Traditional concerns about concentration in product markets have centered on the social loss associated with the mispricing that occurs when market power is exercised. This paper focuses on a potentially greater loss from market power—a reduction in cost efficiency brought about by the lack of market discipline in concentrated markets. We employ data from the commercial banking industry, which produces very homogeneous products in multiple markets with differing degrees of market concentration. We find the estimated efficiency cost of concentration to be several times larger than the social loss from mispricing as traditionally measured by the welfare triangle.

The paper is concerned with developing a production theory for the case when some inputs have nonlinear prices because the price depends on endogenous quality. This involves extending the notion of a cost function to the case where nonlinear prices are parameters of costs. After developing the appropriate theory, we apply our results to the case of coal-fired electric power generation where fuel quality depends on sulfur and ash impurities. Environmental regulations induce a negative value on sulfur whereas ash impurities degrade performance and thus reduce production possibilities. A number of empirical results emerge, including significant rates of technological change that are sulfur and ash saving though capital using. This change may explain in part the recent drop in the price of sulfur allowances in the United States.

This paper proposes an explicit test for determining the significance and the timing of slowdowns in economic growth. We examine a large sample of countries and find that a majority—though not all—exhibit a significant structural break in their postwar growth rates. We find that (a) most industrialized countries experienced postwar growth slowdowns in the early 1970s, though (b) the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom did not, and (c) developing countries (and in particular, Latin American countries) tended to experience much more severe slowdowns which, in contrast with the more developed countries, began nearly a decade later.

This study tests for the presence of prejudicial or “noneconomic” discrimination on the part of mortgage lenders by evaluating the performance of home mortgage loans. The approach differs from that of previous studies of loan performance in that it is based on the proposition that noneconomic discrimination should be more pronounced in less competitive lending environments, while statistical discrimination should not. Using a rich set of FHA-insured loan records and measures of local market concentration to proxy the competitive environment, we test for the prediction of better loan performance by minority borrowers relative to white borrowers in more concentrated markets. We argue that this approach substantially reduces the potential for omitted-variable bias that has cast a shadow on previous studies of lending discrimination. Results fail to reject the null hypothesis of no noneconomic discrimination.