This study investigates whether subjective communication from team members to a manager responsible for allocating performance-based bonuses increases team performance and whether the efficacy of such communication is reduced in heterogeneous teams. We draw on both economic and behavioral theories to predict that communication content, even though subjective, provides information that enables the manager to allocate bonuses so as to enhance the relation between individuals' contributions and rewards, thereby increasing individuals' effort and team performance. However, we also predict that the positive effect of team member subjective communication is more muted when team members' abilities are heterogeneous compared to homogeneous. We test these predictions via an experiment. Consistent with our predictions, team member subjective communication has a positive effect on team performance, and the positive effect is more muted for heterogeneous teams. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by enhancing our understanding of the role of subjective communication from team members to team managers in motivating effort in teams and, particularly, how its efficacy is affected by team composition. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

In the presence of litigation-facing suppliers, the supply chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).

Contrast analysis has become prevalent in experimental accounting research since Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) introduced it to the accounting literature over 25 years ago. Since its initial introduction, the scope of contrast testing has expanded, yet guidance as to the most appropriate methods of specifying, conducting, interpreting, and exhibiting these tests has not. We survey the use of contrast analysis in the recent literature and propose a three-part testing approach that provides a more comprehensive picture of contrast results. Our approach considers three pieces of complementary evidence: the visual evaluation of fit, traditional significance testing, and quantitative evaluation of the contrast variance residual. Our measure of the contrast variance residual, q2, is proposed for the first time in this work. After proposing our approach, we walk through six common contrast testing scenarios where current practices may fall short and our approach may guide researchers. We extend Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) and contribute to the accounting research methods literature by documenting current contrast analysis practices that result in elevated Type I error and by proposing a potential solution to mitigate these concerns.

We investigate whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies lead to higher audit fees or turnover likelihood for clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this, we identify areas of GAAP related to PCAOB deficiencies for each auditor. We then use textual analysis to identify how important the deficiencies are to clients to measure each client's exposure to deficient auditing. We find that this measure positively relates to audit fees and that this association is moderated by client bargaining power. Auditor turnover is also higher when deficiency exposure is high relative to what it would be for peer auditors, but we only observe this relation for smaller clients and do not find it is affected by client bargaining power. Finally, we find that companies switching Big 4 auditors tend to select an auditor resulting in lower deficiency exposure. These results have implications for understanding how PCAOB inspection reports affect the market for audit services. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: We obtain all data from publicly available sources.