Knowledge that Transforms

We conducted a clustered randomized field experiment with 20 Brazilian distributorships of a multinational direct sales organization to examine whether controlling failure perceptions through formal communications increases performance. We used the organization's weekly sales meetings to deliver a video-based message from the regional head that either communicates workers should view failure as a natural part of learning rather than an indictment of their ability (treatment condition) or simply summarizes the organization's history (control condition). We find that those who were assigned to the treatment condition were more likely to sustain their effort in response to the economic adversity that coincided with our experiment. Additional analyses suggest that our treatment accomplished this by increasing job-specific confidence and by reinforcing social norms that encourage workers to persevere after failure. Overall, our findings highlight that formal communications from senior management are a viable control mechanism for sustaining effort in the face of failure.

I investigate how the consolidation of securitization entities under SFAS 166 and 167 spills over to banks' supply of small business loans, which are rarely securitized in the United States. This spillover operates through two channels. (1) In the leverage channel, consolidating banks downsize their entire loan portfolios, both small business loans and other loans, in response to increased leverage after consolidation. (2) In the risk management channel, consolidating banks adjust the mix of loans to maintain optimal diversification. The adjustment can increase the supply of small business loans when their performance covaries positively with the performance of other loans. I find that, on average, banks that consolidate more securitized assets reduce small business lending; consequently, counties with a greater market share of consolidating banks experience slower growth in small businesses. I also identify a small group of banks with sufficiently large positive performance covariance that increase small business lending. Data Availability: All untabulated results are available upon request.

We document multiple dimensions of usefulness of banks' interest income sensitivity disclosures. First, we find management-generated sensitivity measures are predictive of future realized changes in net interest income. Second, we find financial analysts' forecasts of net interest income reflect information provided by interest income sensitivity disclosures. Third, we find equity market responses to interest rate shocks as well as firms' interest rate betas are larger for banks with greater disclosed sensitivity of net interest income to interest rate changes. Across all of these tests, the informativeness of income sensitivity measures is incremental to that of regulatory data. These results suggest that interest income sensitivity disclosures are informative measures of interest rate risk. Our results contradict assertions that these disclosures are useless due to lack of relevance of income sensitivity, poor modeling techniques, and/or redundancy relative to regulatory data.

ABTRACT This study investigates the way that experienced audit committee Chairs address barriers to effective performance. We conceptualize audit committees as groups of individuals gathering, elaborating, and sharing information, and identify key group barriers to effective audit committee oversight. Drawing on 24 interviews with audit committee Chairs from leading Australian-listed companies, we provide new evidence of the approaches used in practice to address information-processing barriers faced by audit committees. Specifically, we identify six key mechanisms: (1) audit committee composition; (2) pre-meetings; (3) handling of disagreements between management and auditors; (4) formal audit committee meeting facilitation; (5) promoting audit committee skepticism; and (6) external auditor selection. Our findings provide insights for audit committee members, audit partners, and policy-makers as they aim to improve financial reporting and audit quality. These findings also have important implications for research designs of future experimental research.

We study the effects of mandatory disclosure on competitive interactions in the setting of oil and gas (O&G) reserve disclosures by North American public firms. We document that reserve disclosures inform competitors: when one firm announces larger increases in O&G reserves, competitors experience lower announcement returns and higher real investments. To sharpen identification, we analyze several sources of cross-sectional variation in these patterns, the degree of competition, and the sign and the source of reserves changes. We also exploit two plausibly exogenous shocks: the tightening of the O&G reserve disclosure rules and the introduction of fracking technology. Additional tests more directly focused on the presence of proprietary costs confirm that the mandated reserve disclosures result in a relative loss of competitive edge for announcing firms. Our collective evidence highlights important trade-offs in the market-wide effects of disclosure regulation.

In China's political selection system, officials capable of growing local economies are rewarded with promotions. Eager to demonstrate economic achievements, newly appointed local leaders may raise tax revenues to expand fiscal expenditures on infrastructure projects. Against this backdrop, we study how political appointments influence local firms' tax planning. Based on a sample of locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that firms decrease their tax avoidance after new leaders take office. The political-turnover effect on these firms' tax positions is more evident when the incoming leaders have more political clout over SOE managers, the incentives to divert resources are stronger, or politician-manager networks are present, and subsides following the launch of the anticorruption campaign. Furthermore, firms with higher post-turnover tax payments subsequently receive more government contracts or subsidies. Overall, our findings suggest political incentives shape the tax-planning activities of SOE managers in a “two-way favor exchange” manner.

Although formal guidance instructs firms to avoid issuing lengthy and boilerplate risk factor disclosures, regulators and users of financial statements note these disclosures are excessively long and boilerplate. The persistence of these characteristics is surprising given that prior research finds that firms disclosing lengthy and boilerplate risk factors experience negative capital market consequences. We investigate two potential sources of firms' incentives to issue such disclosures by examining how judicial and regulatory assessments of firms' risk factor disclosures correlate with the disclosure length and boilerplate. Results suggest that lengthier and more boilerplate risk factor disclosures are less likely to be considered inadequate under judicial and regulatory review. Further analysis finds that when risk factor language is assessed as adequate in judicial review, industry peers borrow that language more frequently, and that judicial assessments of risk factor disclosures prompt industry peers to lengthen their risk factor disclosures.

We develop a linear corporate tax function where taxes paid are regressed on pre-tax income and an intercept. We show that if the intercept is positive, cash ETRs are a convex function of pre-tax income. We present large-sample evidence consistent with this ETR convexity. Thus, although firms may have stable linear tax functions (i.e., constant parameters in the linear tax model) representing stable tax avoidance behavior, ETRs can change over time because of growth in pre-tax income. Consequently, simply examining changes (or differences) in cash ETRs is nondiagnostic about whether tax avoidance has changed over time (or differs across firms). We illustrate our argument by showing that all of the observed downward trend in cash ETRs documented by Dyreng et al. (2017) can be explained by growth in pre-tax income. The wholesale concern about increased tax avoidance over time might be overstated. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We examine the macroeconomic information content of aggregate earnings from the labor market's perspective. We use insights from the labor economics literature to characterize the information contained in aggregate GAAP earnings and its components that is relevant for predicting aggregate job creation and destruction. Our results suggest that not only does aggregate earnings news convey information about future labor market aggregates, but its information content is incremental to other macroeconomic variables at near-term horizons. Further, the source of this information stems primarily from two earnings components: aggregate core earnings and special items. Shocks to core earnings signal persistent changes in economy-wide profitability that predict aggregate job creation up to four quarters ahead, while shocks to special items predict job destruction up to one quarter. Taken together, our results suggest that aggregate earnings contain useful information about future labor market conditions, with the nature of such information varying across earnings components.

We hypothesize that prior evidence of target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities affecting acquisition features is driven by the tax liabilities of the target firm CEO. To test this, we estimate CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities for a large sample of acquisitions and examine the effects of such liabilities on acquisition outcomes. Results indicate that the previously documented positive relations between shareholder-level capital gains tax rates and (1) the likelihood of a nontaxable acquisition (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2004), and (2) acquisition premiums (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003) are largely driven by CEO tax effects. We also find evidence consistent with (1) CEOs' tax incentives leading to potential agency conflicts under certain conditions, and (2) acquisition structure or premium being adjusted in response to CEOs' taxes depending on the alternatives available to the acquirer. Our study contributes to our understanding of what and whose taxes affect acquisition structure and value.