The article presents the author's response to comments on his paper "Coalition Formation in the APB and FASB: Some Evidence on the Size Principle," by accounting expert James A. Anderson. These comments given by Anderson are partitioned into two major areas and the article provide a few general arguments in defense of the size principle and the particular investigation. In particular, topics including assumptions of the model and methodological issues on observation of coalitions, specifying payoffs and operationalizing tendency seem to capture the major points. The article also provides some remarks regarding the simplistic nature of the size principle versus more developed models of coalition formation based on policy dimensions. Anderson raises a number of points regarding the conditions required to test the predictions of the size principle and the information and threat effects. Some concerns are over the surrogates utilized in the tests. These comments focus on the inability to observe a winning coalition, the nature of a "tendency" toward minimum winning coalitions and the payoffs to participants in the standard-setting process.

The objective of this study is to investigate the applicability of the size principle, which predicts a tendency to minimum winning coalitions, to political processes in accounting standard formulation. Actual winning coalitions in the APB and FASB are found to be significantly larger than minimum winning, leading to a consideration of the assumptions underlying the size principle. Two alternative hypotheses, the "information effect" and the "threat effect," are examined. Evidence regarding these hypotheses is inconclusive due to the inability to define unambiguously an observed winning coalition for the APB.

[A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decision-theoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.]

A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decisiontheoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.

The accounting profession has raised concerns that excessive liability exposure renders audit firms unwilling to provide audit services to risky clients, limiting the prospective clients' ability to raise external capital. We address this concern in a model in which the auditor evaluates the riskiness of the client before accepting the client engagement. We consider a setting in which a shift to stricter legal liability regimes not only increases the expected damage payments from the auditor to investors in case of audit failure, but also increases litigation frictions such as attorneys' fees. The main finding is that the relationship between the strictness of the legal regime and the probability of client rejection is U-shaped. Our model suggests that in environments with moderate legal liability regimes, the client rejection rate is lower than in environments with relatively strong or relatively weak legal regimes.

We consider how auditors assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and plan their audit where a possibly fraudulent auditee anticipates the assessment and planning process. The auditor uses the auditee's (possibly fraudulent) earnings report to revise his beliefs about the likelihood of fraud when formulating an audit plan. We find that as underlying earnings increase, a fraudulent auditee increases reported earnings. In turn, as the auditee's reported earnings increase, the auditor increases audit effort. We also find that the auditee (who knows the auditor will use the report for audit planning) selects reports that increase his own expected payoff, relative to reports he would select if the auditor did not observe the report before finalizing the audit plan. By contrast, the auditor is no better off using the auditee's report for audit planning. Inherent risk, detection risk, and overall audit risk can increase when the auditor uses the auditee's report. Thus, because of the dynamic interaction between the auditor and auditee, procedures that aid in assessing audit risk may not reduce that risk or result in more efficient audits.

Protection of outside investors depends on the detection and punishment of resource diversion by corporate insiders, including managers and controlling shareholders. We focus on the role played in investor protection by self-interested auditors operating in a competitive audit market. In our setting, auditors represent the mechanism whereby detection of diversion occurs. We show that markets with relatively greater auditor penalties for audit failures and greater insider penalties for detected resource diversion have larger total investment levels, a higher proportion of the firm held by outsiders, higher audit resource investment, higher audit fees, and higher expected investment returns.