This study examines the impact of religion on financial reporting. We predict that firms in religious areas are less likely to engage in financial reporting irregularities because prior research links religiosity to reduced acceptance of unethical business practices. Our results suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms generally experience lower incidences of financial reporting irregularities. We also examine whether religiosity influences managers' methods of managing earnings. Although we find a negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals, we find a positive association between religiosity and two measures of real earnings management, suggesting that managers in religious areas prefer real earnings management over accruals manipulation. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by firms headquartered in rural areas and conclude that religious social norms represent a mechanism for reducing costly agency conflicts, particularly when other external monitoring is low. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Companies are adopting executive compensation recoupment (“clawback”) policies to discourage aggressive financial reporting choices. Recent research suggests clawback policies encourage other means of meeting earnings expectations. We suggest that reducing income tax expense is a means of meeting earnings expectations. We find that effective tax rates are lower after clawback adoption due to increased investments in tax planning. We identify three tax planning activities that clawback companies invest in to lower effective tax rates: purchases of auditor-provided tax services, increased connections to other low-tax companies, and use of tax havens. We provide evidence that effective tax rate decreases do not result from use of opportunistic income tax accruals, and that decreases are stronger among companies that adopt robust clawback policies. Additional tests indicate lower tax outcome volatility and longer, more readable tax footnotes following clawback adoption. Our results suggest a positive spillover effect of clawback adoption on corporate tax policy.

This study investigates whether the tax-specific industry expertise of the external audit firm influences its clients' level of tax avoidance. Our results suggest that clients purchasing tax services from their external audit firm engage in greater tax avoidance when their external audit firm is a tax expert. Because the external audit firm potentially influences clients' tax avoidance activities via the provision of tax consulting services and the financial statement audit, we also examine whether the overall expertise (i.e., the combined tax and audit expertise) of the external audit firm is associated with tax avoidance. We find that the external audit firm's overall expertise is generally associated with greater tax avoidance, which suggests that overall experts are able to combine their audit and tax expertise to develop tax strategies that benefit clients from both a tax and financial statement perspective. In combination, our results suggest that the tax-specific industry expertise of the external audit firm plays a significant role in its clients' tax avoidance. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the article.

This study investigates auditor-provided tax services from 2000 to 2002, during which fees paid to auditors for nonaudit services (NAS) were disclosed, but separate disclosure of tax service fees was voluntary. We examine changes in the market for tax NAS in 2002, as Congress debated possible prohibition of these services. Using the Heckman MLE procedure to control for selection bias in tax fee disclosure, we find that a strong pre-2002 positive association between tax fees and higher than expected audit fees weakened significantly in 2002, suggesting that some companies paying high audit fees reduced or terminated auditor-provided tax services in 2002. Our findings also suggest that auditor-provided tax services were reduced among new or short-tenure clients. Controlling for tax complexity, we also find some evidence that early “returns” (i.e., tax rate reductions) to companies from auditorprovided tax services were reduced in 2002. Finally, results of our selection model imply that the decision to voluntarily disclose fees paid to the auditor for tax services is positively associated with tax complexity and auditor tenure, and negatively associated with the proportion of NAS fees to total fees. Overall, our findings imply significant change in auditor-provided tax services prior to 2003, when separate disclosure of auditor-provided tax service fees was mandated.

In this study, we document evidence on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality using the dispersion and sign of both absolute Jones-model abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies for earnings quality. Our study is motivated by calls for “mandatory auditor rotation,” which are based on concerns that longer auditor tenure reduces earnings quality. Multivariate results, controlling for firm age, size, industry growth, cash flows, auditor type (Big N versus non-Big N), industry, and year, generally suggest higher earnings quality with longer auditor tenure. We interpret our results as suggesting that, in the current environment, longer auditor tenure, on average, results in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial performance.

This study examines the tax avoidance behavior of firms prior to the issuance, and following the resolution, of SEC tax comment letters. We find that firms that appear to engage in greater tax avoidance are more likely to receive a tax-related SEC comment letter. We also find that firms receiving a tax-related SEC comment letter, relative to firms receiving a non-tax comment letter, subsequently decrease their tax avoidance behavior consistent with an increase in expected tax costs. Additionally, we document evidence consistent with other firms that do not receive a comment letter reacting to multiple publicly disclosed tax-related comment letters within their industry by increasing their reported GAAP ETR, consistent with an indirect effect of regulatory scrutiny on certain types of tax avoidance.

Product market power provides firms with comparative advantages through more persistent profitability and insulation from competitive threats. These advantages likely provide firms with the ability to engage in greater tax avoidance. We present evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We also show that firms mimic the tax outcomes of their product market leaders. Among firms with greater product market power and comparatively high cash tax avoidance, we find stock prices to be less informative and that investors require additional compensation for the risks associated with comparatively high cash tax avoidance. Our results survive numerous robustness tests. Overall, our results suggest that industry dynamics, particularly related to a firm's competitive position, play a meaningful role in corporate tax policy.