Schrand and Walther's (2000) archival evidence suggests that managers strategically disclose prior-period benchmarks in current earnings announcements, which, in turn, influences investors' judgments. Using a controlled experimental setting, I present evidence confirming that a transparent description of a transitory prior-period gain or loss affects how investors apply prior-period earnings when evaluating currentperiod earnings. I also provide evidence that this effect is likely to be unintentional on the part of investors, resulting from limitations in their memory for the prior-period event. Overall, the experimental results suggest that a quantitative description of the transitory prior-period gain or loss in a current earnings announcement helps investors to evaluate company performance. The results also highlight the need for consistency in reporting non-GAAP financial performance measures.

Editors exhort authors to circulate and present their working papers to colleagues before submitting them to journals (Zimmerman 1989; Green et al. 2002). Authors heeding such advice are said to increase the likelihood of getting their work published and making their research, once published, more influential (Zimmerman 1989). While evidence regarding these matters is of keen importance to authors, editors, and administrators, no research exists showing that circulating and presenting manuscripts increases their probability of being accepted in accounting journals or, when published, their influence on stimulating other research. I present such evidence by perusing acknowledgments in premier accounting journals. I examine the relation between circulating and presenting manuscripts and the probability of acceptance by relating acknowledgments of 305 papers submitted to The Accounting Review during June 2002–May 2003 to the editor's reject versus revise and resubmit decision. I examine the relation between circulating and presenting manuscripts and an article's influence by relating the acknowledgments in 256 articles published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, and Journal of Accounting and Economics to citations to these articles. My two analyses of acknowledgments to institutions, conferences, and individuals yield similar results. I find that papers presented at more workshops are more likely to be invited back to The Accounting Review, and that papers published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Economics, or Journal of Accounting Research generate more citations if they were presented previously at more workshops.

Applying a Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)/Degeorge et al. (1999) type methodology to quarterly data for the 1985–2002 time period, we show that, since the mid-1990s, but not before then, managers seek to avoid negative quarterly earnings surprises more than to avoid either quarterly losses or quarterly earnings decreases. Our findings suggest that the quarterly earnings threshold hierarchy proposed by Degeorge et al. (1999) does not apply to recent years, and that managers' claim that avoiding quarterly earnings decreases is the threshold they most seek to achieve (Graham et al. 2004) is inconsistent with their actions. We provide an intuitively appealing economic rationale for why the shift in threshold hierarchy occurred; since the mid-1990s, but not before then, investors unambiguously rewarded (penalized) firms for reporting quarterly earnings meeting (missing) analysts' estimates more than they did for meeting (missing) the other two thresholds. We provide several explanations for why investors unambiguously reward firms for reporting quarterly earnings that meet or beat analysts' estimates more than for meeting the other two thresholds late (but not early) in our sample period: increased media coverage given to analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered by analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts.

I extend prior research on the information content of conference calls by examining whether they accelerate analysts' and investors' responses to the future implications of currently announced earnings. I find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with a significant reduction in the serial correlation in analyst forecast errors, a measure of initial analyst underreaction. I also find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with significant reductions in two measures of initial investor underreaction: (1) post-earnings announcement drift and (2) the proportion of the total market reaction to firms' earnings announcements that is “delayed” (i.e., that is attributable to post-earnings announcement drift). The reduction in post-earnings announcement drift surrounding conference call initiation is concentrated in the set of sample firms where drift is most severe (i.e., the smallest, least heavily traded sample firms) while the largest, most heavily traded sample firms do not exhibit significant drift either before or after conference call initiation. Robustness tests, including analyses of matched samples of nonconference call firms, indicate that the results are not driven by general increases in analyst and investor sophistication over time or by contemporaneous increases in the information and trading environments of conference call initiators.

This paper examines the link between managers' equity incentives—arising from stock-based compensation and stock ownership—and earnings management. We hypothesize that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993–2000 time period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointments. Collectively, our results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management.

We develop an empirical method that allows us to evaluate the reliability of an expected return proxy via its association with realized returns even if realized returns are biased and noisy measures of expected returns. We use our approach to examine seven accounting-based proxies that are imputed from prices and contemporaneous analysts' earnings forecasts. Our results suggest that, for the entire crosssection of firms, these proxies are unreliable. None of them has a positive association with realized returns, even after controlling for the bias and noise in realized returns attributable to contemporaneous information surprises. Moreover, the simplest proxy, which is based on the least reasonable assumptions, contains no more measurement error than the remaining proxies. These results remain even after we attempt to purge the proxies of their measurement error via the use of instrumental variables and grouping. We provide additional evidence, however, that demonstrates that some proxies are reliable when the consensus long-term growth forecasts are low and/or when analysts' forecast accuracy is high.

Performance-measure weights for incentive compensation are often determined subjectively. Determining these weights is a cognitively difficult task, and archival research shows that observed performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Ittner et al. (2003) have concluded that psychology theory can help to explain such inconsistencies. In an experimental setting based on Feltham and Xie (1994), we use psychology theories of reasoning to predict distinctive patterns of similarity and difference between optimal and actual subjective performance-measure weights. The following predictions are supported. First, in contrast to a number of prior studies, most individuals' decisions are significantly influenced by the performance measures' error variance (precision) and error covariance. Second, directional errors in the use of these measurement attributes are relatively frequent, resulting in a mean underreaction to an accounting change that alters performance measurement error. Third, individuals seem insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one measure has spillover effects on the optimal weighting of the other measure in a two-measure incentive system. In consequence, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to result in misallocations of agent effort.

Protection of outside investors depends on the detection and punishment of resource diversion by corporate insiders, including managers and controlling shareholders. We focus on the role played in investor protection by self-interested auditors operating in a competitive audit market. In our setting, auditors represent the mechanism whereby detection of diversion occurs. We show that markets with relatively greater auditor penalties for audit failures and greater insider penalties for detected resource diversion have larger total investment levels, a higher proportion of the firm held by outsiders, higher audit resource investment, higher audit fees, and higher expected investment returns.

Two alternative approaches are used in audit practice to provide quantitative materiality assessments about proposed audit adjustments. The cumulative approach compares to net income the total amount of misstatement existing at the end of the current period, while the current-period approach compares to net income the amount of misstatement added in the current period. Depending on the relation between total misstatement and current-period misstatement, either the cumulative approach or the current-period approach can calculate higher quantitative materiality. This paper reports an experiment that varies materiality approach between auditors by providing auditors with either the current-period or cumulative formats used by their firm to summarize proposed audit adjustments. Results indicate that, across a variety of experimental contexts (varying misstatement size, subjectivity, precision, and income effect, and varying whether auditors document effects on their client's quality of earnings), auditors are more likely to require their client to book the misstatement under the approach that makes the misstatement appear more material. These results suggest that standard setters mandate that auditors require adjustment whenever a misstatement is material under either approach.