The SEC is moving toward requiring real-time reporting. Proponents have predicted that disclosing a news event immediately after it arises could reduce information aggregation and disclosure bunching. But evidence from the theoretical literature suggests that the effect depends on whether managers can time the underlying required reporting event. Managers, for example, can time regular poison pill adoptions, but have limited ability to time in-play pill adoptions. Thus, I test whether real-time reporting deters disclosure bunching around the disclosures of regular and in-play poison pill adoptions to examine whether managers' ability to time events affects whether real-time reporting deters strategic disclosure. I find that real-time reporting does not deter disclosure bunching for regular poison pills, but does deter it for in-play pills. These results suggest that real-time reporting will reduce disclosure bunching only if managers cannot time the underlying event.

We investigate whether meeting Wall Street’s expectations affects rank-and-file employees’ satisfaction. Controlling for firms’ underlying financial performance, we find that those currently working for firms that meet or marginally beat analysts’ forecasts experience increased job satisfaction. This positive effect is concentrated among employees who are less transient, receive more nonexecutive stock options, or are more unionized. Furthermore, the positive effect exists only when employees do not incur higher costs associated with reaching the threshold because they overwork, suffer from labor law violations, or experience layoffs. Lastly, more senior or highly skilled employees respond more strongly when their employer meets Wall Street’s expectations. These results suggest that the effect of meeting earnings targets on employee satisfaction is significant when employees’ incentives align more with those of their employer or when employees are not unduly pressured. Data Availability: Data are commercially available.

We examine the effects of banking deregulation on bank board policies—specifically, whether deregulation affects the performance and risk exposure measures used in bank CEO turnover decisions. Using the staggered adoption of interstate branching as our setting, we find that bank CEO turnover is more (less) sensitive to stock (accounting) performance after deregulation. We also find that deregulation is associated with a higher sensitivity of bank CEO turnover to the idiosyncratic component of tail risk. Moreover, such changes in turnover policies primarily exist in large banks and federally chartered banks, which are best positioned to exploit growth opportunities, and in banks that expand branch operations after deregulation. Our results indicate an increased emphasis on stock performance and tail risk in turnover decisions when growth opportunities are greater in the deregulated environment. The findings provide evidence that the information used in board decisions varies with features of the competitive environment.