Using granular data on job postings and employee flows, we examine how firms adjust human capital investments during periods of uncertainty brought on by gubernatorial elections. We find that firms reduce job postings in the 6 months leading up to an election, particularly advertisements for more costly to reverse positions (highly skilled, less flexible, or unionized). We also explore the sources of election uncertainty and find stronger effects in elections where public interests more heavily focus on labor issues. Our results are consistent with the real options framework, where firms adopt a “wait and see” approach in response to uncertainty.

We document novel evidence on the spillover effect of a corporate control regulation on local mortgage markets. We find that banks directly targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to rectify their internal control weaknesses reduce mortgage originations following the regulation’s enactment. This causes mortgage credit to be reallocated toward other banks in the same local markets: while competing public banks expand lending to safer borrowers, private banks increase lending toward risky applicants. Consequently, loans originated by private banks in spillover counties report higher default rates.