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Communication and Information Sharing in Teams

The Accounting Review 2015 90(2), 761-784
This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other's effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent's signal is useful as a performance measure for the other agent and for making efficient production choices. The more informative the signal is about agents' efforts, the greater the benefit of the additional performance measure, but there is a cost due to higher information rents. With no dissemination, the downstream agent learns about the upstream agent's productivity state by observing that agent's effort. The upstream agent's rents are lower because he has no incentive to free-ride on the downstream agent, who follows his effort, but there is less information on which to base the payments. The choice between dissemination and no dissemination depends on the informativeness of the signal about agents' efforts.

Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?

The Accounting Review 2015 90(3), 1013-1047
This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures.

Training Auditors to Perform Analytical Procedures Using Metacognitive Skills

The Accounting Review 2015 90(1), 351-369
Although lower-level auditors increasingly carry out mandatory analytical procedures (APs) in audits, they do not perform as well as partners and managers. In order to improve performance in APs by lower-level auditors, we investigated tasks requiring creativity, where training in metacognition—consciously thinking about one's thought process—improves task performance. As a result, we train lower-level auditors to use a sequential thought process comprised of two metacognitive skills: divergent thinking, where they generate explanations for unusual evidence, followed by convergent thinking, where they evaluate explanations generated and eliminate those judged infeasible. To test the efficacy of our training, we conducted an experiment with three conditions: both divergent and convergent thinking, divergent thinking only, and a control. We found that training auditors in only divergent thinking increases both the number and quality of explanations generated for an unusual situation. However, the combination of divergent and convergent thinking training leads to improved explanation generation over divergent thinking alone and, more importantly, leads to a greater likelihood of generating and choosing the correct explanation.

The Consequences of Hiring Lower-Wage Workers in an Incomplete-Contract Environment

The Accounting Review 2015 90(3), 941-966
Firms frequently attempt to increase profits by replacing some existing workers with new lower-wage workers. However, this strategy may be ineffective in an incomplete-contract environment because the new workers may provide lower effort in response to their lower wages, and hiring new lower-wage workers may damage the remaining original workers' reciprocal relationship with the firm. We conduct an experiment to examine this issue and find that when new lower-wage workers become available, firms hire them to replace original higher-wage workers and pay the new workers lower wages. However, these lower wages do not improve firm profit because the decision to hire new lower-wage workers causes both the new and remaining workers to provide lower effort. Moreover, hiring lower-wage workers reduces new workers' payoffs and, thus, decreases social welfare. These unintended consequences suggest that firms should consider both the wage savings and the potential costs when deciding whether to replace some workers with new lower-wage workers. We discuss the implications of our findings for contract design, hiring practices, and managerial accountants.

Product Market Power and Tax Avoidance: Market Leaders, Mimicking Strategies, and Stock Returns

The Accounting Review 2015 90(2), 675-702
Product market power provides firms with comparative advantages through more persistent profitability and insulation from competitive threats. These advantages likely provide firms with the ability to engage in greater tax avoidance. We present evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We also show that firms mimic the tax outcomes of their product market leaders. Among firms with greater product market power and comparatively high cash tax avoidance, we find stock prices to be less informative and that investors require additional compensation for the risks associated with comparatively high cash tax avoidance. Our results survive numerous robustness tests. Overall, our results suggest that industry dynamics, particularly related to a firm's competitive position, play a meaningful role in corporate tax policy.