We examine whether cost structure influences tax-motivated income shifting. We predict and find that U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) with a less rigid cost structure engage in greater levels of tax-motivated income shifting relative to MNCs with a more rigid cost structure. This result is consistent with a less rigid cost structure providing greater flexibility to enable MNCs to take advantage of income-shifting opportunities. Further, we find that this relation is more pronounced when firms face greater costs in adjusting their operations, have less transfer pricing flexibility, and operate in a more uncertain environment. These results suggest that firms with less rigid cost structures possess the strategic operating and accounting flexibility necessary to take advantage of income-shifting opportunities. We provide evidence suggesting that a firm’s cost structure, a fundamental attribute of a firm’s business model, is a distinct and incrementally important determinant of tax-motivated income shifting. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available.

Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enforcement. We find that large audit firm offices improve audit quality following enforcement naming another office within their firm while small firm offices improve following enforcement of local small firm competitors, with these responses varying by enforcement type. To understand potential mechanisms for the geographic deterrence effect, we examine the first occurrence of a revoked PCAOB registration within a market and find that results are stronger if there is greater news coverage or if nonsanctioned firms are in closer proximity to the sanctioned auditor. Supplemental tests reveal that results are stronger when nonsanctioned auditor clients are similar to the sanctioned firm’s clientele. Our findings suggest a positive but varied deterrence effect following PCAOB enforcement.