Das et al. (1998) suggest that as earnings become less predictable, analysts issue increasingly optimistic forecasts to please managers and consequently gain, or at least limit the loss of, access to managers' private information. We reexamine the association between earnings forecast error and earnings predictability because there is evidence suggesting that deliberate earnings forecast optimism is not an effective mechanism for gaining access to managers' information (e.g., Eames et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002). We document associations between earnings level and both forecast error and earnings predictability. These associations suggest that earnings level may be an important control variable when examining the association between forecast error and earnings predictability. When we control for the level of earnings we find no significant association between forecast error and earnings predictability. Thus, we find no evidence that analysts intentionally issue optimistically biased earnings forecasts.

Prior research reveals that the accrual component of profitability is less persistent than the cash flow component, and that investors fail to fully appreciate their differing implications for future profitability (Sloan 1996). However, accruals are a component of growth in net operating assets as well as a component of profitability. Just as we can disaggregate profitability into accruals and cash flows from operations, we can disaggregate growth in net operating assets into accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets. We find that, after controlling for current profitability, both components of growth in net operating assets—accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets—have equivalent negative associations with one-year-ahead return on assets. This result is consistent with conservative accounting and diminishing marginal returns on investments. We also find that, after controlling for current profitability, the market appears to equivalently overvalue accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets relative to their association with one-year-ahead ROA. Our evidence suggests that the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) is a special case of what could be viewed as a more general growth anomaly.

The accuracy of sell-side analysts' forecast revisions is related to a number of factors, including characteristics of the analyst and the age of the forecast. In this study we examine whether there are differences in how sophisticated and unsophisticated investors use these factors to predict the relative accuracy of forecast revisions. We adapt the lens model methodological approach from the judgment and decision-making literature to investigate these differences in an archival setting. Our results suggest that sophisticated investors have greater knowledge overall about the relation of the factors to forecast accuracy. Further, our evidence is consistent with sophisticated investors relying more on the specific factors that provide the most benefits (relative to their costs) for predicting relative forecast accuracy.

This paper examines whether risk-management strategies (specifically, the use of specialist personnel and higher billing rates) moderate the effect of risk on client acceptance decisions, thereby assisting auditors in bringing prospective client relationships to acceptable risk/return levels. We propose a conceptual model of the client acceptance decision process, and use archival data on one firm's actual client acceptance decisions to test the model. Our results demonstrate the selective use of risk-management strategies in the client acceptance decision, based on the nature of the risks present for each particular client. Specifically, plans to charge a higher billing rate are associated with a reduction in the negative relationship between client acceptance likelihood and both going-concern risk and public trading status, and plans to assign specialist personnel are associated with a reduction in the negative relationship between client acceptance likelihood and both fraud risk and error risk. Therefore, we provide evidence that while risky clients are less likely to be accepted overall, the application of particular risk-management strategies to particular risks increases the likelihood of accepting such clients.

Empirical accounting research provides surprisingly little evidence on whether accounting earnings numbers capture cross-sectional differences in risk that are associated with cross-sectional differences in share prices. We address two questions regarding the risk-relevance of accounting numbers: (1) Are accounting-related risk measures (i.e., the systematic risk and total volatility in a firm's time-series of residual return on equity) associated with the market's assessment and pricing of equity risk? (2) If so, then are these accounting-related risk measures incrementally associated with the market's assessment and pricing of equity risk beyond other observable factors, such as those in the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model? We develop an accounting-fundamentals-based measure of the market's pricing of risk—the difference between actual share price and a residual income valuation model estimate of share value using risk-free rates of return. Our results show that both systematic risk and total volatility in residual return on equity partially explain this pricing differential, and that the explanatory power of total volatility is incremental to the Fama and French (1992) factors—market beta, firm size, and the market-to-book ratio.

We document several factors that help explain cross-sectional variations in the post-revision price drift associated with analyst forecast revisions. First, the market does not make a sufficient distinction between revisions that provide new information (“high-innovation” revisions) and revisions that merely move toward the consensus (“low-innovation” revisions). Second, the price adjustment process is faster and more complete for “celebrity” analysts (Institutional Investor All-Stars) than for more obscure yet highly accurate analysts (Wall Street Journal Earnings-Estimators). Third, controlling for other factors, the price adjustment process is faster and more complete for firms with greater analyst coverage. Finally, a substantial portion of the delayed price adjustment occurs around subsequent earnings-announcement and forecast-revision dates. Collectively, these findings show that more subtle aspects of an earnings revision signal can hinder the efficacy of market price discovery, particularly in firms with relatively low analyst coverage, and that subsequent earnings-related news events serve as catalysts in the price discovery process.

The Securities and Exchange Commission now requires auditors to review interim earnings reports on a timely basis. Previously, auditors could perform this review retrospectively, as part of the year-end audit. We investigate whether timely reviews are likely to increase the relevance and reliability of reported earnings, as reflected by the extent to which the earnings-return relation is contemporaneous. We find that when the auditor reviews interim earnings on a timely basis, the association between quarterly returns and earnings (and between quarterly returns and unexpected earnings) is predominantly contemporaneous. When the auditor reviews interim earnings retrospectively, however, the association between quarterly returns and earnings is not entirely contemporaneous; with retrospective reviews, returns lead interim earnings. We conclude from these findings that timely reviews increase the likelihood that accounting earnings reflect economic events contemporaneously with returns.