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Does Contract Enforcement Mitigate Holdup?*

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2018 7(2), 245-275
This paper provides novel evidence that stronger contract enforcement mitigates holdup in business investment decisions using stark, externally imposed variation in contract enforcement across Native American reservations. My tests focus on the golf course industry. A high degree of sunk costs and long investment horizons in this industry make it naturally subject to the classical holdup problem. I find that state courts, which provide stronger contract enforcement than do tribal courts, lead to at least 27% more golf courses, with greater effects in areas with greater natural amenities. These findings suggest that courts play an important role in facilitating the oft-discussed contractual solutions to the holdup problem. Received November 13, 2017; editorial decision May 31, 2018 by Editor: Uday Rajan.

Speculative and Informative: Lessons from Market Reactions to Speculation Cues

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2025
Speculative language in corporate disclosures can convey valuable information about firms’ fundamentals. We evaluate this idea by developing a measure for speculative statements based on sentences marked with the “weasel tag” on Wikipedia. In the 16-week test period after filing, greater use of speculative statements in 10-Ks predicts higher and nonreverting abnormal returns, more insider and informed buying, and higher news sentiment. These findings imply that managers’ usage of speculative language in 10-Ks reflects voluntary disclosure of their private information about the positive prospects of events when market implications of the events are uncertain and thus have room for (re)interpretation.