This paper investigates two competing hypotheses for the accrual anomaly: investment/growth and persistence. Both investment/growth and persistence information in accruals are likely to vary cross-sectionally, depending on a firm's business model, a fact that generates different cross-sectional implications for the accrual anomaly. I find that the magnitude of the accrual anomaly monotonically increases with the investment information contained in accruals, as measured by the co-variation between accruals and employee growth. In industries/firms in which accruals co-vary with employee growth, accruals show strong predictive power for future stock returns. In industries/firms in which accruals show little correlations with employee growth, the accrual anomaly is much weaker. In contrast, the evidence from the cross-sectional analysis is inconsistent with the persistence argument. From the earnings perspective, the evidence on one-year-ahead earnings growth is inconclusive, but the results on longer-term earnings growth support the investment argument but not the persistence argument. Collectively, I conclude that these results support the view that the accrual anomaly is attributable to the fundamental investment information contained in accruals.

We examine firms' financial reporting practices during the missing months that are induced by fiscal year changes and not covered by regular quarters. We find that firms tend to report much lower income for the missing months than for adjacent quarters, mainly by recording higher operating expenses. We also find that managers have various incentives to manage earnings. Executive compensation is not tied to firm performance in the transition period as it is in adjacent fiscal years. Growth firms, firms with poor stock returns, and firms with weak external and internal monitoring tend to manage earnings more. Finally, we find that firms are more likely to meet or beat earnings targets in the subsequent quarter by reporting lower income in the missing months. Investors and analysts perceive the earnings surprise to be less persistent in the quarter after than in the quarter before the missing months. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

This paper examines the implications of tax loss carryback incentives for corporate reporting decisions and capital market behavior. During the 1981 through 2010 sample period, we find that firms increase losses in order to claim a cash refund of recent tax payments before the option to do so expires, and we estimate that firms with tax refund-based incentives accelerate about $64.7 billion in losses. Tax-motivated loss shifting is reflected in both recurring and nonrecurring items and is more evident for financially constrained firms. Analysts do not generally incorporate tax-motivated loss shifting into their earnings forecasts, resulting in more negative analyst forecast errors for firms with tax-based incentives than for firms without. Holding earnings surprises constant, however, investors react less negatively to losses reported by firms with tax loss carryback incentives. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

We explore whether accounting fraud can be detected using the information of firms economically linked to a focal firm. Specifically, we examine whether customer information disclosed by a supplier firm, combined with customers’ accounting information, helps to detect the supplier’s revenue fraud. We first confirm the economic link between the supplier and customers by showing a strong positive correlation between the supplier’s sales growth and the growth rate of total customer purchases. We then introduce two variables based on customer accounting information—the discrepancy between supplier sales growth and customer purchase growth and customer excess purchases—and show that they are predictive of supplier revenue fraud. We conduct a battery of cross-sectional tests and generally find results to vary cross-sectionally in a predictable way. Finally, the out-of-sample tests indicate that adding the two variables to Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) model increases fraud prediction accuracy.

Prior research documents a negative link between risk and executive holding of stock, but a corresponding positive link for options. We find a similar negative relation for non-executive holding of stock. Our finding is consistent with the view that non-executives not only face significant incentives to reduce risk when they hold stock, but they are also able to affect corporate risk. While endogeneity cannot be ruled out fully, the results of a battery of tests suggest that it plays a limited role. A second robust result is that the documented relation becomes more negative as option-based executive compensation increases. Overall, corporate risk is related to the incentives created by stock and options held by both executives and non-executives, as well as interactions among those incentives.

We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm's future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by obser.ving analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm's earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm, yet are absent from that firm's call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences.

Disclosure is of fundamental interest to accounting research. When the sign/magnitude of disclosed news is unclear, the information in disclosure events is inferred using the ratio of return volatilities during event and non-event windows (Beaver 1968). We show that return noise due to microstructure frictions and mispricing affects this ratio, and that effect is comparable to or exceeds that of information content. We use the SEC's Tick Size Pilot program to confirm the causal effect of return noise on the ratio, and to evaluate alternative ways to control for it. The most promising approach is to use the difference between, rather than the ratio of, return volatilities during event and non-event windows. We illustrate its benefits by showing how it alters prior inferences regarding time-series and cross-sectional variation in information content as well as changes in the information content of earnings announcements around the 2004 amendments to Form 8-K filings.