We test the conjecture from prior research that defense contractors' excess profitability in the 1980s stemmed from their ability to shift common overhead costs to government contracts that typically allow cost reimbursement or price renegotiation (Rogerson 1992; Thomas and Tung 1992; Lichtenberg 1992). Although we confirm prior evidence that defense contractors enjoyed abnormally high profitability on their government work in the 1984–1989 period (a period of relatively low competition for defense contracts), we find no evidence that this excess profitability is attributable to cost shifting. In addition, we find no evidence that the Top 100 defense contractors (firms that likely wield above-average market power) are able to use cost shifting to exploit a lack of competition in the industry. Our results suggest that, contrary to the conjectures in prior research, the unusually high profitability reported on government contracts in 1984–1989 is more likely attributable to nonaccounting explanations than to cost shifting.

This paper investigates three potential explanations for the puzzlingly weak value relevance of oil and gas asset present values documented in prior research: measurement error, model misspecification, and time-period idiosyncrasy. I operationally define the magnitude of measurement error as the measurement error variance, estimated using an errors-in-variables two-stage regression model similar to that used by Barth (1991) and Choi et al. (1997). I find that (1) measurement error in the present value measure of oil and gas assets is on average less than the measurement error in the historical cost asset measure; (2) oil and gas assets measured at present value explain significantly more across-firm and across-time variation in stock prices than do oil and gas assets measured at historical cost; and (3) model misspecification partially accounts for the puzzlingly weak reported value relevance of the present value measure in prior research.

In this paper, we derive a measure of diluted EPS that incorporates the economic implications of the dilutive effects of employee stock options. We show that the existing FASB treasury-stock method of accounting for the dilutive effects of outstanding options systematically understates the options' dilutive effect, and thus overstates reported EPS. Using firm-wide data on 731 employee stock option plans, our proposed measure suggests that economic dilution from options is, on average, 100 percent greater than dilution in reported diluted EPS using the FASB treasury-stock method. We examine the implications of our analysis for stock price valuation, the price-earnings relation, and the return-earnings relation. We demonstrate analytically that when firms have options outstanding, empirical applications of equity valuation models that use reported per-share earnings as an input (e.g., Ohlson 1995) yield upwardly biased estimates of the market value of common stock. We predict that when the difference between our measure of economic dilution from options and the FASB treasury-stock method dilution from options is greater, the observed return-earnings and price-earnings coefficients will be smaller, and we provide some (albeit weak) empirical support for this prediction.

Citing fear of legal liability as a partial explanation, prior research documents (1) managers' reluctance to voluntarily disclose management earnings forecasts, and (2) greater forecast disclosure frequencies in periods of bad news. We provide evidence on how management earnings forecast disclosure differs between the United States (U.S.) and Canada, two otherwise similar business environments with different legal regimes. Canadian securities laws and judicial interpretations create a far less litigious environment than exists in the U.S. We find a greater frequency of management earnings forecast disclosure in Canada relative to the U.S. Further, although U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during interim periods in which earnings decrease, Canadian managers do not exhibit that tendency. Instead, Canadian managers issue more forecasts when earnings are increasing, and their forecasts are of annual rather than interim earnings. Also consistent with a less litigious environment, Canadian managers issue more precise and longer-term forecasts. These findings hold after controlling for other determinants of management earnings forecast disclosure that might differ between the two countries—firm size, earnings volatility, information asymmetry, growth, capitalization rates, and membership in high-technology and regulated industries.