In this study I investigate the relation between information complexity and financial analysts' use of that information. I rank by complexity six tax-law changes enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and then examine analysts' explicit forecasts of effective tax rates around those changes. I show that analysts' revisions of their forecasts of effective tax rates appear to impound the effects of the less complex tax-law changes but not the more complex changes. Furthermore, as expected, if analysts assimilate less complex (but not more complex) information, the magnitude of the errors in their forecasts of effective tax rates increases with the effects of the more complex tax-law changes, but is unrelated to the less complex changes. Taken together, these results indicate that analysts assimilate less complex information to a greater extent than they assimilate more complex information. Either analysts' abilities to incorporate specific information into their forecasts is a decreasing function of the complexity of that information, or analysts choose not to assimilate complex information because the cost would exceed the benefit. In either case, complexity reduces analysts' use of information. These results demonstrate the importance of considering information attributes, such as complexity, when investigating why analysts' forecasts fail to incorporate all public information.

Frankel and Lee (1998) show that the value-to-price ratio (Vf/P) predicts future abnormal returns for up to three years, where Vf is an estimate of fundamental value based on a residual income valuation framework operationalized using analyst earnings forecasts. In this study, we examine whether the Vf/P effect is due to market mispricing or omitted risk factors. We find that the Vf/P effect is partially concentrated around the future earnings announcements, consistent with the mispricing explanation. On using an extensive set of risk proxies, suggested by Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Gode and Mohanram (2001), we also find that Vf/P is significantly related to some risk proxies. However, after controlling for these risk factors, Vf/P continues to exhibit a significant positive association with future returns suggesting that these risk factors are not responsible for the Vf/P effect. Overall, the results seem consistent with the mispricing explanation for the Vf/P effect.

We investigate two explanations for the declining contemporaneous linear relation between annual stock returns and accounting earnings over the past 30 years: (1) earnings increasingly reflect news with a lag relative to stock prices and (2) earnings increasingly reflect good and bad news in an asymmetric fashion. We hypothesize and find that annual earnings have a weaker association with current price changes and a stronger association with lagged price changes over time. We hypothesize and find that annual earnings reflect current positive price changes less strongly and current negative price changes more strongly over time. We also find that asymmetry with respect to lagged price changes is increasingly important over time. Strikingly, we find that, since the mid-1980s, the aggregation of earnings over a four-year window increasingly does less to reduce the importance of lags and asymmetry.

We document several factors that help explain cross-sectional variations in the post-revision price drift associated with analyst forecast revisions. First, the market does not make a sufficient distinction between revisions that provide new information (“high-innovation” revisions) and revisions that merely move toward the consensus (“low-innovation” revisions). Second, the price adjustment process is faster and more complete for “celebrity” analysts (Institutional Investor All-Stars) than for more obscure yet highly accurate analysts (Wall Street Journal Earnings-Estimators). Third, controlling for other factors, the price adjustment process is faster and more complete for firms with greater analyst coverage. Finally, a substantial portion of the delayed price adjustment occurs around subsequent earnings-announcement and forecast-revision dates. Collectively, these findings show that more subtle aspects of an earnings revision signal can hinder the efficacy of market price discovery, particularly in firms with relatively low analyst coverage, and that subsequent earnings-related news events serve as catalysts in the price discovery process.

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.

In this study, we document evidence on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality using the dispersion and sign of both absolute Jones-model abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies for earnings quality. Our study is motivated by calls for “mandatory auditor rotation,” which are based on concerns that longer auditor tenure reduces earnings quality. Multivariate results, controlling for firm age, size, industry growth, cash flows, auditor type (Big N versus non-Big N), industry, and year, generally suggest higher earnings quality with longer auditor tenure. We interpret our results as suggesting that, in the current environment, longer auditor tenure, on average, results in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial performance.