Building on the Dechow et al. (1998) model of the accrual process, this study investigates the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows. The model shows that each accrual component reflects different information relating to future cash flows; aggregate earnings masks this information. As predicted, disaggregating accruals into major components—change in accounts receivable, change in accounts payable, change in inventory, depreciation, amortization, and other accruals—significantly enhances predictive ability. Each accrual component, including depreciation and amortization, is significant with the predicted sign in predicting future cash flows, incremental to current cash flow. The cash flow and accrual components of current earnings have substantially more predictive ability for future cash flows than several lags of aggregate earnings. The inferences are robust to alternative specifications, including controlling for operating cash cycle and industry membership.

I present evidence consistent with managers using derivatives and discretionary accruals as partial substitutes for smoothing earnings. Using 1994–1996 data for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, I estimate a set of simultaneous equations that captures managers' incentives to maintain a desired level of earnings volatility through hedging and accrual management. These incentives include increasing managerial compensation and wealth, reducing corporate income taxes and debt financing costs, avoiding underinvestment and earnings surprises, and mitigating volatility caused by low diversification. After controlling for such incentives, I find a significant negative association between derivatives' notional amounts and proxies for the magnitude of discretionary accruals.

Concern that earnings management erodes the quality of financial reporting has prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to question the role of the external auditor. To help address that concern, this study examines the relation between earnings management and auditor litigation. While prior research on the relation between auditor litigation and total accruals has yielded inconclusive results, I find that the risk of auditor litigation is positively associated with a sharper measure of earnings management—abnormal accruals. Using a larger and more recent sample, this study provides evidence that the probability of auditor litigation increases as clients report more positive (income-increasing) abnormal accruals. This result holds in: (1) univariate analyses, (2) logit analyses that also control for auditor size, client importance to the auditor, length of the auditor-client relationship, client industry, client financial condition, client size, and client growth, and in (3) the subsample of lawsuits alleging wrongdoing in the more recent time period (1984–1998).

If the market anticipates the reversing nature of abnormal working capital accruals, then the reported magnitude of earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals will differ from the underlying magnitude that is priced by the market. We expect the market's perception of this difference to affect the ERCs associated with earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals. We test our predictions using an abnormal accruals measure that captures the difference between reported working capital and a proxy for the market's expectations of the level of working capital required to support current sales levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find higher ERCs when abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of earnings surprises, and lower ERCs when abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of earnings surprises. We also find results consistent with analysts predictably considering the reversing implications of abnormal accruals in revising future earnings forecasts. These findings are consistent with market participants anticipating the reversing implications of abnormal accruals. However, analysis of subsequent stock returns provides evidence that market participants do not fully impound the pricing implications of abnormal accruals at the earnings announcement date

This paper examines the market pricing of Jones (1991) modelestimated abnormal accruals (often termed “discretionary accruals” in the prior literature) to test whether stock prices rationally reflect the one-year-ahead earnings implications of these accruals. Using the Mishkin (1983) and hedge-portfolio test methods Sloan (1996) employs, I find that the market overestimates the persistence, or one-year-ahead earnings implications, of abnormal accruals, and consequently overprices these accruals. These results extend Subramanyam (1996) by demonstrating that the market not only prices, but also overprices abnormal accruals. They also suggest that the overpricing of total accruals that Sloan (1996) documents is due largely to abnormal accruals. The results are robust to five alternative measures of abnormal accruals, and still hold when I estimate abnormal accruals after controlling for major unusual but largely nondiscretionary accruals. The latter finding is consistent with the notion that the market overprices the portion of abnormal accruals stemming from managerial discretion

We develop a theory of the relation between biases in financial reporting and managers' incentives to issue timely voluntary disclosures. We find that firms with relatively more conservative accounting are less likely to make timely voluntary disclosures than firms with less conservative accounting. Therefore, price is more timely in reflecting the news of firms with less conservative accounting. Prior research has assumed that the timeliness by which news is impounded in price is uncorrelated with the nature of accounting earnings and has ascribed a concave earnings-return relation to the accounting system reporting bad news on a more timely basis than good news. In our theory, a concave relation is not necessarily attributable to a difference in the way the accounting system reports good vs. bad news. Rather, our prediction stems from how biases in mandatory financial reports determine which firms optimally choose to make voluntary preemptive disclosures and which do not. Hence, our theory provides an alternative explanation for the empirical findings and cautions against interpreting them as evidence that accounting is conservative. Finally, we identify means of empirically distinguishing between the alternative explanations.

We investigate the effects of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEO's annual bonus. After controlling for the general pay-for-performance relation, we find a significant incremental adverse effect on CEO annual cash bonuses when the firm's quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst forecast or the earnings for the same quarter of the prior year, for at least two quarters during the year. However, we find that the relation between the bonus and the number of loss quarters is not significant. Our results suggest that CEO bonus payments provide CEOs with economic incentives to meet quarterly analyst earnings forecasts and earnings from the same quarter of the prior year.

This paper introduces a model in which the firm's returns depend on trading volume when the firm defers disclosure, because market makers use volume to draw inferences about better-informed investors' private information on firm value. In addition, we show that a firm's commitment to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes dampens the slope coefficient on volume in a Taylor expansion of the log of the absolute value of returns on volume. The reason for this is that when a firm commits to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes, the deferral of a report indicates that the outcome is extreme. This heightens adverse selection. In turn, this makes informed trade more costly and hence less likely, thereby rendering returns less dependent on trading volume as a source of information about firm value. This result predicts that firms committing to more disclosure should experience a smaller slope coefficient on trading volume. Thus, the slope coefficient offers a potential tool for measuring the economic consequences of shifts in disclosure regimes

This study reports the results of three experiments that examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting. We find that subjects often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports, and they generally do not lie more as the payoff to lying increases. We also find less honesty under a contract that provides a smaller share of the total surplus to the manager than under one that provides a larger share, suggesting that the extent of honesty may depend on how the surplus is divided between the manager and the firm. The optimal agency contract yields more firm profit than a contract that relies exclusively on honest reporting. However, a modified version of the optimal agency contract, which makes use of subjects' preferences for honest reporting, yields the highest firm profit. These results suggest that firms may be able to design more profitable employment contracts than those identified by conventional economic analysis.