoff 1977). Specifically, because information from management could be incorrect or biased, auditors must arrive at an independent evaluation of the item in question (e.g., year-end book values, accounting estimates, or internal controls). This study examines the general issue of auditors being “second movers” by investigating how their awareness of management’s severity classifications of internal control problems influences auditors’ initial assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) under Auditing Standard No. 2. Our experimental design allows us to determine that management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments is an unintentional cognitive effect, rather than an intentional use of management’s classifications. We further examine whether cognitively restructuring the ICFR assessment task reduces management’s influence on auditors’ judgments by asking auditors to evaluate and explicitly document the likelihood and magnitude of the effect of an ICFR problem on the financial statements. We find that cognitively restructuring the task mitigates management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments.

This study examines whether straight-line depreciation, relative to accelerated depreciation, causes non-executive managers to make non-value-maximizing capital investment decisions. To do this, I conduct experiments in which managers must decide whether to continue using an existing asset or invest in a replacement asset. By design, replacing the existing asset yields higher cash flows and managers are aware of this fact. However, if the asset is replaced, then the greater remaining book value under straight-line depreciation relative to accelerated depreciation causes earnings to be lower. Lower earnings and psychological forces may push managers of firms that use straight-line depreciation away from making the economically efficient capital investment decision. The results suggest that managers of firms that use straight-line depreciation are less likely to invest in a replacement asset than are managers of firms that use accelerated depreciation. Further, the results suggest that managers perceive that an asset depreciated using straight-line depreciation has provided less retrospective utility than an asset depreciated using accelerated depreciation. In turn, I find that depreciation method-induced differences in managers' retrospective utility perceptions influence their prospective utility perceptions, which, in turn, influence managers' asset replacement decisions. By theoretically and empirically linking firms' depreciation method choice to managers' capital investment decisions, I provide evidence that a seemingly innocuous choice made for external financial reporting purposes can cause managers to make non-value-maximizing capital investment decisions.

Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to share fine information than coarse, less detailed information, which suggests that fine information systems can exacerbate hold-ups. When negotiators share fine information they achieve more efficient bargaining agreements. However, we find that strategic concerns about inequitable outcomes (fear of opportunistic behavior) lead fewer negotiating pairs to share fine information (where inequitable outcomes can be larger) than coarse information (where inequitable outcomes are smaller). Our results demonstrate that information fineness leads negotiators to trade-off potential utility losses due to fairness considerations and potential monetary gains. Fewer (more) negotiators chose to share fine (coarse) information and thus minimize fairness based utility losses (maximize monetary gains).