Regulators and researchers express concern about auditors who leave their firms for employment at their clients, due to lingering relationships which might represent a threat to audit quality. These relationships could negatively impact audit quality through undue influences of the client personnel on auditor judgment. We examine how these relationships influence novice auditors during evidence collection. Understanding the effects of alumni affiliation on evidence collection is important because undiscovered issues at this phase may go unaddressed, potentially hurting audit quality. Contrary to most research findings, we find that alumni affiliation can benefit the audit by increasing auditors’ evidence collection. However, we also find, when auditors become depleted, the benefits of alumni affiliation actually reverse, as auditors overrely on the relationship, leading them to prematurely cease evidence collection. These findings have implications for both practitioners and researchers. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Although the increase in non-GAAP earnings metrics has drawn unfavorable attention from regulators and standard setters, it can provide valuable experience for investors. We investigate whether experience with non-GAAP earnings metrics influences investors’ pricing of non-GAAP exclusions. We measure experience as the frequency with which managers or analysts provide non-GAAP earnings over the prior eight quarters and find that experience aids in the pricing of non-GAAP exclusions. Absent prior experience with non-GAAP earnings metrics, investors appear to overestimate the persistence of exclusions at the earnings announcement, which corrects in the following months. Cross-sectional tests suggest that experience facilitates investors’ pricing of non-GAAP exclusions by reducing their information processing costs.

Research indicates that auditors have an impoverished understanding of trial preparation factors that, independent of audit quality, can significantly elevate audit litigation risk. As the scholarly literature sheds little insight about the nature and implications of these factors, we identify what factors audit litigators consider in trial preparation, how they expect these factors to affect litigation outcomes, and how they attempt to leverage these factors. To do so, we interview 39 audit litigators, who identify factors germane to trial venues, jury pools, and case arguments. Guided by the elaboration likelihood model, we construct a framework that predicts these factors influence litigation outcomes by changing jurors’ motivation and/or capability to elaborate. Importantly, we find that litigators who defend (sue) auditors strategically maneuver these factors to increase (decrease) the likelihood of higher juror elaboration, because higher elaboration is favorable to auditors. We discuss implications of our results for practice and research.

Creativity drives profit in an idea economy, and many companies organize teams to facilitate creativity. This paper investigates the strategic deployment of individuals to boost a team’s creativity. More individualistic team members tend to generate highly original ideas yet are less likely to share these ideas. We theorize that adding a connector—an individual strongly predisposed to form and foster relationships—to a team will enable more idea sharing among individualistic team members, thus increasing the likelihood that the team’s creative potential will be realized. We leverage a new conceptualization of the “connector” construct to identify connectors and then use an experiment to study the impact of their presence or absence on team creative performance. Our results support these predictions and suggest that connectors improve team creativity by enabling others to share in the creative process and not because connectors themselves exhibit greater creative performance than their average peer. Data Availability: The data reported in the paper are available from the authors.

We study off-the-clock indiscretion accusations against corporate officers and directors and examine the extent, effectiveness, and context of auditors’ response. In the year that indiscretion allegations are first publicized, auditors charge higher fees and are more likely to resign. Auditors respond to allegations against both top executives and board members. Further, reactions are strongest when allegations demonstrate a lack of individual integrity and, separately, when the audit office has previously audited other similarly accused clients. Importantly, the resulting increase in auditors’ effort partially negates the association between indiscretions and lower financial reporting quality. However, auditors are primarily reactive, rather than proactive, and their response is stronger when the accused client is less important economically. These results suggest that company leadership’s off-the-clock indiscretions are signals to auditors of poor tone at the top, but the audit response is not uniform across all clients.