Empirical studies of forecasts often fail to reconcile the rational expectations hypothesis with a minimum mean square error objective function. Recent studies, however, have argued that observed bias may be rational in certain advising games, or for objective functions that include publicity or forecasting reputation as additional arguments. This paper analyzes multistep forecasting behavior for individuals forecasting bond yields in the Blue Chip Financial Survey over the 1987–1996 period and uncovers statistically significant evidence supportive of Ehrbeck and Waldmann's rational stubbornness. I find that forecasters rationally place too much weight on their previous forecasts in an attempt to mimic the behavior of more able forecasters (perhaps attempting to fool their clients). Jointly, I also find that this pattern of under-revision is positively correlated with mean square forecasting errors. Rational stubbornness is sensitive to the forecasting horizon as well as bond maturity.

Using confidential firm-level panel data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we examine how the bilateral trade flows of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) and their Canadian affiliates responded to U.S.-Canadian tariff reductions from 1983 to 1992. We find that Canadian affiliate sales to the United States are negatively correlated with Canadian tariffs, but U.S. parent sales to Canadian affiliates have little association with Canadian tariffs. These results contradict the notion that Canadian tariff reductions would lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of Canadian manufacturing. We also find substantial heterogeneity in MNC responses to tariff changes within narrowly defined manufacturing industries. Overall, bilateral trade liberalization is trade-creating, as U.S. MNCs integrated their North American production such that Canadian affiliates increased sales to the United States and reduced domestic sales.

In a privatization competition, private contractors bid against an in-house team to perform a governmental function that is currently performed by the in-house team. The Department of Defense initiated 3,500 privatization competitions from 1978 to 1994, generating estimated annual savings of $1.46 billion. We estimate a reduced-form model of the savings from these competitions that takes into account the premature cancellation of some competitions and the censoring of the in-house bid at current cost. The Department of Defense maintains a list of candidates for future privatization competitions. Using our model, we forecast annual savings of $5.74 billion if privatization competitions were completed for all functions on this list.

The theory of intertemporal choice predicts that the cross-sectional variance of the marginal utility of consumption is equal to its own lag plus a constant and a random component. Using general preference specifications and some assumptions about the nature of the random component, we provide an explicit test of this hypothesis. Our approach circumvents the necessity to identify a pure age profile of the cross-sectional variance of consumption and yields a well-specified statistical test. This test is applied to data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The results are remarkably consistent with the restrictions implied by the theory of intertemporal consumption choices.