Knowledge that Transforms

My assignment is to analyze the development of accounting thought and its position within the university. The focus is on the expected development in the next 20 years, despite the fact that that is an impossible task. I will ruthlessly extrapolate from my personal observations of the activities in the accounting community. In doing this, I will deal with accounting research, the relationship between research and teaching within the field of accounting, and the relation to other disciplines in the business school. This will be done in three steps. I will give a brief review of the recent history of accounting thoughts, then comment on current status of 2016, and, finally, give some perspectives. The road ahead is going to be bumpy as many institutional barriers are in the way. This has to change for the accounting academics to retake their space in the academic community.

This paper studies the reliability of financial reporting when the credibility of the manager, represented by his misreporting propensity, is unknown. We show that credibility concerns affect the time-series of reported earnings, book values, and stock prices in ways that seem consistent with empirical evidence. When investors are uncertain about the credibility of the reporting process, earnings response coefficients, as well as market-to-book values (MTB), are random and time-varying; relatively low MTB reflect poor credibility of financial reporting; stock prices are s-shaped in earnings surprises and relatively insensitive to bad news. Finally, when the manager is more likely to have reporting discretion, discretionary accruals tend to be larger and more volatile. We estimate the model using U.S. earnings announcement data during 2002–2012 and find that the probability of misreporting is 7 percent. A counterfactual analysis reveals that ignoring the possibility of misreporting leads to overestimation of the mean (3.5 percent), volatility (13 percent), and persistence of earnings (17 percent).

We study intertemporal incentive properties of conditional accounting conservatism. Conservatism has detrimental and beneficial properties. In our first model, conservatism introduces downward bias in the first period; any understatement of first-period performance is reversed in the second period. A conservative bias is not costly in the first period but instead is costly in the second period when a new manager may be rewarded for the performance of his predecessor. In an extension on learning, we illustrate a beneficial role of conservatism in fine-tuning incentives. In the second model, conservatism is modeled as recognizing effort-independent bad news early and good news late. Recognizing bad news early can be optimal because of intertemporal rent shifting, which improves incentives via an “incentive spillback.” We also study overlapping projects (a multi-task setting) in which an interior accounting system can be optimal to avoid making one of the overlapping projects an incentive bottleneck.

We investigate how XBRL adoption affects smaller institutions' access to financial statement information relative to their larger counterparts. We examine three aspects of trading responsiveness: abnormal trading volume, response speed to 10-K information, and decision to trade immediately following the 10-K filing. With regard to all three aspects of trading responsiveness, we find that small institutions' responsiveness to 10-K news increases significantly more relative to the change experienced by large institutions from the pre- to post-XBRL periods. We further document that small institutions' stock picking skills in the 10-K filing period increase more compared to those of large institutions following the regulation. Our results are robust to a battery of falsification and sensitivity tests. Collectively, our results suggest that the informational playing field between small and large institutions has become more even following the SEC's XBRL mandate.

While researchers and practitioners alike estimate firms' exposures to systematic risk factors, the disclosure literature typically assumes that exposures are common knowledge. We develop a model where the firm's exposure to a factor is unknown, and analyze the effects of factor-exposure uncertainty on share price and the effects of disclosure about the exposure. We find that: (1) factor-exposure uncertainty introduces skewness and excess kurtosis in the cash flow distribution relative to the commonly used normal distribution; (2) risk-factor disclosure affects all moments of that distribution; and (3) the pricing of higher moments affects the price response of disclosure and the incentives to disclose. For example, factor-exposure uncertainty may actually increase price when the uncertainty implies positive skewness in the cash flow distribution. Hence, a reduction in uncertainty through disclosure may increase cost of capital. We also extend our model to multiple firms and show that factor-exposure uncertainty manifests as uncertainty about a firm's CAPM beta.

This article was originally published in 2017 in The Accounting Review 92 (3): 155-184.

We examine how incentive systems influence knowledge transfer between group members with equal or different status who solve an interdependent task. In our experiment, group members receive group or individual incentives, while status is manipulated by assigning job titles with corresponding role descriptions. Although all conditions require knowledge sharing to maximize payoffs, our results suggest that significantly more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incentives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge shared does not differ across these incentive manipulations for equal-status groups. These findings are in line with theory suggesting that individual incentives can motivate knowledge sharing among equal-status groups, but cannot overcome the negative interactions that arise under status differences. Instead, group incentives are required to induce cooperative behavior that mitigates the negative effects of status differences on knowledge sharing. We contribute to the literature and practice by showing that the effect of incentives depends on the social context and that job titles can have unintended consequences.

Gupta and Gerchak (2002) argue that different acquirers can arrive at different equity valuations for the same target depending on their strategic intent. A reason for acquirers' equity valuations to vary, holding target fundamentals constant, may be that individual acquirers place different weights on underlying fundamentals. I examine this possibility using Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) theoretical framework. They argue that the relative importance of earnings and book value depends on expected adaptation, which is the likelihood that the existing earnings generating process will be altered. Using restructuring costs to proxy for expected adaptation at the individual acquirer level, I find that the association between the target's earnings (book value) and acquirers' bid prices is decreasing (increasing) in expected adaptation, consistent with theoretical predictions. These findings are less pronounced during merger waves and intense bid competition for the target.

Tax regimes treat losses and profits asymmetrically when profits are immediately taxed, but losses are not immediately refunded. We find that treating losses less asymmetrically by granting refunds less restrictively increases loss firms' investment: A third of the refund is invested and the rest is held as cash or returned to shareholders. However, the investment response is driven primarily by firms prone to engage in risky overinvestment. Consistent with the risk of misallocation, we find a delayed exit of low-productivity loss firms receiving less restrictive refunds, indicating potential distortion of the competitive selection of firms. This distortion also negatively affects aggregate output and productivity. Our results suggest that stimulating loss firms' investment with refunds unconditional on their future prospects comes at the risk of misallocation.

We study whether the corporate tax system provides incentives for risky firm investment. We analytically and empirically show two main findings: first, risk-taking is positively related to the length of tax loss periods because the loss rules shift some risk to the government; and second, the tax rate has a positive effect on risk-taking for firms that expect to use losses, and a weak negative effect for those that cannot. Thus, the sign of the tax effect on risky investment hinges on firm-specific expectations of future loss recovery.